

Appendix 7.1

Representative Case for the Use of the SCOMAR System

A Turkish fishing vessel detained in the Black Sea

On 27th May 2011, border policemen within County Inspectorate of Border Police Constanta detected, through SCOMAR system, the AHMET COMOGLU fishing vessel, Turkish flag, which was about 60 sea miles from shore, in the exclusive economic area of Romania.

As the fishing vessel refused to obey the flashing lights, the radio and acoustic stopping signals and continued to sail, another Border Police vessel was deployed, which carried out manoeuvres to stop the fishing vessel. Because the fishing vessel's commander refused to stop in order to undergo the legal verifications, border policemen fired several warning gunshots. As the vessel continued to disobey the warning signs, the police shot the stern of the ship, the floating line level, and propulsion area system. Still the fishing vessel did not stop and entered the exclusive economic area of Bulgaria. The Romanian Border Police, in keeping with the cooperation protocols concluded with the Black Sea littoral states, notified the Bulgarian Border Police and the Turkish Coast Guard Command continued the pursuit. At 1pm, the fishing vessel stopped and the border policemen saw the crewmembers ignite fumigants aboard the Turkish vessel. The Border Police boarded the ship and ascertained that the motor compartment of the vessel was on fire and one crewmember had a superficial wound to the left leg. He received first aid immediately. The sailor whose health was out of danger and the Turkish crew were transferred to the Border Police vessel.

The Romanian Border Police acted and exercised its prerogatives while strictly observing the national and international legal provisions in force.



Case Study Seven - Romania

Source: <http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/>

Video source:

http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=790

Others video sources using SCOMAR system at the Black Sea:

http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=608

http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=827


A Bulgarian fishing vessel detected while illegally fishing turbot in the exclusive economic area of Romania

On 13th April 2011, with the aid of the maritime surveillance and control equipment of SCOMAR, a suspect target was identified, as being a possible stationing fishing vessel approximately 19 miles abeam Mangalia, in the exclusive economic area of Romania.

A ship of Mangalia Naval Group intervened to identify the target and found it was a fishing vessel bearing a Bulgarian flag.

The fishing vessel's crew complied with the radio warnings of the border police and the police boarded the vessel. The fishing vessel's commandant with a crew of 10 Bulgarians admitted he knew he was in the exclusive economic area of Romania and that they were fishing turbot. Border police discovered aboard 11 turbot fishing nets; moreover in the vicinity of the fishing vessel they observed a net, which belonged to the same Bulgarian vessel. The net of approximately 30m was dragged out containing 12 turbot.

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Source: <http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/>

Video source:

http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=767

Appendix 7.2

Phases in the Implementation of SCOMAR System

No.	Company	Title	Aim	Budget
1.	IBM Belgium	SCOMAR feasibility study		194.650,00
2.	Guardia Civil Spain French Maritime Gendarmerie (Associate)	Twinning Institutional Convention – The improvement of Romanian Border Police for SCOMAR implementation (RO/2003/IB-JH-02)	The increase of the capacity of Romanian Border Police personnel to operate with the SCOMAR system through the providence of training, technical assistance and design of the management of technical means (18 months).	869.999,00
3.	SELEX Italy	SCOMAR implementation – Communication infrastructure - Phase 1 (RO/2003/005-551.04.12.05)	Development of the integrated system of surveillance and observation at the Black Sea.	4.097.711,61
4.	ISDEFE Spain	The elaboration of the technical documentation and auction to SCOMAR contract - Phase 2		1.442.135,76
5.	INDRA SISTEMAS S.A. Spain	SCOMAR implementation – radar and optoelectronic equipment – Phase 3	Development, Implementation and functional accomplishment of the system that will ensure the observation, surveillance and control of the Romanian Border	17,999,999.98

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			at the Black Sea. This is in order to ensure a perfect system adapted to Black Sea shore necessities and characteristics. All the activities were conducted in perfect coordination and in common with the Spanish, French and Romanian experts and specialists.	
6.	DAMEN Shipyards Gorinchem – Holland	The acquisition of “Stefan cel Mare” maritime surveillance vessel (Project OPV 6610)	To ensure the maritime surveillance at the Black Sea.	27.500.000,00
7.	Israel Shipyards	The acquisition of MAI 2110 and MAI 2111 maritime patrol vessels (Project SHALDAG MK IV)	To ensure the maritime patrol at the Black Sea.	26.914.000,00
TOTAL				79.018.496,35

Appendix 7.3

Copy of the Romanian Border Police Electronic Press Release Related to the Maritime Surveillance, Patrol and Intervention Vessels

THREE STATE-OF-THE-ART MARITIME VESSELS ENTER THE ENDOWMENT OF THE ROMANIAN BORDER POLICE

Today, 22.09.2010, in Constanta Harbour, in the presence of the minister of administration and interior Mr. Vasile BLAGA, the general inspector of Romanian Border Police, police principal quaestor Mr. Ioan BUDA, and several officials within Phare Payments and Contracting Unit, DAMEN Shipyards Gorinchem - the Netherlands and ISRAEL Shipyard; the ceremony of the baptism and handing over of the flag of the offshore patrol vessel "Stefan cel Mare", built in Damen Shipyard – Galati, took place.

Within the same ceremony, another two patrolling and intervention vessels, MAI 2110 and MAI 2111, which will enter the endowment of the Romanian Border Police, received their flags. These maritime vessels were purchased through two contracts financed from European funds Schengen Facility, RO FSCH 18.1.1 - Offshore Patrol Vessel and RO FSCH 18.1.2. - Patrolling and intervention vessels. This is carried out within RO FSCH 18 project: "Reinforcement of external border control through the increase of naval and land mobility".

Offshore patrol vessel "Stefan cel Mare" MAI 1105 was built by DAMEN Shipyards Gorinchem - the Netherlands, in Galati Shipyard, amounting to 24,750,000 EURO, and it started on 12.01.2009. The vessel is able to navigate annually for at least 4000 hours, it can operate on a sea state 6, perform missions a minimum of 7 days, the radius of action is a minimum of 1,800 nautical miles at cruise speed, it has interoperability capacity with other surveillance, communication, data transmission systems and is part of SCOMAR. The offshore patrol vessel has the capacity to carry out search-rescue activities, as well as prevention and countering pollution at sea and can extinguish fires on the vessels in danger at sea.

Technical characteristics:

- Length: 66 m

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- Breadth: 10 m
- Crew: 19 sailors
- Transport capacity: maximum 100 persons, including crew
- Operation autonomy: 1,800 miles at cruise speed of 17 knots
- Engine type: 2 engines MTU type, type 16V4000M73
- Maximum speed: 21 knots
- Patrol speed: 12 knots

Patrolling vessels MAI 2110 and MAI 2111 were built by Israel Shipyards; the total amount of the contract is 26,914,000 EURO - for 3 vessels - their construction began on 18.02.2009 and has 15.11.2010 as due date. Within the same contract, another similar vessel is due to be delivered 15.11.2010.

The patrolling and intervention vessels will perform specific missions of the Romanian Border Police: intervention, interception, pursuit in the inland maritime waters, territorial sea, contiguous area and exclusive economic area of Romania.

Technical characteristics:

- Length: 26.7 m
- Weight: 60 tons
- Maximum speed: 44 Knots
- Autonomy: 700 nautical miles
- Engines: 2 x MTU 2000
- Crew: 13 sailors

These vessels will have an important role in the surveillance of the E.U. border, future border of Schengen area, having at the same time the necessary capacities to execute long term missions, at long distances from the shore, in the contiguous area and exclusive economic area of Romania and to receive / transmit data and information to the surveillance and control system. They will also be part of the European Patrol Network within the joint European operations organised under FRONTEX aegis - European Agency for Surveillance and Control of E.U. external borders.

The maritime vessels will complete the offshore extension of observation radius of existing surveillance and control system, SCOMAR, realised by the

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Romanian Border Police in a project financed previously through European funds, being one of the most performing maritime border surveillance systems in Europe.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

SCOMAR is an operational surveillance system, based on state-of-the-art technology allowing early detection, pursuit, recognition and identification of vessels carrying out illegal trafficking activities at the Black Sea. The complex integrated system for observation, surveillance and control of traffic at the Black Sea (SCOMAR) main objectives are the observation, surveillance and control of the Romanian border at the Black Sea.

The structure of the Complex System for Observation, Surveillance and Control of Traffic at the Black Sea allows:

Improvement of surveillance process of the state border in the maritime area;

Improvement of navigation security in the operational area of the system;

Decrease of illegal activities in the territorial sea and in the contiguous area;


Rendering continuous surveillance in the covered area;

Creating a database regarding the maritime activity in the sea area;

Decrease the number of patrol vessels, surveillance missions and, thus an important economy of fuel and resources.

SCOMAR is prepared for surveillance and monitoring, permanently (24hours/day, 7days/week), providing a tactical image of the water surface in the maritime territorial area, contiguous area and exclusive economic area (up to 100 nautical miles offshore), of the air activity and the land situation.

In order to achieve this purpose, the proposed system was designed to guarantee early detection of vessels and boats so that they are localized before nearing the coast shore and thus, ensuring the essential reaction time for the Border Police in order to undertake the necessary measures.



Appendix 7.4

SCOMAR System Technical Supply

The SCOMAR physical resources (sub-systems) are:

- 1. Sensors Station Sub-System** that includes Sensors Stations (SS) equipped with radar station and opsonic sensors. It permits the detection, identification and surveillance of the suspected vessels using the functions of the radar and sensors by sending the video images or signals to the Command and Control Centre.
- 2. Operative Intervention Units:**
 - Naval resources: patrol maritime ships (maritime ships project P157, maritime ships project 0111C), port control boats (project R-1120), towing and rescue boats (project 405), and approach and control boats (project SLP5400).
 - The maritime surveillance vessel “"Ștefan cel Mare" (MAI 1105) build by DAMEN Shipyards Gorinchem (Holland) cost 27,500,000 Euros (project OPV 6610; 12.01.2009 – 22.09.2010). This type of ship is able to annually navigate at least 4000 hours, to operate on a six-level sea, to execute missions having a minimum of 7 days, having an action beam of 1,800 marine miles, at the cruise speed, having an inter-operability capacity with other surveillance, communication and data transmissions. It has also the capacity to execute search and rescue activities and to prevent and combat the sea pollution and fires started on the ships in dangerous seas.
 - Vessels represented by maritime patrol vessels. These vessels are involved in specific missions of the Romanian Border Police including intervention, interception and surveillance in the interior maritime waters, territorial sea, contigua area and exclusive Romanian economic area. They have the essential qualities to execute long-term missions, long far away from shore and to receive and transmit data and information to the surveillance and control system. They will complement the extension to the sea of the observation beam of SCOMAR system. Also, these patrol and

intervention vessels are involved in the European Patrol Network in the common European actions organised by FRONTEX.

- Terrestrial resources: cars, special cars and minibuses, ATV motorbikes, thermo-vision car, forensic self-labs.
- Air helicopters from the supply of Aviation Special Units.

3. Communication Sub-System that permits the data exchange (images, voice and data transmission) in real time between the Sensor Station Sub-system and Command and Control Centre. Also, these communication links are available for superior Command and Control Centres and other external agencies and organisations. This sub-system includes:

- Data: PHD and SDH microwaves radio equipment, multiprotocol ATM switches, modern VHF radio on ships, CDMA2000 and 65m 3G on ships.
- Voice: TETRA network of the Ministry of Administration and Interior, fixed phone private network of the Ministry of Administration and Interior, fixed phone public network, VHF and HF encrypted communications through mobile radiophones, CDMA2000/GSM mobile phone, SATCOM, IRIDIUM.

4. Command and Control Centre (CCC) that centralises and analyses all the information provided by the Sensor Station Sub-system and other inter-connected systems. It includes: equipment and software applications including local network LAN; applications, databases, and video storing servers; operation point with multi-monitor system; video-wall; video-conferences subsystem; VHF/HF radio and TETRA terminals; CDMA2000/GSM mobile phone.

Appendix 7.5

Copy of the Romanian Border Police Electronic Release on SCOMAR and Bilateral Projects and Partnerships

International Mission on the Black Sea

Romanian Border Police officers participated in an international search and rescue drill on the Black Sea, in the territorial waters of the Republic of Turkey. During the period 05th Sept to 08th Sept 2011, a Romanian Border Police delegation participated, with Stefan cel Mare Border Police maritime surveillance O.P.V. (Offshore Patrol Vessel) vessel, in Sea Search and Rescue Drill, activity carried out in the territorial waters of the Republic of Turkey. The activity was carried out in accordance to the provisions of Romanian (General Inspectorate of Border Police) - Turkish (Coast Guard) Implementation Plan for 2011. The objective was to exchange good practice in the maritime field and the development of interoperability between Romanian Border Police and Turkish Coast Guard, as a support for the coordination of operational units and for taking the effective measures for countering illegal activities in the responsibility area, and also for searching and rescuing on the sea. In the joint drill, the vessel belonging to Romanian Border Police and also vessels belonging to the Turkish Coast Guard were involved. During the drill, the vessel belonging to Romanian Border Police had to intercept and question a suspicious vessel, involved in illegal activities and acted in order to inspect this suspicious vessel with the help of the collision and control group. Using the communication systems, the MAI 1105 vessel had to give information on the activities carried out and fulfil the existing tasks for search and rescue on the sea. Participation in this activity was a new opportunity for strengthening the bilateral relations with the Turkish authorities and the Romanian Border Police.



Appendix 7.6

SCOMAR and Frontex Missions

Active Presence of Romanian Border Police Vessels within Frontex Missions

Romanian Border Police will participate within "E.P.N. POSEIDON Sea 2011" Joint Operation - organized by FRONTEX European Agency in the maritime area of Greece - with the second patrol and intervention vessel - C.P.B. Shaldag type. Also, on 03rd August 2011, the patrol and intervention Romanian Border Police Vessel - C.P.B. Shaldag type, will return to Romania with the entire crew, after successfully participating in "E.P.N. POSEIDON Sea 2011" Joint Operation - organized by FRONTEX European Agency in the Mediterranean Sea, in Lesvos island area, Greece.

- In August, at the sea border between Greece and Turkey, there will be a new phase of "E.P.N. POSEIDON Sea 2011" Joint Operation, organized at the external sea borders of European Union under the management of FRONTEX, within E.P.N. (European Patrol Network) project, mission in which Romanian Border Police is going to participate, in accordance with Romania's commitment as a Member State. The, Romanian Border Police will participate in this operation, from 01st August to 31st August 2011, with a patrol and intervention vessel - P157 / C.P.V. type and its crew of 15 Border Police officers, in order to individually patrol, explore, search and rescue, as other European Member States involved in this mission, at the Mediterranean Sea. Also, within the same joint operation, Romanian Border Police will deploy an officer within the International Coordination Centre - I.C.C. from Piraeus, in order to permanently ensure the connection between the deployed Romanian Border Police vessel in Greece and Operational Coordination Centre within General Inspectorate of Romanian Border Police as well as the representatives of Sea Borders Sectors within FRONTEX Agency.

Taking common measures in regards to counter the illegal migration phenomenon at the sea borders of the European area, increasing the operative exchange of data and information between law enforcement of these countries and an effective experience exchange between European


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Border Police officers is going to be taken into consideration. The main objective of "E.P.N. POSEIDON Sea 2011" Joint Operation is to counter the illegal migration phenomenon at the external borders of E.U.

- From 01st July to 31st July 2011, a patrol and intervention vessel - C.P.B. Shaldag type - belonging to Romanian Border Police, and its crew of 15 Border Police officers, conducted specific activities at the external sea border of E.U. within the same joint operation. During this period, the vessel was involved in 20 patrol missions with a total of 155 patrolling hours and 2 search and rescue missions.
- In order to reach the objectives, Romanian Border Police officers cooperated with the Greek Coast Guard and the Finish one.

The joint operation was fully financed by FRONTEX Agency.

This activity is a continuation of the operations organized by FRONTEX Agency for countering illegal migration, to which Romanian Border Police significantly contributed with regard to technical means, number, profiles and professionalism of the deployed officers. Appreciation has come from the Greek authorities and FRONTEX Agency.



Source: <http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/>

Video source:

http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=805

Video source:

http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=826

Other videos sources on SCOMAR in international exercises:

http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=533

Appendix 7.7

Copy of the Romanian Border Police Electronic Press Release on SCOMAR and its International Mission on the Black Sea

International Mission on the Black Sea

Romanian Border Police (RBP) participates in an international operation for preventing and countering illegal migration.

In the period 05th July to 09th July 2011, Romanian Border Police flagship "Stefan cel Mare" (Offshore Patrol Vessel), participated in the international operation Black Sea Hawk 2011, which took place in Novorossiysk - The Russian Federation. The activity was performed in agreement with the Memorandum signed by the Heads of the Border/Coast Guards of the Black Sea Littoral States within the 11th Annual Meeting, which took place in Soci in the period 19th October to 22nd October 2010. It aims to improve the information exchange and the interoperability with the Border/Coast Guard of the Black Sea Littoral States and to support the coordination of the operational unit and the adoption of effective measures to counter illegal activities in the area. Vessels of the Border/Coast Guards and from five States (the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Turkey and Romania) participated in the joint operation. Within the operation, the RBP vessel had to intercept, stop and inspect, with the aid of the team for boarding and control, a suspect ship involved in illegal migration activities. After carrying out this operation, the suspect ship was escorted to the harbour and the RBP vessel crew gave an update on the activities by using the communications system on board. At the same time, Romanian officers within the International Coordination Centre communicated with the other Border/Coast Guards, belonging to the States participating in the operation, through the integrated system, so as to fulfil all the operation phases. Participating in this operation represents an opportunity to strengthen the relations with the authorities and organisations of other countries involved in the fight against illegal migration, and aims to ensure operative exchange of data and information.



8

Tutoring Programme for Minors *Servicio de Agentes Tutores* POLICÍA MUNICIPAL DE MADRID, SPAIN

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Acknowledgements

We acknowledge the positive support for the COMPOSITE research project provided by the police force of Policía Municipal de Madrid (the local police force of the city of Madrid, Spain). We thank the individual police officers and other personnel who participated in the interviews and provided the data for the writing of this report. Our sincere thanks go to Chief Emilio Monteagudo and to Inspector Óskar de Santos for their invaluable support regarding this deliverable. Particularly, Mr. de Santos's knowledge about the selected best practice has been very important in order to finish this report.

Introduction

This report aims to present the analysis of a best practice project within the Policía Municipal de Madrid (the local police of the city of Madrid) in Spain. In particular, the tutoring program for minors is described and analysed. Not only has this been an awarded initiative by UNICEF (October 2010) but it has also proved an innovative project that has been transferred and adapted to other (mostly local) police forces, chiefly within the Autonomous Community of Madrid. In this respect, we believe this case is of genuine interest and provides insights that others could find helpful.

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In order to write this report, a lot of documentation was reviewed, coming from two different types of sources: the organisation itself (internal documents and presentations were studied) and several newspapers. This is a programme with a high impact on the media, not only because of the UNICEF award but, also because it has a lot of political support, directly from the Mayor himself, who takes any opportunity to speak about it.

Several interviews were also conducted. In particular, nine semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted in the Policía Municipal de Madrid headquarters during the month of November 2011. All of them were very relevant and the sample was well chosen. Thus, one interview was conducted with the “father” of the programme (that is, the one who had the idea, obtained political and police support and started to implement it back in 2001), four were with the Heads of the programme in different moments in time, and two were with tutors. These eight interviewees were police officers within the police force and had different levels of experience regarding the programme. The last in-depth interview was conducted with one of the police partners regarding the tutoring programme: the Minor Ombudsman. All the interviews lasted between one hour and a half and two hours and a half. The interviewer was not allowed to record them, but they were well documented.

The Tutoring Programme for Minors

Background

The tutoring programme for minors (“Servicio de Agentes Tutores”) was the idea of a police officer, Mr. Óskar de Santos, who currently is the head of the Planning and Coordination Section. He was studying for a competitive exam in order to gain promotion and had to prepare a project to be evaluated and graded. He was particularly aware of the difficult issues with minors and the difficulties for the Policía Municipal de Madrid to address them since they did not have a specialized unit. Also, he knew that the performance of the Minors Group (GRUME – Grupo del Menor in Spanish) within the National Police Force could be improved.

Mr. de Santos detected there was a need for a particular service addressed to minors, that could take advantage of the territorial structure of the police force (the districts), and could approach the problems related to minors from a specialized and global point of view. He therefore started to design a new

Tutoring Programme for Minors

service focused on the management of minors' issues from a preventive point of view, although reactive actions were also considered. He passed his competitive exam and a few days later the town Councillor responsible for security called him. The Councillor had particularly liked the project and wanted to implement it. That was the beginning of the programme.

During 2001, Mr. de Santos's project was completed and refined. It was decided that the programme would focus on the education community. Doing that would allow the preventive nature of the new service to be made clearer. In April 2002, a new unit, the "Servicio de Agentes Tutores", was officially set up. It had (and still has) the following principles (Fernández Ruiz, 2011 & 2005):

- Specialised intervention: specific dedication
- Proactivity: getting ahead of risk situations
- Proximity: decentralized service which is in continuous touch with its "clients"
- Effectiveness and efficiency: autonomy in order to give more efficient solutions to the minors' problems.
- Coordination with other social actors focused on minor issues (social, education, and health services) and with other police forces.

The responsibilities of the police officers (of the tutors) fall within two areas:

- School: for example, issues such as school absenteeism, bullying, alcohol/drugs, and illegal possession of arms/dangerous tools, mistreatment, or control of illegal nurseries.
- Out of School: for example, interventions related to minors who are in a risk situation or abandoned, the prevention and eradication of children's begging, inspections of popular businesses among minors, the control of drugs and alcohol consumption in public spaces, the finding of minors that have run away from home or from children's centres, girls' prostitution, and the labour exploitation of children.

As highlighted, the tutoring programme allows for two types of police actions: preventive and reactive. The former include talks at schools, inspections, or monitoring of cases, while the latter relate to the interventions that are needed in the presence of criminal and administrative infractions (interventions as a

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judicial police force). Despite this statement, the program aims to be more preventive than reactive. In fact, according to our interviewees, what gives value to this service is, precisely, the preventive perspective. Prevention is what makes this an innovative and, more important, a useful initiative.

Resources and Capabilities

Generally speaking, two kinds of resources have been identified as key by our interviewees: human and material resources.

Regarding *human resources*, the first group of tutors was directly chosen (and later coordinated) by Mr de Santos after a workshop and a test conducted in March 2002. Around 50 people applied and 30 were finally accepted. The profile was not homogeneous. As a matter of fact, it never has been. After almost 10 years, there are a lot of differences among the police officers that work for this programme in terms of education, age, police experience, or tenure. Probably, the only common feature they share is their willingness to work with children.

Nowadays, there are 177 tutors distributed in 22 districts working on two shifts of morning and afternoon (on average, there are 4-6 tutors on each shift). There are not any tutors during the night or weekends. The coordination of these police officers has changed over time. At the beginning, Mr de Santos informally coordinated the tutors from the district of Tetuán, where he used to work. In 2004, a formal Coordination Unit, managed by Óskar de Santos was set up and four police officers joined it, two for the morning shift and two for the afternoon shift. This change, which marked the beginning of the consolidation of the programme, was important since the number of police officers participating in it had almost doubled (De Santos, 2007). It had gone from 36 in 2003 to 67 in 2004 and there was a need to start having common guidelines and sharing procedures.

The programme grew and, in 2006, a Service Charter for the Minor was approved by the Madrid City Council. The new service charter gave rise to new responsibilities and 25 police officers became new tutors. As a result, there was a need to increase the staff in the Coordination Unit and four more people joined each of the shifts with a police officer becoming a member of the Coordination Unit to assist Mr. de Santos.

Tutoring Programme for Minors

In 2010, the whole Coordination Unit was transformed into a judicial police unit. Mr. Javier Fernández Ruiz coordinated this unit. But, since the tutoring program was a preventive program, having a judicial police unit in charge of the coordination of the tutors did not make much sense. That is why, in September 2011, taking advantage of an organisational restructuration process undertaken by the Policía Municipal de Madrid, a new Prevention and Coexistence Unit was created. This new section is in charge of coordinating the social and preventive aspects of the tutors' work⁵⁰. Simultaneously, all the issues related to criminal and administrative offences are now in the new Central Investigations Unit's hands. In sum, it can be said that the coordination of the programme has split into two different units.

Regarding the selection process, police officers that join the service do so on a voluntary basis. As explained, the 30 first tutors were selected by Óskar de Santos among a pool of more than 50 volunteers. But after this, police officers interested in the programme have applied to join it. Also, sometimes, command leaders have proposed police officers to become tutors due to their special awareness of children's issues.

Finally, with reference to human resources, something has to be said on the subject of training. Due to the high heterogeneity among the police officers, a basic workshop on police work with minors was designed with the help of external agencies, such as the Minor Ombudsman, Social Services, or the Minor Public Prosecutors' Office. This compulsory workshop, which has been updated over time, lasts for two weeks and it constitutes the basic training any tutor has to have before starting to work for the programme. Other than that, there are several specialized seminars that are extra but there is no obligation to participate in them. In this respect, a tutor gets more or less training depending on his/her willingness to learn.

Material resources are also very important for the correct implementation of this programme although, according to our interviewees, they are somewhat poor. In this respect, generally speaking, the material resources the tutors have are the material resources of the force. However, each district has a separate office for them (and for the Citizen Care Office) as well as a computer that is not shared. Also, one part of the Intranet is exclusively accessible to them.

⁵⁰But not only that. Minors are only one of the issues that are addressed by this unit.

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More important (because it makes a difference regarding the rest of the police force) is the fact that they can work in plain clothes. Also, in each district, they are issued with a cell phone and a PDA and a covered up car. However, these resources are shared with the Citizen Care Office, and may be inadequate at times to carry out all the necessary tasks, particularly when there is a need for different individuals to go from one place to another in a short period of time to address different situations.

Technically, no extra *financial resources* were assigned to the programme because it started to work with police officers that were already in the force. This has always been the case. Tutors have always come from the Policía Municipal de Madrid and no additional money has been needed to hire new police officers. Also, despite being a specialized service, police officers are not paid extra. Finally, the covered up car and the few extra material resources that the tutors use have been bought with the existing budget.

External Stakeholders/Partners

As outlined, the tutoring programme for minors has a very important preventive component. For most of our interviewees, prevention is what really matters when dealing with children. Particularly in this field, police forces are not alone. In fact, there are several institutions that have been working for children from different perspectives. As one of our interviewees stated:

'...we are successful because we are part of a network that addresses minors' problems from a global point of view and taking into account the expertise of different types of organisations. Our work only makes sense within this network'.

There are several partners in this network. Some of the more relevant are:

- **Schools:** Despite the surprised reactions after the first contacts by the tutors (schools did not understand what the role of the tutors really was) schools have become a chief supporter of the programme, specifically public schools. The relationship works very well. On the one hand, schools were overwhelmed by taking care of problematic issues that, often, they did not know how to address. In this respect, tutors are a very valuable and useful resource. On the other hand, schools have a lot of

information about the children; for that reason, they can identify risk situations faster and easier than police officers themselves.

- **Other Police Forces:** Frequently, children live in one town but study in the city of Madrid. Thus, it is not unusual to have to interact with other local police forces in order to get information about a minor and be able to solve his/her problem. Also, until a few months ago, when a minor was caught regarding a criminal offence, they had to be taken to a National Police Force station so as to investigate the case⁵¹. As a result, cooperation with this police force has always been relevant although the National Police Force does not have a preventive perspective when they work with minors⁵².
- **Social Services:** Joint work is particularly needed with the district's social services. In this respect, it is social services that lead the preventive work with minors in the district. They are the ones that call the meetings with the rest of the organisations. However, work with social services has not always been easy. The beginnings were pretty rough since social services saw police officers as intruders. Also, both institutions had a different view about how to address social problems. This gave rise to several conflicts. Currently, cooperation has improved a lot, although some tensions remain particularly concerning the limits of social and police work⁵³.
- **Families and Mothers and Fathers Associations (AMPA – Asociaciones de Madres y Padres in Spanish).** Along with schools, families also demand the presence of tutors. AMPA is particularly interested in preventive work and therefore in talks or similar projects, such as 'Safe Way to School' (Camino Escolar Seguro). Police officers need families and Mothers and Fathers Associations as well. They are a significant source of information but, more importantly, they are a key ally when specific situations involving minors have to be addressed although the contrary may also be true: parents may hinder both preventive and reactive police work with the child.

⁵¹ An agreement between the Policía Municipal de Madrid and the Spanish Ministry of the Interior (in charge of the National Police Force) has recently been signed. It allows the Madrid police force to also investigate cases related to minors.

⁵² The National Police Force's Minors Group (GRUME – Grupo del Menor in Spanish) is a judicial police group focused on minors. Therefore, they have a reactive point of view.

⁵³ One of the police officers provided the following interesting example: "it is not always clear when one has to stop approaching abuse as a social problem and start tackling it as a criminal offence".

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- **The Minor Public Prosecutor's Office:** Obviously, the Public Prosecutor's Office has also a lot to say when it comes to minors' issues. Many conflicts end up in the Public Prosecutor's hands. Therefore, communication between him/her and the Policía Municipal de Madrid is essential. Coordination, and having a similar view on the problems, is important too. Otherwise the police might feel they are working for nothing⁵⁴.
- **Other Agencies:** Several other organisations are part of the network, which deals with minors. For example, the Minors Ombudsman (who, in fact, proposed the Policía Municipal de Madrid for the UNICEF award), judges, civic associations, or organisations from both the Madrid City Council (such as the Social SAMUR, which takes care of social emergencies) and the Autonomous Community of Madrid (such as the Anti-Drug Agency).

Enablers and Barriers

There are several aspects that have enabled the work of the tutors and therefore the success of the tutoring program for minors.

- **Voluntary Work:** This is a very special programme because working with children is not always easy. Often, police officers have to address difficult issues, such as girls' prostitution, abuse or homicides. Volunteers are very motivated police officers who might feel stronger in the presence of these tough situations. Actually, as stated by our respondents, staff turnover is very low. Over the years, only a few police officers have left the programme. Volunteerism is also relevant in terms of commitment. As already explained, tutors are not paid extra for this specialised service while other police forces with a minors programme, such as the National Police Force or the Civil Guard, recompense their officers. Additionally, despite the shifts, risk situations can take place at any time and, on several occasions tutors give their personal phone

⁵⁴ That was the case when the police focused on eradicating Romanian children's begging. For a long period of time, despite the fact that they were arresting the same children twice or three times a week, the minor public prosecutor did not think custody had to be withdrawn. When he realized it was important to have a shared strategy and parents started to lose custody of children, within a few months, Romanian minors were no longer found begging on the streets.

numbers to schools and families. In sum, volunteerism allows for a higher level of motivation and commitment.

- **Autonomy:** Tutors are very independent when it comes to planning and organising their tasks and taking decisions. This gives them a lot of flexibility to address the different problems related to minors and, better, it allows them to act faster, which is very important in the specific situations they may encounter. Although sometimes tutors feel isolated, autonomy is one of the attributes of their work they value the most.
- **External Networks:** As has already been explained, due to the nature of their tasks, tutors need to work in cooperation with other partners that also address minors' issues. Children's problems cannot only be approached from a police perspective. Education, health, and family are also important when helping a minor from the preventive point of view. Understanding this has helped the Policía Municipal de Madrid to overcome some of the initial resistance from other partners (see below) and to gain a global and more integrated perspective of the field, which has given rise to more efficient work with minors. In sum, combining resources, knowledge and experience have proved useful to offer a better service.
- **Leadership:** All the interviewees referred to the leadership of Mr. Óskar de Santos. All of them recognized he was an '*artist*' transforming a written idea into a real project. For a number of years they felt Mr. de Santos '*was the programme*'. One of the respondents stated:
'...slowly, the program started to consolidate with a formalised Coordination Unit and the Minor Service Charter but, still, Óskar (Mr. de Santos) was behind it all'.

His motivation and commitment has, without a doubt, set an example for the rest of the tutors. He was promoted in 2010 and left the programme. Yet, he is required several times for advice. Also, most of the speeches regarding the programme are still prepared and delivered by him, particularly in the framework of international events.

Case Study Eight - Spain

At the same time, the following issues have been identified as important *barriers* to overcome:

- ***Unclear Hierarchy:*** Tutors have always had a double dependency. From a functional point of view, they have had to report to the Coordination Unit; whilst from an organisational perspective, they belong to the district. In addition the last structural change implemented in September 2011 has divided the Coordination Unit into a Prevention and Coexistence Unit and a Central Intelligence Unit, introducing a third head to report to. This situation has been a source of uncertainty and conflict, particularly because tutors are supposed to exclusively work for the programme. However, and in spite of the top instructions, as they also belong to the district, their command leaders might use them for other tasks. Thus, tutors have theoretical but not real exclusivity.
- ***Lack of Internal Support and Understanding:*** Regardless of the high level of support the programme has received, both from politicians and the heads of the police force, tutors are not popular among their colleagues and command leaders. Their autonomy and the fact that they can work in plain clothes have given rise to the feeling that these police officers do not work hard. Also, still, for many people, preventive work is not real police work. Many command leaders are also uncertain about their responsibilities toward tutors, as although they are a valuable resource it is difficult to manage them as expected or needed.
- ***Difficult Beginnings with External Partners:*** It has already been mentioned that no matter how committed the first group of tutors were with the programme, contact with external partners was difficult, particularly with those who were used to working with minors from a social point of view. Since there was an explicit need to work with them in order to be really successful, social services and other agencies resilience to the new programme was a key barrier to overcome. It can now be said that external agencies trust the tutors more than they used to, which makes their work easier, but still stronger and bilateral relationships are needed as well as improved cooperation.

Achievements

It is easier to assess the achievements from a qualitative point of view than from a quantitative perspective, which would involve analysing if crime ratios have

decreased as a consequence of the tutors' work. Whilst preventive work is very difficult to measure the work carried out with children each day will bear fruit in the future.

'...how can I know what the real impact of my talk has been on the students?'
(Tutor)

This said, there are some indicators regarding the number and type of interventions that can be taken into account in order to value the results of the programme (see Table 8.1). They show that tutors' activity has increased throughout the years; the total number of interventions has more than doubled in five years. However, these numbers do not tell much about the real impact of the programme. Also, the observed patterns are not clear and cause-effect relationships are not easy to identify. For example, if the indicator 'offences by minors between 14 and 18' is used, is that evaluation good or bad? Do more offences mean that the programme is not performing well because minors commit more crimes or does it mean tutors have been able to solve more cases? Table 1 does not give an answer to this kind of question and therefore does not shed light on real achievements and impacts.

Interviewees confirmed that, currently, there is not a useful assessment/evaluation tool. However, all of them thought that, generally speaking, the programme was performing really well. They gave two reasons for this positive evaluation. First, they referred to schools' satisfaction. They felt that schools are very happy with tutors and with the programme. Satisfaction leads to a higher demand, which means that, year on year, the number of interventions increases. This makes sense. However, paradoxically, this perspective is not totally corroborated by the numbers shown in Table 8.1 (see last indicator). In this respect, from a more objective point of view, it could be said that schools' satisfaction is not that high. The interviewees also referred to the inclusion of the tutoring programme in the election manifestos of all the political parties that took part in the local elections in May 2011. For them, this was a sign that the programme is important and it is because it is working well and, therefore, making a difference that it had been recognised in this way.

Table 8.1 Indicators Regarding Number and Type of Interventions 2005-2011

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011 ⁵⁵
Number of interventions	24.590	39.001	51.941	57.622	64.535	73.485	68.849
Number of interventions regarding drugs possession and consumption	300	436	555	479	636	990	853
Number of businesses reported by selling alcohol to minors	41	44	39	26	53	76	35
Number of weapons seizures	28	81	57	62	44	65	85
Number of offences by minors under 14	77	107	127	164	83	28	24
Number of offences by minors between 14 and 18	378	458	394	418	311	424	514
Number of minors taken to children's shelters	259	602	541	788	710	364	388
Detected cases of absenteeism	569	503	508	521	480	348	295
Number of talks in schools	233	242	316	365	355	360	563
Schools' satisfaction with the programme	5,4	5,5	5,4	5,7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Source: Policía Municipal de Madrid (2009, 2010 and 2011)

⁵⁵From January to October 2011.

Future Developments

Nobody in the Policía Municipal de Madrid thinks the programme will be cancelled. Furthermore, as stated, it is getting more and more political support. As an example the Mayor of Madrid, Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón, in June 2011, transferred 85 police officers that were escorting politicians to the Citizen Care Offices and the tutoring programme.

The high-ranking senior officers within the Policía Municipal de Madrid also sponsor the programme. So, despite some reticence within the force, the hierarchy continue to work towards its consolidation, even though in terms of the total amount of human resources involved as the tutoring programme develops is not yet clear.

Probably, more important than the long-term development of the programme is the impact the last structural change, that occurred a couple of months ago, is going to have. Although it was proposed in order to put more emphasis on the preventive part of the programme, tutors do not seem happy with it. In the first place, they argue that they were never consulted about the change but, also, they are doubtful about how useful the change is going to be regarding their daily work. The new structure means a third head to report to and this can cause problems. The managing police officers that work in the new units are more positive about the change. The real impact remains to be seen.

Conclusion

This report has aimed to describe and analyse the Servicio de Agentes Tutores of the Policía Municipal de Madrid, a programme that can be considered a best practice. It is probably the philosophy and operation of the programme, more than its results, which make it a good practice. The emphasis on prevention and the global consideration of minors' issues have proved invaluable, and explicit recognition from different agencies, such as politicians or UNICEF, has highlighted this. The fact that many local police forces, in Spain but also abroad, have required the Policía Municipal de Madrid to advise them in the implementation of similar projects also shows the leadership of the Madrid police force in this field and, consequently, its innovative nature. This does not mean that the programme is perfect, far from it; there are several challenges that need to be addressed. These include the status of tutors and the value of their work both internally and externally, and the management and coordination of the programme.

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9

Project Gulf

Fighting Organised Crime through Effective Partnership and Disruption Strategies

SALFORD DIVISION, GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE,
THE UNITED KINGDOM

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Acknowledgements

This case was compiled through consideration of desk research of published information and other sources, and through follow up visits to conduct interviews and hold discussions with key individuals. We thank Salford City Council, Salford Community Safety Partnership and Salford and Oldham Divisions of Greater Manchester Police for their kind support for the writing of this case study. In particular, we gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Mr Don Brown (Assistant Director of Environment and Community Safety, Salford City Council), Mr Kevin Mulligan (Chief Superintendent, Salford Division), Mr Tim Forber (Chief Superintendent, Oldham Division) and Mr Gary Simpson, (Superintendent, Oldham Division).

Organised Crime Policy in England and Wales

Organised crime is a serious issue in the United Kingdom (Home Office, 2009). The overall cost to the United Kingdom economy is estimated to be between £20 billion to £40 billion a year (Home Office, 2004). It can also be considered to

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pose significant threats to national security (Home Office, 2009). In 2009, it was estimated that approximately 2,800 organised crime groups were operating across England and Wales (HMIC, 2009). Organised crime group (OCG) operations include drug and people trafficking, fraud (VAT and excise), counterfeiting, supply of illegal firearms, computer-enabled crime, metal theft, the illegal trade of wildlife and waste trafficking. Activities are underpinned by highly developed money laundering operations, which create substantial profit from the proceeds of crime for organised crime groups. Despite the fact that the public are generally unaware of the activities and impacts, individuals, communities, businesses and the economy feel the effects of organised crime on a daily basis. In particular, organised crime group operations create a downward spiral of fear, intimidation and economic decline, which tend to harm vulnerable and deprived communities.

In 2004, the then Labour Government launched a programme of research to review policing organisational structure and methods for tackling organised crime (Home Office, 2004). The strategy proposed was to adopt a *harm reduction approach*. The main proposals were to reduce profit opportunities for criminal enterprises through disruption of their businesses and markets and increase levels of personal risk for key criminals through targeted prosecution activity (Home Office, 2004). This was a significant shift in the Government's logic on policing (Innes and Sheptycki, 2004). *Intelligence-led policing*⁵⁶ methods had been found to be more effective than traditional approaches in terms of arrests, convictions and crime reduction (Maguire and John, 1995, cited in Maguire, 2000). The harm reduction approach proposed that intelligence-led methods were used and aimed to disrupt organised crime activities through police strategies and tactics designed to prevent organised crime from occurring or to reduce its impact where it did occur. This new approach was labelled a '*disruption-directed mode*' (Innes and Sheptycki, 2004). Disruption, whether viewed as preventative (Levi, 2008) or as a strategy of intervention (Innes and Sheptycki, 2004), is essentially based on the idea that law enforcement agencies

⁵⁶The Audit Commission report (Audit Commission, 1993 cited in Maguire, 2000), to 'target the criminal, not just the crime', contributed to the police believing the way forward was in 'proactive' or 'intelligence-led' policing (Maguire, 2000). Intelligence-led policing has since evolved into a management philosophy where intelligence is acquired through the extensive use of confidential informants, offender interviews, surveillance of suspects, and exchanges of data and information from community and other sources (Maguire, 2000), subjected to analysis, problems identified, risks managed and subsequent operations targeted to ensure effective deployment of resources (Ratcliffe, 2008).

can engage in actions that make it difficult for individuals participating in a criminal network or market to continue with their illegal activities.

In 2009, despite substantial investment in a new Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), created to achieve better generation, dissemination and use of intelligence material, it was considered that the harm reduction approach and proposed strategies were not fully effective (HMIC, 2009). The Government responded with a comprehensive review and an innovative strategy to fight serious and organised crime. Whilst disruption tools such as criminal proceedings involving prosecution remained, new tools in the form of non-criminal proceedings, such as administrative, regulatory or tax approaches to disrupt the activities of those involved in serious and organised crime, were added. This was to be achieved through collaboration of key local government agencies, the police and international partners (Home Office, 2009).

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In early 2006, a new Chief Superintendent was appointed in Salford Division⁵⁷, Greater Manchester Police. His initial assessment suggested that organised crime groups (OCGs) in Salford were causing significant issues. The police response, at that time, was largely reactive and high levels of resources were dedicated to deal with the outcomes of organised crime group activities. For example, in March 2006, two young males who had attempted to kill members of a Salford OCG, on a Sunday afternoon in a pub, were themselves killed⁵⁸. It was later discovered that the two victims were members of a Manchester OCG, and had been commissioned by another Salford OCG; to carry out the original attempted killings. In response to this situation *Operation Thermopylae* was introduced to map and target members of OCGs in Salford. While initially successful, the Chief Superintendent felt that the impact on OCGs and their activities was not as significant as originally hoped. This was as a result of the limitations of a traditional policing methodology, the use of a one-dimensional source of intelligence⁵⁹ and due to policy and performance incompatibility, the reluctance

⁵⁷Salford Division is a Basic Command Unit (BCU). Chief Superintendents are fully responsible for the activities of a BCU.

⁵⁸The investigation of a single murder costs an estimated £1.6 million to the agencies involved.

⁵⁹A one-dimensional source of intelligence is considered as that available to the Police from their own activities and sources rather than a multi-dimensional approach which would include intelligence available from external agencies.

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of other agencies to get involved and contribute to Operation Thermopylae. Following the new Government policy issued in 2009, (see above), in February 2010, the Home Office invited Salford Community Safety Partnership⁶⁰ (CSP) to be one of thirteen national pilots to use the new tools and techniques to tackle organised crime. The reasons for this invitation were: the recognised strength of operations and competence of Salford CSP, it was felt that the knowledge and expertise of Operation Thermopylae could be built upon and the high need to tackle OCG activity in Salford. In line with the Government's approach and strategy to tackle organised crime through increased collaboration, harm reduction, enforcement activities and disruption tactics; Salford CSP was tasked with disrupting criminals' wider operations and lifestyles. The aim of the partnership was to attack the businesses central to the operations of OCG members. For the first time, the administrative powers of key agencies were to be invoked in a co-ordinated way to create a hostile environment for serious organised crime (Salford City Council, 2011). Over thirty agencies became partners in Project Gulf⁶¹. Whilst monies have been recovered through the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA)⁶² and retained in a financial pool within Salford Division, (with a percentage distributed to relevant participating agencies), no additional funding was provided by the Government and each partner had to fund the activities from existing budgets and funding streams.

One of the common misconceptions held by the partner agencies in the early days of Project Gulf was that legislation made it difficult to share sensitive personal data. This was further compounded by the belief that partner agencies could not be trusted with sensitive information (Salford City Council, 2011). Initial meetings were held to enable partners to establish roles and relationships, to understand the powers and policies to be operated under and how each partner could contribute, without jeopardising their operational independence or incurring risk. A *'Partnership Intervention Toolkit'*⁶³ was developed to provide a clear understanding of the regulatory powers of each agency and how these could be used for tactical interventions against OCGs (Salford CSP, 2010). Clear

⁶⁰Salford Community Safety Partnership (CSP) is a multiagency group of local partners (see Appendix 9.1).

⁶¹See Appendix 9.2 for details of the partners involved in Project Gulf in 2011.

⁶²The Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) was introduced in 2002. It provides for the confiscation of assets from individuals who benefit from criminal conduct and for restraint orders to be put in place to restrict dealings in property to allow for recovery of property which was obtained through unlawful conduct.

⁶³This was reported as being the only one produced in the country and was considered to be of high value to partners in determining their ability to contribute.

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objectives were identified, agreed and published. Initial results of the collaborations and actions taken were encouraging. The Assistant Director of Environment and Community Safety, Salford City Council commented:

'...at first we didn't know what all our powers were so we organised a day where all the agencies came together and we worked through various case studies... ...an example of how quickly we started to see results was there had been a garage under surveillance for 5 years and involved in various police operations during that time, within 6 weeks of us all coming together it was closed...'

A Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) representative commented (Salford City Council, 2011):

'The pooling of our resources and intelligence has uncovered fraud that would otherwise have gone undetected. We are learning about each other's job roles and how we can help each other – it is a different way of investigating.'

The leadership and management structure of Project Gulf operates at three different levels. The Gold Strategic Group is chaired jointly by the Divisional Commander of Salford and the Director of Environment and Community Safety within Salford City Council. They, with other key senior leaders drive the strategic action plan and provide direction and support to the tactical and operational groups within the partnership. The Chief Superintendent felt it was imperative that the Local Authority rather than the police took the lead on many matters. He stated that:

'...a key issue in my view was it had to be local authority led because if the police led on it then all the time we'd be hearing...oh the police are pushing us into doing this sort of stuff...'

The Silver Operational Command Group is also jointly chaired. This is by a Superintendent from Salford Division and the Assistant Director of Salford City Council. This group invites agencies to participate, plans intelligence gathering and determines OCG targets and tactical interventions. Different agencies have led identified operations. To ensure local ownership of operations and the aftermath, police neighbourhood Inspectors usually chair the Bronze Tactical operation groups.

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Two examples of operations led by partner agencies are Operation Vertebra and Operation Foxglove. Each is briefly described below.

Operation Vertebra

Lead Agency: Security Industry Authority (SIA)

Operation Vertebra is one of a number of operations within Project Gulf. The Security Industry Authority (SIA) was the lead agency for this operation and worked with the UK Borders Agency, Salford Local Authority, the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) and Salford Police. From consideration of intelligence, it was identified that nearly every OCG within Salford, of which there are approximately 15, has links to the security industry. The security industry is highly competitive and features low margins in business operations. A number of OCGs run ‘*front*’ business security companies. As part of their money laundering and business operations, these *front* businesses are often able to undercut legitimate companies in bids to obtain public contracts. Sharing of information between agencies allowed the SIA to make informed decisions concerning the awards of ACS⁶⁴ and so to prevent OCG *front* companies being able to bid for public contracts. A number of companies have been targeted and identified as being involved in a range of criminal activities including the employment of illegal immigrants and will face significant fines. Operation Vertebra is seen as a key example of how a collaborative approach, with the sharing of resources, information and intelligence, combined with joint targeted actions is fundamentally important and can provide significant benefit in the fighting of OCG activities and their impact on society. As previously mentioned, organised crime is a serious issue in the United Kingdom and is considered to be a threat to the United Kingdom’s national security (Home Office, 2009). As highlighted by the Assistant Director of Environment and Community Safety, Salford City Council:

‘... you are allowing criminals to have plans about your infrastructure on a core function within the City ...whether it be a headquarters or whatever so they are a security risk. We have to get away from the idea that these are people are rehabilitating themselves. They’re not. They are involved in criminality; they are invariably involved in money laundering and all the other bits that go with it...’

⁶⁴To bid for public funded contracts Approved Contractor Status (ACS) is a pre-requisite for invitation to tender.

Operation Foxglove

Lead Agency: Environmental Crime Agency and Department of Work and Pensions

Sharing of data and intelligence between the Environmental Crime Agency and Department of Work and Pensions, supported by Salford Police, allowed the identification of a local tyre disposal depot which, having collected scrap tyres, was illegally exporting them in large volumes under-cutting licensed operators. This organisation has also been found to be fraudulently claiming employee benefits. A number of people were arrested and there is an on-going POCA investigation aiming to confiscate £400,000 (Salford City Council, 2011).

Achievements of Project Gulf (to date)

Project Gulf is considered to have successfully fulfilled the requirements presented by the Home Office in 2010 (Salford City Council, 2011). It is recognised as a best practice achievement by the Government who commend it and seek to promote similar activities throughout the United Kingdom. It has received a National award for best Public-to-Public Partnership Working (2011), by the Association for Public Sector Excellence (APSE) and has been nominated for the Jane's Police Review Excellence Award. It has been achieved through partner organisations existing budgets and funding streams with no additional funding provided by the Government.

A total figure of £9 million has been recovered through Project Gulf. Achievements include:

- Customs and Excise recovery of £500,000 in unpaid taxes
- Seizure of £90,000 of class 'A' drugs (by Salford Police)
- Seizure and recovery of £172,000 of cash and property from criminals under the Proceeds of Crime Act (by Salford Police)
- Benefits recovery of £78,000 (by the DWP)
- Confiscation of counterfeit goods to the total value of £300,000 (by Salford Council Trading Standards)

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- The tracing of fugitives living in the Netherlands and Spain and recovery of £92,000 of cash and goods (by Salford Police, working with SOCA)

In addition to these achievements, it is felt that Project Gulf has led to a significant increase in capability to disrupt OCG activities and allow targeted individuals to be dealt with through mainstream policing. For example, an individual stated:

‘If you disrupt them you push them out into mainstream criminality where you get the chance to catch them anyway.....you start to identify some really interesting prisonable tax offence... ..it all starts to unravel for them.’

It was also suggested that benefits and savings had been achieved through a reduction in criminality. For example, one individual commented:

‘...you could also actually say that we have prevented another 4 murders at a cost of £1.6 million each...’

Key Success Factors and Enablers

Key success factors and enablers identified that contributed to the success of Project Gulf are listed below.

- The knowledge, expertise and capabilities acquired and developed by Salford Division Police through participation in Operation Thermopylae provided a strong resource base for the project.
- The key capabilities and knowledge of partnership working with external agencies and the high credibility and respect that Greater Manchester Police have from their partners were key resources for the achievement of the project.
- The Government policy of granting local personnel and agencies high levels of autonomy allowed the local leadership team to develop the strategies for intelligence gathering and tactical interventions adapted to the local context and conditions.
- The high acceptance of the need for action to tackle the significant number of OCGs in the Salford area, coupled with the strong political

support for the project provided, from the outset, by the Chief Executive of Salford City Council.

- The fact that Salford already had a strong, well-established Community Safety partnership in place and the positive relationships that existed between key individuals in Salford Police Division and Salford City Council ensured high levels of communication and trust between these partners.
- The decision for the lead agency of the project not to be the police, but to establish joint leadership, and to allow partners to lead identified operations acted as a positive in terms of building strong relationships between the agencies and encouraged commitment to deeper engagement in the partnership working arrangements.
- The joint development of the '*Partnership Intervention Toolkit*' provided clear understanding of the regulatory powers each agency held and how these could be utilised for tactical interventions.
- The identification of champions, in key partner agencies who were tasked with identifying benefits for these agencies, was useful in achieving awareness, knowledge and commitment and for the development of plans and interventions.
- The clear leadership structure adopted of gold, silver and bronze.

Limiting Factors and Barriers that had to be Overcome

- As Project Gulf rolled out it became apparent that the strategic buy-in and support from national agencies was not as available as initially expected.
- A main barrier identified was the lack of awareness by the public of the dangers organised crime pose to society. Organised crime underlies a large number of businesses that the public deal with on a regular basis ranging from car washes, tanning salons, nail parlours to garages, tyre depots, cafes, childcare nurseries and care homes and the public do not realise who or what they are dealing with. Because of this some agencies may regard the fighting of OCG as a lower priority. As the Chief Superintendent of Salford suggested:

'I don't think people realise... ...they think it's not a problem in this country, when it is... ...even in quiet little hamlets and shire towns, organised crime is there...'

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- The sharing of information, although having improved, is still an area where difficulties can and do occur.
- A potential scarcity of resources in some agencies is also a potential barrier to the successful continuation of collaboration and partnership working. With recent Government cuts this could potentially become a serious issue. As identified by the Chief Superintendent of Salford:

'...people will retreat into their own areas once again...which is a big mistake'.

Future Developments

The Government seeks to roll out Project Gulf countrywide. Within Greater Manchester Police, the *Partnership Toolkit* had been disseminated to every Division and a number of these are seeking to establish similar programmes. For example, in Oldham Division *Operation Caminada* was established on 21st November, 2011 (See YouTube, 2011) and is expected to be in place for at least six years.

There are approximately 9 OCGs in Oldham. Organised crime activities are a significant issue affecting a large proportion of communities living within some of the most deprived economic areas of the UK. In certain areas, organised criminals are clearly visible through '*...individuals driving round with money and the visible trappings of wealth with no apparent legitimate source of income.*' (Chief Superintendent, Oldham). Historically, there has been considerable work within Oldham to tackle serious and organised crime using traditional police tactics. As the Oldham Chief Superintendent commented:

'We have had some successes...we've had a significant number of convictions for supplying drugs, some really significant seizures...over £1 million worth of cannabis recovered recently. In terms of the divisional response for the proceeds of crime act and actually seizing money off criminals, we are as good as any division in the force.....but in terms of that traditional approach I still feel that we are just scratching the surface.'

The Chief Superintendent felt that when considering the level of resources required tackling organised crime, against other demands and the current economic climate, with the current reduction of police resources, there is a clear need to do things differently:

'We cannot hope to do all that and achieve all that by doing less of the same. We have to think and do things differently.'

To establish Operation Caminada, the Oldham Senior Leadership Team attended workshops on Project Gulf and spent time in understanding the lessons that could be learnt from the project. After significant planning and preparation the strategy was identified and specified, and an Operational Team established. This comprised 9 individuals who were assigned to work full time on Operation Caminada. The next stage was to achieve stakeholder involvement and 'buy-in.' The Chief Executive of the Local Authority has agreed to support the Operation and Oldham Community Safety Partnership, the Local Strategic Partnership and other key agencies have been briefed and agreed to participate. Unlike Salford, Oldham has a high number of different ethnic communities. To guard against a negative response from communities to disruption activities and to ensure that these are not misinterpreted, it is felt in Oldham that a key partner for Operation Caminada is the Local Authority Inclusion team, which is responsible for the reduction of community tensions.

Briefing meetings on the extent of organised crime in Oldham, its impact on Oldham citizens, the strategy and how police officer roles may need to change for success of Operation Caminada have been held with Oldham Division staff. As the Superintendent in charge of Partnerships suggested, success in policing may need to be rethought:

'It's also around what do we define as success? Our own mind set in the police is that success is putting people in prison and that's right, we still want to do that, but we also have to look at success being taking the business off an organised criminal so they can't launder money through it. That will be a success, they might not end up in prison for it but we've damaged that group to the point of we're making Oldham a hostile place for them to operate.'

Reflections

Although there is low public awareness of organised crime and associated activities, OCGs should be considered a serious issue in the United Kingdom and a threat to national security. Two principal kinds of disruption can be

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identified in tackling organised crime. The first involves entrepreneurial use of legal powers to affect criminal networks and markets. Through an intelligence-led mode of operating, individuals are targeted and the police powers of arrest are used to extract key players from the market or network. This has the disadvantage that it is resource intensive and individuals are quickly replaced. The second involves a more extra-legal form of disruption where agents do not attempt to affect an arrest or submit the suspect to due process. Rather, actions are designed and intended to prevent or make it more difficult for the organised criminal(s) to continue to engage in unlawful activity (Innes and Sheptycki, 2004). Project Gulf appears to be an excellent example of this. The collaboration of key local government agencies, the police and international partners in the adoption of a *harm reduction approach* to disrupt organised crime activities has proven successful. The ability to utilise non-criminal proceedings such as administrative, regulatory or tax approaches to disrupt the activities of those involved in serious and organised crime, as well as disruption tools such as criminal proceedings involving prosecution has proven highly effective.

Project Gulf can be considered a best practice achievement. Additional funding was not provided to external partners and agencies to participate in the project. The leadership structures and organisational arrangements established have been crucial in establishing commitment and participation by partner agencies. The level of autonomy granted allowed these factors and strategies to be developed to meet local context requirements. Key resources and capabilities such as the prior knowledge of operations through Operation Thermopylae and the strength of relationships and capabilities of the key partner agencies were essential resource factors.

It has been suggested that a disruption-directed model of crime control for removal or destabilisation of criminal networks is cost-effective, compared to the costs involved in preparing full criminal trials (Innes and Sheptycki, 2004). As such, given the current reductions in police resources it may be that this approach is a way that police organisations can tackle OCGs and their impact on society, particularly when facing resource reductions. However, it may also be that resource reductions in partner agencies will become a significant barrier to their future commitment and participation.

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Appendix 9.1

Partners Involved in Salford Community Safety Partnership (CSP)

City West Housing Trust
Council for Voluntary Services
Criminal Justice Board
Crown Prosecution Service
Drug and Alcohol Action Team
Greater Manchester Ambulance Service
Greater Manchester Chamber of Commerce
Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service
Greater Manchester Police – Salford Division
Greater Manchester Police Authority
HM Prison Service
Primary Care Trust
Registered Social Landlords
Salford City Council
Salford Magistrates Court
Salford Probation Service
Salix Homes Limited
Transport for Greater Manchester
University of Salford
Victim Support and Witness Service
Youth Offending Service

Appendix 9.2

Partners Involved in Project Gulf

City West Housing Trust
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS)
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP)
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA)
Environment Agency
Gambling Commission
Greater Manchester Against Crime (GMAC)
Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS)
Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Executive (GMPTE)
Greater Manchester Police Authority (GMPA)
Greater Manchester Police (GMP) Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB)
Greater Manchester Police (GMP) Senior Crime
Health Service
Her Majesty's Prison Service (HMPS)
Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC)
Home Office
Probation Service
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS)
Salford City Council (SCC)
Salix Homes
Security Industry Authority (SIA)
Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)
United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA)

Discussion and Conclusions

The nine best practice achievements examined and documented in the case studies presented in the previous sections cover a diverse range of projects and activities. Depending on the nature of the project and of the organisation of the police force involved, some projects or activities address local issues while others are national or international in nature. As such, there is a great deal of variance in terms of the size, complexity, scope and the level of resources involved in each of the best practice achievements. In the discussion below, similarities and differences between the cases are examined in terms of evidence that they are best practices, whether they arose from the need to meet environmental changes or internal improvements, whether the knowledge and capabilities already existed within the police force or whether it was necessary to acquire new thinking and capabilities from external sources, the key factors that may have contributed to the success of the project or activity and how they will be adopted by others or further developed. In each case we present relevant, but by no means exhaustive, examples from the cases to illustrate the argument or point made.

A key factor in deciding whether each of the cases can be considered as a “*best practice*” is determined in part from consideration of the level of recognition of success of the project or activity from key external stakeholders. For example, in the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* case (West-Coast Police, Belgium) external individuals such as the Mayor of Koksijde and the Public Prosecutor indicated their positive assessment of the project and its achievements. For the modular training programme in international crisis management case, *EUPFT 2009*, (Arma dei Carabinieri, Italy) applications by police officers to the programme was over-subscribed and senior officers who attended provided very positive feedback. The Council of the European Union, who in the framework of the 2974th External Relations Council meeting, held in Brussels on 17th November 2009, in acknowledging the relevance for civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions recognised the positive impact of the

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Instrument for Stability project EUPFT2009. In the *Tutoring Programme for Minors* case (Policía Municipal de Madrid, Spain) external stakeholders such as schools expressed high satisfaction while other external individuals demonstrated their positive opinion for the project by providing additional resources to expand the programme. For instance, the Mayor of Madrid, in June 2011, transferred 85 police officers that were previously assigned to escorting politicians, to the tutoring programme. The *Safety Houses* project (Rotterdam-Rijnmond and Gelderland-Zuid Police, the Netherlands) is also widely regarded as successful. Similar to a number of the other local projects (see discussion on future developments below) the success of the *Safety House* model is clearly evidenced by the decision to extend this model throughout the country. In a letter to parliament, the former Minister of Justice outlined the expected benefits of the programme's extension in terms of crime reduction and recidivism.

In terms of external recognition, in a number of instances this is further evidenced by the receipt of awards. For example, the *Safe Location – Safe Housing* project (The Municipal Police of Brno, Czech Republic), was awarded the “Urban Security Award” 2011 by Safe City EURO – MED, the *Tutoring Programme for Minors* received a UNICEF award (October, 2010) and *Project Gulf: Fighting Organised Crime Through Effective Partnership and Disruption Strategies* (Salford Division, Greater Manchester Police, the United Kingdom) received a National award for best Public-to-Public Partnership Working (2011) by the Association for Public Sector Excellence (APSE) and has been nominated for the Jane's Police Review Excellence Award.

While in some instances, such as the *Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan* case (Biro Central Police Services, Public Security: National Police, The Republic of Macedonia), a review will take place in the near-term future, a number of the projects have been assessed by external stakeholders or have operational data available to support the benefits and value-added for citizens achieved. The *Installation and Operation of SCOMAR*, a blue border surveillance system, (Romanian Border Police) is considered as best practice because it shows how, in a few years, a country can move from having no integrated maritime surveillance system to having one of the best systems in operation in the European Union (EU). The *Installation and Operation of SCOMAR* was extensively reviewed by the Schengen evaluation commission experts in terms of its technical capabilities and appropriateness of associated

Discussion and Conclusions

legislation. For both aspects, a positive result was achieved. The final report stated that Romania had achieved compliance with the Schengen Aquis requirements and mentioned, in particular, the high level of training and competence of the Romanian Border Police personnel working in the Command and Control Centre, at border crossing points, at the surveillance points and on the ships that are part of the SCOMAR system. In addition to the review by the Schengen experts, the SCOMAR system has received positive feedback from partner countries that interact with it in joint operations conducted through the FRONTEX Agency or in cooperation with neighbouring countries at the Black Sea.

The following cases have evidence of best practice achievement from consideration of operational data. In the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* case, objective data indicates that crime rates in the West-Coast Police zone have decreased at a greater rate than the national figures. For the *Safe Location – Safe Housing* project, data reveals that the number of interventions by police officers to events at Koniklecová Street has declined dramatically in a one year period. For the *Project ZENTRAB, Central Criminal Case Processing* case (Criminal Police of the Land Brandenburg, Germany) the commission in charge of the structural reform of the police of Brandenburg called “Brandenburg 2020” is identified as considering *ZENTRAB* as a valuable instrument for the achievement of an increase of efficiency and quality of case management. An increase in performance in levels of investigative success, even with a reduction in the number of staff utilised, is evident from the statistics. There is also documented evidence of improvements in employee morale and a reduction in absenteeism. After several evaluation studies on precursor *Safety House* initiatives, the former Minister of Justice evaluated that *Safety Houses* had contributed to the overall goal of reducing criminality and harassment by 25% and the number of re-offenses by 10%. *Project Gulf* has led to a significant increase in capability to disrupt organised crime group activities and allowed targeted individuals to be dealt with through mainstream policing. The published data suggests that a total figure of £9 million has been recovered. Examples include Customs and Excise recovery of £500,000 in unpaid taxes, seizure of £90,000 of class ‘A’ drugs, seizure and recovery of £172,000 of cash and property from criminals under the Proceeds of Crime Act, benefits recovery of £78,000 and confiscation of counterfeit goods to the total value of £300,000.

Discussion and Conclusions

In summary, the best practices examined and documented can be considered to be best practice achievements.

From examination of the cases presented it is clear that the need for the projects or activities can be driven by internal factors or to meet external opportunities and threats. For example, the *Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan* to meet the commitment of the Republic of Macedonia to build a system of border control compatible with the standards of the Schengen legal system, which is a key factor required for the Republic of Macedonia to be eligible for membership of the EU, is driven by a key opportunity and has large international impact. The *Installation and Operation of SCOMAR* blue border surveillance system by the Romanian Border Police to control traffic in the Black Sea area is also a very large project of both national and international importance. It is considered as one of the most ambitious international projects in terms of security and cooperation in this region. The project was initiated by the EU who recommended the implementation of SCOMAR to maintain border security. Moreover, efficiency in the surveillance and control of all of its national borders remains a requirement for compliance with the Schengen Catalogue and the Schengen Aquis and is therefore central to Romania's efforts to become part of the Schengen Area. A third project that arose from external factors and has international importance is that of *institutional cooperation with examples of skill sharing and optimisation* of the Arma dei Carabinieri. In response to the European Commission decision to undertake a series of initiatives relating to the Peace Building Partnership policy aimed, firstly, at the prevention of conflicts, the Arma dei Carabinieri developed a modular training project including simulation exercises, aimed at training approximately six hundred European police experts in the field of international crisis management. The other which relates to international projects is the project of the Corpo Forestale dello Stato to develop national synergies for the prevention and control of forest fires in Italy.

The other six cases describe projects that are bounded and were initiated in the main to address local concerns. The West-Coast Police force, in Belgium, is relatively small (around 171 officers) and, as there is a large transient population movement across national borders, has specific issues for the tackling of crime, where the criminals may be anonymous to the local police. To tackle specific safety and security issues, the leadership of West-Coast Police initiated a project

to adopt a *Nodal Orientation*. Automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) and other technological resources were installed and utilised to monitor vehicle flows to detect the entry of potential criminals into the police zone. Once criminals were identified they could be intercepted on a priority basis. The *Safe Location – Safe Housing* project was initiated locally by the Crime Prevention Department of the Municipal Police of Brno, in the Czech Republic, to increase the quality of life for citizens living in a large apartment block and in the immediate vicinity, by increasing their personal and property safety and security. The main drivers for the project were the key findings from a sociological survey which indicated that fear of theft within the home was one of the four greatest risks perceived by the public within the City, 70% of respondents did not feel completely safe in their own home (both at night and during the day) and respondents felt most threatened in the entrance halls, stairs and lift. While difficult to identify the exact origin of the *Safety Houses* initiative in the Netherlands, it appears this idea also arose as a response to fears surrounding neighbourhood safety. The pilot *Project ZENTRAB* in the Barnim police district, Land Brandenburg, Germany was established locally by the Criminal Police to assess the effectiveness of centralization of criminal cases classified as minor crime, which do not require an investigative procedure, with the aim of improving efficiency and morale in policing activities in the Brandenburg police force. The *Tutoring Programme for Minors* in the Policía Municipal de Madrid, in Spain, was proposed by an individual police officer who was aware of the difficulties the Policía Municipal de Madrid faced to address issues with minors. Finally, while *Project Gulf* in Salford Division, Greater Manchester Police, in the United Kingdom, can be considered local in terms of the issue to be tackled and its implementation; it was initiated by central government. In summary, the nine best practices examined and documented can be concluded to arise from clearly identified issues and requirements from both external and internal factors.

Although very different in size, scope and complexity a common feature of the cases is that the achievement of an increase in level of proactivity appears to be a major driver. Clearly for the large, complex nationally important projects such as the *Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan* and the *Installation and Operation of SCOMAR*, where failure would have serious consequences for the countries involved and the European Union this is a clear requirement. But, it also seems to be true for the cases where the projects were initiated locally, that

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there is a drive to achieve a more proactive state and achieve the ability to engage in preventative actions rather than to just continue in a reactive state. For example, in the *Safe Location – Safe Housing* project the Municipal Police of Brno can be seen to adopt a proactive approach in that they attempt to address the causes of specific problems and crimes in relation to personal and property safety and security, rather than just continuing with the previous reactive approach of making repeated interventions to address problems or crimes. In addition it is clear in *Project Gulf* the intent and final achievement was to move from a reactive response to issues arising from organised crime group activities to a more proactive approach through the disruption and minimization of criminal activities. *Project ZENTRAB* and the project of the Corpo Forestale dello Stato, to develop national synergies for the prevention and control of forest fires, can also both be considered to be proactive in nature in that they attempt to make improvements in resource utilization and effectiveness. The *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* at West-Coast Police clearly involves a change from a purely reactive approach to one that is both proactive and reactive in nature. From the monitoring of the vehicles entering the police zone, potential criminals can now be identified and intercepted before they commit crimes. This information advantage allows the police to be proactive in terms of how they deal with the potential criminal through interception and making the criminal aware of being monitored (the increase in criminal's awareness of their explicit identification and presence significantly reduces the likelihood of their committing a crime) and also improves the efficiency of reactive actions and investigation of crimes committed. Similarly, in the *Tutoring Programme for Minors* two types of police actions can be identified: preventative (proactive) and reactive. The former include talks at schools, inspections, or monitoring of cases, while the latter relates to the interventions that are needed in the presence of criminal and administrative infractions (interventions as a judicial police force). Despite this statement, the programme aims to be more preventive than reactive. In fact, according to the interviewees, what gives value to this service is, precisely, the preventive (proactive) perspective.

In terms of the levels and sources of financial resources in each of the best practice achievements, examined differences are clearly apparent. In the three cases of the *Tutoring Programme for Minors*, *Project ZENTRAB* and *Project Gulf* no additional resources were provided and no new additional staff were recruited. Additional material resources had to be covered by existing budgets

and funding streams. In contrast, the *Installation and Operation of SCOMAR* required very high levels of capital investment (the budget allocated for this project was €24.6 million) and additional funding was clearly required. For the *Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan* additional financial resources were mainly from internal sources, however, some external funding was achieved for training and education of the national working teams, exchanging experiences and exploring best practices. For the training initiative "*European Union Police Forces Training 2009*" (EUPFT 2009), the Arma dei Carabinieri obtained funding from the EU. For the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* project additional funding had to be obtained from the three municipalities that make up the West-Coast police zone.

In some of the cases the knowledge and capabilities were already present in the focal police forces. For example, for the development of national synergies in Italy for the prevention and control of forest fires, the Corpo Forestale dello Stato already possessed the key resources of experience, expertise and knowledge in the prevention and control of forest fires and there was no need to bring in resources or capabilities from outside sources. Similarly, for the training initiative in international crisis management, "*European Union Police Forces Training 2009*" (EUPFT 2009), the Arma dei Carabinieri utilised internal expertise through the establishment of a dedicated planning working group of staff from operational units with appropriate expertise.

In other cases however, knowledge creation and acquisition routines to build new thinking and bring in new resources and capabilities from external sources was a defining feature, particularly where the introduction of new technology is part of the project. For example, for the *Installation and Operation of SCOMAR*, as France and Spain were already operating similar systems, Romanian experts visited the Guardia Civil (in Spain) and the Gendarmerie (in France) to study the systems and their operation in the field. The main knowledge transfer was from the Spanish SCOMAR system, used by the Guardia Civil (Spanish Border Police) for several years mainly on the African border, which is considered to be one of the most dangerous European borders. Collaboration with the Spanish and French colleagues was essential as, later on, they helped in training the Romanian SCOMAR personnel. For the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* a number of work visits with both the West-Coast Police and key stakeholders of the project to foreign police forces that had already adopted a nodal orientation

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proved to be beneficial. Work visits were undertaken to the United Kingdom (Kent and Edinburgh) and to Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The automatic number plate reading technology (ANPR) was later bought from the United Kingdom. This appears, however, not to have been straight forward. Initial difficulties in applying the technology in Belgium were experienced. The reason for this is that Belgian number plates have red letters and numbers against a white background rather than the black letters on a yellow background of the United Kingdom. This made them difficult to read at night. Furthermore, number plates in Belgium are not tied to the vehicle, but to the individual. Every time a new vehicle is bought the personal plates have to be transferred. This results in many plates having screw holes in different places, which further confused the technology. As a result, in the early phases of the project, a high number of errors occurred that produced faulty hits or no hits at all, in terms of detection of potential criminals entering the police zone.

Other cases that utilised external sources as a source of ideas or to develop knowledge and capabilities are the *Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan*, where the working group used the experiences and the Schengen Action Plans from Croatia, Czech Republic and Bulgaria, *Safety Houses* in the Netherlands, where the programme took some inspiration from France's 'Maison de la Justice' initiative following the visit of two Dutch civil servants at the French ministry and *Project ZENTRAB* where the department of the Cologne police district served as a model. Unlike the problems that were experienced in the transfer of the ANPR technology from the United Kingdom to Belgium, the transfer of the filing and software systems from the Cologne ZENTRAB department to Barnim appears to have been relatively straight forward. This is despite the difference in context between the Cologne and Barnim police districts, of Cologne being urban and Barnim rural.

In the cases studied a number of common enablers contributing to the achievement of the project or activity are evident. In some of the cases examined, particularly the smaller local cases, the capabilities and credibility of the individual leading the project was frequently identified as a key enabler. For example, in the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* case the track record of the police chief is noted to have contributed significantly to the successful implementation of the project. In the *Tutoring Programme for Minors* case the leader of the programme was described as an 'artist' transforming his written idea into a real project. In *Project Gulf* the leadership structures were also

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identified as crucial. The decision for the lead agency of the project not to be the police, but to establish joint leadership, and to allow partners to lead identified operations, acted as a positive in terms of building strong relationships between the agencies and encouraged commitment to deeper engagement in the partnership working arrangements. In the *Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan* case the quality of the organisation and coordination activities was identified as essential for the success of the project.

In many of the cases high quality relationships needed to be achieved with key stakeholders. In the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* case, for example the establishment of the informal relationship with the Dunkirk Police was essential for the provision of crucial information from outside of the West-Coast police zone. In *Project ZENTRAB* the preparations made in terms of achieving the support of the staff unions and the public prosecution department was a significant positive factor in the project. For the *Tutoring Programme for Minors* project, children's problems cannot only be approached from a police perspective and so due to the nature of the tasks; tutors need to work in cooperation with other partners to address minors' issues. In *Project Gulf* key capabilities and knowledge of partnership working with external agencies and the high credibility and respect that Greater Manchester Police have from their partners were key factors for the achievement of the project. While it is evident that high quality relationships needed to be achieved with key stakeholders, this is clearly not always easy to do. At the start of *Project Gulf* it became apparent that the strategic buy-in and support from national agencies was not as available as initially expected. Similarly, in the *Safety Houses* project professionals of several organisations, with their own perspectives, sense making, values, organizational histories and cultures, disciplinary backgrounds, laws, rules and instructions represent a highly complex collective. The management of these different partners is identified in the case as being inherently difficult and misunderstandings and inefficiencies are mentioned as being a possible outcome.

In a number of the cases the recognised level of importance of the project and close alignment of priorities of key stakeholders is evident as a key factor in the realisation of the best practice achievement. A clear example of this is the case of SCOMAR, where successful installation and operation of the blue water surveillance system was considered to be in the national interest of Romania. The project was given a status of high importance by the Romanian Border

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Police and a number of Ministries. This ensured a common focus, from authorities such as the Ministry of Administration and Interior, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Transportation who coordinated efforts to enable the efficient implementation of the project. Together with the provision of adequate financial resources, difficulties relating to the challenging geographical environment of the coast, where installation had to occur, and to the winter weather, which posed a series of unexpected problems, with storms, strong winds and floods, were successfully overcome in order to meet required deadlines.

In the four cases of the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation*, the *Safety Houses* project, the *Tutoring Programme for Minors* and *Project Gulf*, high levels of support from external stakeholders was crucial to the success of the projects. Without the support of all three municipalities, the West-Coast Police could not have achieved the required level of funding. In the case of the *Safety Houses* project, institutional support from Ministers and the Cabinet and the main offices of separate partner-organisations was very important in terms of initial funding and the legitimacy of the initiative. In the *Tutoring Programme for Minors*, high levels of support for the programme were received from both politicians and the heads of the police force. In *Project Gulf*, the high acceptance of the need for action to tackle the significant number of organised crime groups in the Salford area, coupled with the strong political support for the project provided, from the outset, by the Chief Executive of Salford City Council was an important factor for the success of the project.

Two final interesting factors that can be identified from the cases as important to success in the initiatives relate to the attitudes of the personnel involved. In both the *Tutoring Programme for Minors* and *Project ZENTRAB* the personnel in the projects were volunteers. This appears to have positive outcomes in terms of motivation, commitment and morale. In the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* case the importance of early success stories, particularly of high profile cases, is evident as a strong enabler for the success of the project, both for internal staff in overcoming staff resistance to changing routines and for gaining support from wider external stakeholders.

As discussed above, the degree to which each of the cases examined and documented can be considered as a best practice is evidenced by the level of

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external recognition achieved. A further measure for those cases where it is appropriate is the degree to which others will adopt the practice in the future or it will be developed further. For example, following the example of West-Coast Police, many other police zones in Belgium are adopting the use of cameras with ANPR to combat safety and security issues. The Government in the Netherlands currently plans to spread the *Safety House* initiative into new regions throughout the country. In addition they aim to further develop and extend the approach. The State Secretary of Justice has launched a knowledge network (a nation wide website) around *Safety Houses*, and research is currently being undertaken to explore the possibility of introducing a nation-wide system of client registration. Based on the success of the pilot project in the Barnim district, the implementation of *ZENTRAB* will be expanded throughout Brandenburg. There are also plans to develop *ZENTRAB II* which will deal with all minor crime offences, rather than just those that do not require an investigative approach.

Following the success of EUPFT 2009, the Arma dei Carabinieri submitted a proposal for the European Union Police Services Training (EUPST) 2011 – 2013, with the aim of increasing and developing understanding and to spread practices and lessons learned within civilian crisis management. The Romanian Border Police have been requested to share their expertise and knowledge of the SCOMAR system and contribute to a series of pilot European programmes for testing different surveillance solutions. They have also expressed their willingness to provide support to countries such as Bulgaria, who are currently developing a surveillance system. The *Tutoring Programme for Minors* has been transferred and adapted to other local police forces within the Autonomous Community of Madrid. In addition, a high number of local police forces, in Spain but also abroad, have asked the Policía Municipal de Madrid to advise them on the implementation of similar projects. *Project Gulf* is seen as a success by the Government, who now seeks to roll out the activity countrywide. Within Greater Manchester Police, a number of the other police divisions are seeking to establish similar programmes.

The best practice achievements examined and documented in the nine case studies presented are diverse in terms of the size, complexity, scope and the level of resources involved in each of the projects undertaken for their attainment. Whilst they only represent a small number of the best practice achievements of the focal police forces, as can be seen from the above

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discussions, a number of interesting common factors are evident. We believe that these cases provide interesting and useful insights that will be helpful to others in the generation of ideas and the attainment of best practice achievements in the future.