

# **Best Practices in European Policing**

A Selection of Case Studies

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# Preface

In this book, we present best practice case studies of successful improvement projects implemented by police organisations in nine European countries (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, the Republic of Macedonia, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom). A key factor for selection of each of the cases for study and inclusion in this book was the level of recognition received from key external stakeholders and the level of benefit achieved for citizens. The best practice cases presented are diverse in terms of their relative sizes and scope and in the levels of complexity and resources involved.

The examination and documentation of each of the case studies is based on work completed as part of the COMPOSITE research project (see <http://www.composite-project.eu>). Data was collected through desk research of documents, reports and other available written materials and through follow up meetings and interviews with key individuals, who had been or are currently involved with the best practice project or operation, by the COMPOSITE consortium country research team members.

A case study approach is a common research method in social sciences and is the preferred research method for answering ‘*how*’ or ‘*why*’ questions (Yin, 2009<sup>1</sup>). It is frequently used for in-depth investigation of contemporary phenomena within a real-life context and is the suggested methodology for the study of strategy formation, decision making within organisations, resource allocation processes, and the management of organisational and strategic changes (Siggelkow, 2001<sup>2</sup>).

Within the analysis of the case studies, factors such as (a) resources and capabilities required to achieve the best practice, (b) the frequency, difficulty and cost involved in acquiring or transferring knowledge and capabilities from

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<sup>1</sup>Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case Study Research Design and Methods*, Sage, London.

<sup>2</sup>Siggelkow, N. (2001) Change in the presence of fit: The rise, the fall and the renaissance of Liz Clairborne, *Academy of Management Journal*, 44 (4):838-857.

one organisation to another, (c) the enablers important to achieve success, (d) the barriers that created difficulties and (e) the levels of adoption and future development of each best practice are examined.

While the nine cases presented only represent a small number of the best practice achievements in policing, we believe they provide interesting and useful insights that are worth sharing across the police in different countries. We hope this book will be of interest to police officers across Europe as they address change issues and implement projects to improve performance and enhance citizens' lives.


Leslie N. Graham, Kathryn, A. Betteridge, Rebecca Casey  
and Arjen van Witteloostuijn  
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We also thank the individual officers and other personnel within these and other organisations who provided their opinions and views and additional information to generate the case studies.



## **Nodal Orientation at West-Coast Police**

WEST-COAST POLICE, BELGIUM

**Ad van den Oord and Nathalie Vallet**  
(University of Antwerp)

### **Introduction**

In this case study, we will describe the adoption of a nodal orientation by the West-Coast Police in Belgium. This nodal orientation complements the narrow interpretation of the community-policing model prescribed in Belgium during the police reforms of 1998-2001, and enables the West-Coast police to tackle specific safety and security issues more effectively.

### **General Trends and Developments**

To fully understand the context of the problem, we have to take into account the general trends of globalisation, which refers to the increasingly global relationships of culture, people, and economic activity through the reduction and removal of barriers between national borders in order to facilitate the flow of goods, capital, services, and labour. As a result of the dissolution of national borders, local, national, and international boundaries are blurring. This implies an increased mobility of people, goods, and capital. Within Europe, this has resulted in the Schengen Agreement, which effectively created a borderless Schengen Area with only external and no internal border controls. The Schengen Area currently consists of 26 European countries, covering a population of over 400 million people and an area of 4,312,099 square kilometres (Wikipedia, 2011). This means that criminals are also increasingly mobile and not hampered by international, national, and/or local borders.

**To summarise:**

- Dissolving national borders;
- Increased flow of people, goods, and capital across borders in Europe;
- Increased mobility of criminals.

**The Organisation of Police in Europe**

While national borders are dissolving for criminals, national borders still form a major impediment for European police. European police are organised nationally and national police forces have no or extremely limited authority across national borders. Consequently, several nation states have formed bilateral or multilateral agreements (e.g., the Benelux agreement and the agreement of Enschede) or signed treaties (e.g., the Treaty of Prüm) to foster cooperation across national borders to tackle safety issues. Furthermore, Europol has been created to tackle safety and security issues across national borders. However, this does not mean that all safety and security issues are tackled efficiently throughout Europe, for two reasons. First of all, while Europol handles cross-border safety and security issues, it only focuses on the major priorities, such as terrorism and large organized crime. Second, the agreements and treaties are not signed or formed between all nation states, and also tend to concentrate on the major safety and security issues. As a result, most police forces are severely hampered by national borders.

**To summarise:**

- National borders remain an extreme impediment for most police forces.

**The Structure of the Belgian Police Force**

The Belgian police are structured at two levels, Local and Federal police, which are autonomous and subordinate to different authorities. The Local Police operate locally in so-called police zones, of which there are a total of 195 (see Figure 1). The police zones are composed of single or multiple municipalities and/or cities, and are run by the police chief who operate under the authority of the mayor<sup>3</sup> or the police council<sup>4</sup>. The Federal Police operate across police zones

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<sup>3</sup>For single municipality/city police zones.

<sup>4</sup>Multiple municipality/city police zones; police councils are composed of the mayors of the different municipalities/cities, the chair of which is being seated by the mayor of the largest municipality/city

### *Nodal Orientation at West-Coast Police*

on issues that transcend single police zones such as inter-zone safety and security issues. Federal Police forces are run by the commissioner-general, and consist of several centralised directorates for example, The Directorate Operational Police Information, The Directorate of International Police Cooperation, The Directorate of Relations with the Local Police, The Directorate of Special Units and decentralised Directorates of Coordination and Support (CSD). The decentralised directorates are managed by a coordinating director who, together with the judicial director, plays a key role in the integrated functioning of the police, more particularly in the approach to security problems, the organisation of the information flow at the judicial district level (in the so-called District Information Crossroads), the co-operation between the different police zones and the functioning of the Provincial Information and Communication Centre (CIC). The integrated police, the combination of local and federal police, operate under the authority of the Minister of Interior Affairs (administrative or uniformed police) and the Minister of Justice (judicial or investigative police).

#### **To summarise:**

- Belgian police structured at two levels: (1) federal police, and (2) local police.

#### **The Belgian Policing Model**

Regarding the Belgian model of policing, during the reforms of 1998-2001, the Belgian government decided to follow the UK and the Netherlands by adopting a community model of policing. A community policing model takes the view that the police and citizens are co-producers of police services, jointly responsible for reducing crime and improving the quality of life in local neighbourhoods (Law Library, 2011). This stresses the need for the police to be integrated in the community, and to be fully aware of the safety and security issues that characterise the community. This is accomplished through the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to crime, social disorder, and fear of crime (COPS, 2011). To complement this model, the Belgian police also adopted a model of intelligence-led policing (ILP). Intelligence-led policing basically consists of:

- information driven local orientation that uses information from the community to combat local phenomena

### *Case Study One – Belgium*

- a technology driven nodal orientation that uses information about flows in the community to combat global phenomena.

For the local police in Belgium, the information driven local orientation of intelligence-led policing is adopted, and the technology driven nodal orientation is largely ignored (Paelinck, 2011).

With respect to the global safety and security issues that transcend local police zones, there is a distinction between the two different kinds. The appropriate centralised unit of the federal police, for example the federal judicial police or anti-terrorist unit, tackles the safety and security issues that are of national importance. Whilst the remaining safety and security issues are resolved through partnerships between local police forces, either with or without the support of the decentralised directorate of coordination and support of the federal police. For these ‘low-profile’ global issues, the underlying assumption is that by combining their knowledge and information about their local communities, local police forces can jointly combat these phenomena effectively.

#### **To summarise:**

- Local safety and security issues can be tackled with a community model and with local intelligence;
- Global safety and security issues of national importance are tackled by the appropriate centralised unit of the federal police;
- All remaining global safety and security issues are tackled through partnerships between local and (decentralised units of the) federal police.

#### **Financing the Local Police in Belgium**

In Belgium, the local police are financed partly by the federal government, and partly by the local government such as the government of the municipalities that make up the police zone. During the reforms, for each police zone the minimum number of staff required to provide basic police care in the police zone was determined, the so-called KUL norm. The federal contribution is not sufficient to provide the basic police care, and local governments are legally obliged to finance the gap. If local government fails to do so, the governor of the province has the authority to explicitly include this ‘expense’ on the budget of the municipality.




**To summarise:**

- Police zones dependent on local governments for funding.

**The West-Coast Police Zone**

The police zone of the West-Coast police spans three municipalities located at the Belgian coast in the judicial district of Veurne in the province of West-Flanders (see Figure 1.1). The municipalities are Koksijde (population of about 22.000), De Panne (population of about 11.000) and Nieuwpoort (population of about 11.000). This part of Belgium is very popular for older people, who come here to enjoy their retirement. As a result, about 60% of the population is older than 55 years. For this residential community, the community model works properly, as the majority of the population is looking to enjoy the final years of their life in a nice and tranquil environment. The local safety and security issues related to the residential community can therefore be tackled effectively through partnerships with and integration in this stable part of the community.

**Figure 1.1 Police Zones, Judicial Districts, and Provinces in Belgium**  
(Police Zone West-Coast is indicated in green)



However, because the police zone is located at the Belgian coast, during the summer months, hundreds of thousands of tourists visit the police zone daily to

### *Case Study One – Belgium*

enjoy the beaches and sea. The municipality of de Panne is also located against the border with France, about 20 kilometers from the city of Dunkirk (population of about 72.000 and 270.000 in the greater metropolitan area). This means that many tourists visiting the police zone are French foreigners. Furthermore, the police zone is also an important transit zone, as freeway A18/E40 crosses the police zone that physically connects Northern Europe with the United Kingdom, via the tunnel in Calais (France). In this context, a mere focus on the local or stable part of the community is insufficient, as the community can also be characterised by a large ‘fluid’ part.

The West-Coast is a rather small police force, with a total capacity of a mere 171 police officers. During the police reforms, the government established the so-called KUL-norm, on the basis of which the staff size and budget of local police zones is determined. The main criterion of the KUL-norm is the size of the municipalities that the police zone is composed of, without regard to tourism, transit zones, or locations at the border. As a result, the KUL-norm for West-Coast police was set to 131. At the time, there were actually 171 police officers active in the police zone, 131 municipal police officers, and 40 gendarmerie police officers. Fortunately, the police council, the mayors of the respective municipalities, decided to also keep the gendarmerie police officers on board.

#### **To summarise:**

- The West-Coast police zone can be characterized by a stable and a fluid part;
- The stable part of the community is represented by a small residential community;
- The fluid part of the community is represented by a large number of tourists, a transit zone, and the location at the French border;
- The police force is rather small, with only 171 police officers.

#### **Safety and Security Issues in West-Coast Police Zone**

The characteristics of the police zone provide significant challenges to the rather small police force. First of all, the fact that the livelihood of the community is dependent upon tourism makes it extremely important to effectively combat safety and security issues in the community. Tourists come to enjoy their free time to unwind, relax, and want to avoid being confronted with crime, social disorder, or fear of crime in any form, shape, or colour. Otherwise, they will take

### *Nodal Orientation at West-Coast Police*

their business elsewhere, and the community as a whole suffers. Second, as mentioned previously, the community can be characterised by a large fluid part that limits the appropriateness of the community model considerably. Especially if the criminals and victims are only visiting the police zone for a couple of hours as tourists, it becomes extremely difficult to pro-actively address safety and security issues effectively. For example, consider the theft of a purse of a tourist by a hit-and-run criminal from the north of France. If both the perpetrator and the criminal do not linger at the crime scene, it becomes extremely difficult to prevent or even solve this crime.

According to the chief of police, the biggest challenge is to effectively combat global safety and security caused by inter-zone mobility, and in particular international mobility. After all, the advantage that non-local criminals or criminals from outside the local police zone have is that they are anonymous and not known by local people or the local police. This makes it easier for them to avoid getting caught and extremely difficult for the police to tackle the related safety and security issues effectively. Many criminals originate from the North of France (Warlop, 2011), especially from the poorer regions surrounding Dunkirk. A narrow interpretation of the community model, a community model without a nodal orientation to tackle global issues, does not provide any modalities to combat this phenomenon effectively. What is needed is information and knowledge about the movements (or flows) of potential criminals. During the summer months, with several hundred thousands of tourists visiting daily, this is impossible with a staff of only 171 police officers. Hence, the police chief realising early on that a nodal orientation was the way forward to combat specific inter-zone safety and security issues.

#### **To summarise:**

- Tourism makes safety and security extremely important;
- Traditional community model inappropriate for fluid part of the community, especially the border provides significant challenges;
- Nodal orientation needed to effectively combat global or inter-zone safety and security issues.

#### **A Nodal Orientation**

The traditional orientation of police work is reactive, after the crime has taken place or has been executed. However, in times of overloaded justice departments, it might be more efficient to battle crime in the earlier stages of a

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crime (Paelinck, 2011). This can be explained on the basis of Patricia Brantingham stages of a crime, which are: (1) the decision-making stage, where the perpetrator decides to commit a crime, either consciously planned or impulsive and irrational, (2) the search stage, where the perpetrator searches for a potential victim or crime scene, and finally, (3) the execution stage, where the crime is actually committed. A nodal orientation can be defined as the acquisition, analyses, and evaluation of information related to safety and security issues to take the appropriate action to combat them effectively. Practically, this entails monitoring the flow of people, goods, information, and money so that potential criminals can be identified before they actually commit a crime. As such, it is a more proactive approach that combats crime before it actually occurs. Instead of an exclusive focus on the crime, there is also a focus on the criminal as they go from the stage of decision-making to the execution of a particular crime.

#### **To summarise:**

- Three stages of a crime: (1) decision-making stage, (2) search stage, and (3) execution stage;
- A proactive approach to combating crime before stage of execution requires a nodal orientation, that is, the monitoring of flow of people, goods, information, and/or money.

#### **The Nodal Orientation of West-Coast Police**

The Chief of Police initiated the nodal orientation of West-Coast police after becoming aware of this in the UK and the Netherlands. However, the technology needed for such an approach does not come cheap, and as local police forces are dependent upon local governments for funding, it was necessary to get the local government on board for this project. The Chief of Police then decided to prepare the case thoroughly and planned a number of work visits to foreign police forces that had already adopted a nodal orientation. This would enable studying this approach in real time, as it is used by police forces to combat the safety and security issues at hand. For these work visits, the police chief decided to invite the stakeholders of this project, as they needed to be on board to provide funding and support. He also invited the members of the police council such as the mayors of the three municipalities and the attorney general of the judicial district of Veurne. There were two work visits to the UK, one to Kent, England and one to Edinburgh, Scotland. There was also one work visit to

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Amsterdam, the Netherlands. During these work visits, the stakeholders could observe how such a project contributed to police work in practice, and decide for themselves whether this is the way forward in their own police zone. It did not take long for them to realise that this was indeed the way forward, as it provided an effective solution to the problems faced at home. Hence, the work visits clearly aligned stakeholder needs, which effectively paved the way for the implementation of the project. Basically, the nodal orientation at West-Coast police consists of the following steps:

- Monitor flow of vehicles
- Identify vehicles of potential criminals
- Evaluate information
- Take appropriate action
  - Do not take action
  - Intercept
  - Monitor

For the first part, cameras with Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) software are used to monitor the vehicles that are entering the police zone. In the second part, the number plates are matched against databases containing number plates of criminal and suspicious vehicles to identify potential criminals.

Basically, the system provides a signal or hit of the entry of a suspicious vehicle into the police zone, and in the third leg the police evaluate this information on the basis of the priorities at that time. In the fourth and final leg, appropriate action is taken on the basis of the evaluation. This revolves around the following basic options: do not take action, intercept, and monitor.

No action will be undertaken if it does not match with the priorities at that time. Of course, at a later stage, follow up remains possible. This can occur when there are more pressing matters at hand and no capacity, for example an intervention unit, is available to take the appropriate action at that time. The second alternative is the vehicle is intercepted, which implies that an intervention unit pulls over the vehicle, identifies the potential criminals, and gathers additional information through the use of telecom equipment such as mobile telephones, SIM-cards and GPS systems. This has two effects. It gives the police information advantage, in the sense that when a potential criminal offends, the police already have a great deal of information about them. It also

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raises the criminal's awareness of being explicitly identified by the police and significantly decreases the likelihood of them actually committing the felony. From the perspective of a potential criminal, this is likely to be highly irritating, and this approach is therefore labelled Very Irritating Police (VIP). This method combines various backgrounds, skills, and experiences, as whole interconnecting systems and routines had to be developed that facilitate such an approach for example CCTV, ANPR, telecom equipment, fast intervention, et cetera. The third and final alternative is to monitor the suspicious vehicle by following them to gather additional information. Obviously, which approach is taken depends upon the priorities at the time and the specific case at hand.

This approach helps the battle against safety and security issues proactively and reactively. Proactively, when potential perpetrators are intercepted and identified, this significantly decreases the likelihood that they will actually commit a crime in the first place. According to the police chief, we take potential perpetrators out of the anonymity by identifying them. This serves two objectives. The identity of a potential criminal is available so if they decide to commit a crime, this greatly facilitates any investigation. Also the potential criminals are aware of the fact they are being monitored, and by removing anonymity, it increases the likelihood of them being caught if they do commit a crime.

Reactively, detailed information about the flows of vehicles in the police zone increases the information that can be used to solve crimes. This is best illustrated by a concrete example from the chief of police:

*'We recently had a series of burglaries in the police zone. These burglaries were committed on different days, and we only had fragmented testimonies from a number of witnesses. For example, one witness noticed a black car and another witness remembered a car with a foreign number plate. These fragments were combined in a query of the system to identify a list of potential matches of cars that entered the police zone around the time that the burglaries were committed. The next step entailed deleting the vehicles that do not belong on this list, such as, for example, a bakery delivery service that takes place every morning from France. The number plates of the vehicles on the short list are put back in the system, so that we are notified when the vehicle enters the zone. This vehicle is then intercepted and checked thoroughly, the people are identified, and*

### *Nodal Orientation at West-Coast Police*

*telephones, sim cards, and gps systems are read. Telecom data is then used to do a mast-investigation, to see where the telephone was during these burglaries. If this additional investigation provides a match than the next time the vehicle enters the police zone the people are arrested, or they are arrested immediately if they reside in Belgium and the police knows where precisely. Finally, a trace evidence investigation is conducted; houses are searched and fingerprints taken. This approach focuses much more on the criminal, and less on the individual crime. We were able to actually catch the criminals because of our nodal orientation. Without it, we can only catch them in the act.'*

### **Resources and Capabilities**

In this section, we will shortly describe some of the resources and capabilities required for the implementation of a nodal orientation. With respect to resources, the three most important ones are: (1) capital, (2) technology, (3) information, and (4) formal and informal relations. First and foremost, capital is needed to acquire the technology that provides the backbone of a nodal orientation. As mentioned, local police forces are dependent upon local governments for this particular resource. The second resource is the actual technology that is needed to monitor the particular flow of people, goods, and/or money in the context of the safety and security issue at hand. Obviously, different safety and security issues require different technologies. Consider, for example, the different technological requirements to battle cybercrime versus burglaries. To combat inter-zone mobility of perpetrators, the West-Coast police chief decided to acquire the following technology:

- CCTV with ANPR: this technology was 'bought' from the UK.
- Technology to read out telecom equipment (e.g., mobile phones, SIM-cards, and GPS systems) was acquired from Israel.

The third main resource required for the implementation of a nodal orientation is information. The system needs to be fed with information about suspicious vehicles, so that the system can provide a hit when this vehicle enters the police zone. Obviously, a great deal of information is already available within the police zone, on the basis of previous and current investigations. However, to effectively tackle inter-zone issues, information from outside the police zone is also needed. To access this information, formal and informal relations are needed, the fourth and final resource. The inter-zone information has two

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components, national and international. Regarding the national information, the District Information Crossroad is responsible for the exchange of information between police zones, and can thus provide information about suspicious vehicles from outside the local police zone. Regarding the international component, we have already explained that many safety and security issues are related to France. This means that effective channels of communication with France are of the utmost importance. Formally, this is arranged through the Centre for Cooperation for Police and Customs (CCPD) located in Tournai (Belgium), which is a shared commissariat of France and Belgium police. However, according to the police chief, the information received from the CCPD is often outdated, because formal channels often take too much time. What is needed is a direct communication link with the Dunkirk police, which is only possible through informal relations. Fortunately, the police chief recognized the importance of the link with France early on, and by now the relationships with Dunkirk police are well established. The police chief explains:

*'It often takes a couple of hours before a car is formally reported stolen in France. We have intercepted many cars that were not even reported stolen in France. For example, recently, there was a carjacking in Dunkirk and we received the number plate from our French colleagues in real time. Ten minutes later, the car was spotted in Nieuwpoort.'*

The police chief further comments that they do have a good working relationship with the CCPD and do check the information with them extensively.

The most important capabilities are technological literacy, analysis and investigation, dispatching, and intervention. Technological literacy refers to the fact that the staff must be able to effectively work with the technology, and keep the system running and up-to-date. Police officers were trained internally to manage data and write queries and a systems analysis has been appointed. Obviously, the effectiveness of a nodal orientation depends to a large extent on the capability to analyse the information that is generated by the technology. On the basis of this analysis, suspicious flows such as vehicle movements in this particular case can be identified, which can then be fed back into the system to monitor when they enter the police zone. In addition, when an intervention takes place, telecom information is gathered that can be combined with the ANPR data and two crime analysts are currently working on this task. Because the information can also be used in criminal investigations, the investigation units



also need to be oriented more towards the use of this technology. What is also needed is your own dispatching, with people that are fully acquainted with the methodology and the workings of a nodal orientation. Initially, West-Coast police was using a central provincial dispatching service located in Bruges. However, this did not work, and the police chief soon realised they needed their own dispatching service (with a staff of eight people), so that all components of the system could work together as a well-oiled machine.

The final capability that is needed is a strong intervention unit, with low arrival times. The reason is that the hits generated by the system need to be followed up directly and in a prompt manner. Because cameras are placed on the entry roads into the police zone only (and not throughout the police zone), there is a limited time frame to intercept the suspicious vehicle before it is off the radar. Fortunately, the intervention capacity has always been rather strong due to the capacity requirements during the busy summer months.

**To summarise:**

- Required resources are capital, technology, information, and relationships.
- The required capabilities are technological literacy, analysis and investigation, dispatching, and a strong intervention unit.

**Obstacles**

There are also a number of obstacles that can be identified. The first obstacle was capital, as the technology does not come cheap. We have already indicated that local government funds more than the law obliges it to. The nodal orientation entailed an additional cost of approximately 5% of the total police budget, which is a significant amount. This money had to be financed by the three municipalities that make up the West-Coast police zone such as Koksijde, De Panne, and Nieuwpoort). Hence, local government needed to be on board with the project, as they provide the financing for this project. As mentioned, the work visits helped significantly in this respect.

The second obstacle was technology due to a number of initial difficulties (or bugs) in applying the UK technology in Belgium. The reason is that Belgian number plates have red letters and numbers against a white background, which is extremely difficult to read in the dark. Furthermore, number plates are not tied

### *Case Study One – Belgium*

to the vehicle but to the individual, and every time you buy a new vehicle you have to change your own personal plates. This means that over time, many plates have screw holes at different places. As a result, in the early phases of the project, there were a lot of errors that produced faulty hits or no hits at all. This automatically brings us to the third obstacle, staff participation/attitude.

The third obstacle was the initial resistance of staff towards the new system. The main reason for this is twofold. First, due to the large number of errors in the early stages, staff were often disappointed as they searched for a vehicle that was not there (due to the false hit). The second reason is related to the first. Staff need to be convinced of the advantages of a system before they adopt it wholeheartedly. Because of the great deal of errors in the initial stages, this was impossible. Hence, the bugs had to be fixed, after which positive feedback would convince staff of the effectiveness of the new system. According to the chief of police:

*'...it takes at least three years to change routines, and success is necessary to convince people'.*

The fourth and obstacle for this project is privacy. According to the police chief, there never has been a real political debate in Belgium about a nodal orientation and the privacy issues involved. Therefore, politicians, media, and academics concerned with privacy in and of itself or as part of their political or personal agenda, express their concern with respect to privacy. For example, in the beginning of this year, information was leaked to the press about the VIP project. The project was completely misinterpreted, which resulted in a significant amount of negative media attention. According to the police chief:

*'Recording all flows assumes that everybody is a potential criminal, which cannot be said as it goes against the assumption that everybody is innocent until proven guilty'.*

According to Prof. de Hert, who specialises in issues relating to privacy and technology, human rights and criminal law, this is only part of the problem. The question of who has access to this wealth of information is also of a major concern, and his main fear is that of a police state, in which the police have

access to information/knowledge about all movements of people. However, according to the police chief:

*‘The police do not need to know everything. The police needs to know what they need to know in the context of fighting crime, and the rest is of no concern to the police.’* It is basically a matter of trust. *“You also trust your physician. If you go to your physician to get a medical check you trust that your health condition will be kept confidential. With us, you also have to have trust”* (Panorama, 2011).

The mayor of Koksijde explains it as follows:

*‘People often have the wrong idea about this project. There is nobody who is looking at these images to use them for his or her advantage. I used to be a notary, and in this function I often handled divorce cases, where the property had to be divided between parties. During these cases, you have little attention for the personal details. You do your job, and that’s it.’*

#### **To summarise:**

The main obstacles for the project were:

- Capital requirements;
- Technological difficulties;
- Staff attitude;
- Privacy concerns.

#### **Enablers**

We can also identify a number of enablers, which have contributed positively to the implementation and success of this nodal orientation. First, the alignment of needs has contributed significantly to the successful implementation of this project. This is illustrated by a simple overview of the needs of the stakeholders directly or indirectly involved in the project:

- Administration/government (positive): less crime, increased feeling of safety and security, no privacy concerns;
- Public prosecutor/justice department (positive): crimes are solved more efficiently, and higher conviction rates due to better case files;

### *Case Study One – Belgium*

- Federal Judicial Police (positive): better information about movements of criminals in police zone West-Coast;
- Foreign police (positive): more information of the movements of potential perpetrators in West-Coast police zone (Belgium)
- Other local police (positive): better informed partner to tackle inter zone safety and security issues;
- Federal police (CSD, CCPD, AIK) (positive): rich information that can be used for strategic analysis of patterns of crime and exchanged with partners;
- Media (negative and positive): negative: privacy concerns, positive: tackle high profile safety and security issues;
- Citizens (positive): increased (perception of) safety and security;
- Criminals (negative): increased convictions, greater likelihood of being caught.

The alignment of needs between local government and police is extremely important in this respect, as the local government is responsible for the budget of the police. The fact that the three municipalities are all touristic coastal municipalities probably contributes significantly in this respect, as this implies that they all face similar safety and security issues.


Second, the track record of the police chief has also contributed significantly to the successful implementation of the project. According to the Mayor of Koksijde:

*'We are extremely satisfied with the working of the police and the police chief and this has certainly contributed to the decision to go ahead with the project.'*

Objective data reveal that police zone West-Coast has decreasing crime rates as compared to the national figures, see Figure 1.2

Third, success stories were also a strong enabler for the success of the project, both for internal staff and external stakeholders. Regarding internal staff, the police chief explains that to overcome the resistance of staff to changing routines, success stories are needed that demonstrates the effectiveness of the approach for example cases that only get solved because of the system or cases that only get opened because of the system.

**Figure 1.2 Reported Crimes in West-Coast Police Zone as a ratio of Belgium as a whole**



Source: infozone.be

The same applies to the external stakeholders. As mentioned, the VIP project received a great deal of initial negative media attention. This all changed when a high profile case was solved using the VIP approach. The police chief explains:

*'This summer, we had a problem with French Skinheads on the Coastal tram (the coastal tram runs along the Belgian coast between De Panne and Knokke), who were traveling from Duinkirk to Oostende every Friday to visit some party. About 15-30 skinheads took the bus to Adinkerke, to take the tram to Oostende from there. The police watched the video from the tram to get an idea of what they were up against. The skinheads were terrorizing the whole tram. They intimidated people, and chased them from their seats. Then they formed a group around a black kid, and started to call names while also making the Hitler-sign. Hence, we decided to conduct systematic controls to intercept them, identify them and take pictures of them to take them out of the anonymity. After four weeks, they did not show up any more, because we knew them, and they wanted to prevent problems. Most likely, they were still going to Oostende, by via alternative means, perhaps by car.'*

Fourth and finally, the personal relationships of the police chief are also of extreme importance for the success of this project. As explained previously, the

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success of this project depends not only on the inner workings of the local police force, but also on the external stakeholders.

#### **To summarise:**

The main enablers of this project are:

- Alignment of needs;
- Track record of the police chief;
- Quick wins or success stories;
- Strong personal relationships.

#### **Evaluation of Project Performance**

Given the fact that the project contributes to all stakeholders, it should come as no surprise that the project is perceived to be highly successful by the main stakeholders. The Mayor of Koksijde explains:

*‘We have already had good results with the project by solving crimes. We are very satisfied with the working of the police, and the feeling of safety and security is really good among both residents and tourists’.*

According to the Public Prosecutor:

*‘Cameras are useful because we have a better picture of who enters the police zone, and we have a better picture of repeat offenders and criminals. Without cameras certain facts would remain hidden and other cases would not be solved so easily. This leads to better trials and more convictions’.*

The police chief makes clear that the nodal orientation has enabled them to solve cases that would not have been solved otherwise, as demonstrated by the following examples:


*‘We received complaints about a gypsy couple who were scamming people and stealing their personal belongings. This was all the information we had from them, which is not much. We decided to contact our French colleagues to find out whether they know gypsies. They did, and provided us with the make of the car and the number plate. This allowed us to observe, follow, and catch them in the act. This would have not been possible without our nodal orientation.’*

*Nodal Orientation at West-Coast Police*

*'Many youngster from the North of France cross the border to go out, mainly because bars and clubs close much later here in Belgium. They often drink a lot and take drugs, and start causing problems. As a result, bars and clubs start rejecting them, which even aggravates the problem. Then the problems really start, as they start fights and start stealing things. At about 04.00-05.00 they are gone again. By taking these youth out of the anonymity by identifying them before the problems start they are less likely to cause problems, because they know they have been identified and are monitored by the police.'*

Next, we take a closer look on more objective data in our effort to determine the effectiveness of the nodal orientation as West-Coast police. In the following figures, we plot the ratio of official crime rates in the West-Coast police zone as compared to different levels of aggregation (see Figures 1.3 to 1.5). Regarding the categories, the pure coastal police zones refer to those police zones where all municipalities are coastal municipalities. We include this category because coastal figures might be influenced by conditions like the weather. According to these statistics, from 2000 to 2005, police zone West-Coast was highly effective compared to all other levels of aggregation, as becomes apparent by the drop in the ratio of crimes conducted in the West-Coast police zone.

**Figure 1.3 The Ratio of Official Crimes in West-Coast Compared to Coastal Police Zones<sup>5</sup>**




Source: infozone.be

<sup>5</sup>These are the following police zones: PZ Westkust, PZ Oostende, PZ Bredene de Haan, and PZ Middelkerke.

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
From 2005 to 2006, we see a small increase in the crime rate at West-Coast police compared to the different levels of aggregation. From 2006 onwards, we again witness a drop in most of the figures. Given the previous declining trend in crime rates at West-Coast police, it is difficult to tease out the precise effect of

**Figure 1.4 The Ratio of Official Crimes in West-Coast Compared to Coastal Police Zones<sup>6</sup>**



Source: infozone.be

**Figure 1.5 The Ratio of Official Crimes in West-Coast Compared to the Province of West-Flanders**



Source: infozone.be

<sup>6</sup>In addition to the pure coastal police zones, these also include the following police zones: PZ Brugge, PZ Blankenberge- Zuienkerke, and PZ Damme-Knokke Heist.



this orientation. However, we can also consider make the following observations that hint toward the success of this project:

- The Governor of the province of West-Flanders has introduced the VIP project in the provincial Security Council, and distributed it to all police zones in West-Flanders as a best practice.
- Many other police zones in Belgium are also adopting the use of cameras with ANPR to combat safety and security issues. According to Polinfo.be (an online library for police officers), currently about 30 police zones have implemented cameras with ANPR, a number that is expected to increase in the future.<sup>7</sup>
- While initially badly received by the media in April 2011, newspapers have proclaimed the VIP methodology as a major success in the fight against crime and nuisance. Especially the story about the French skinheads was received very positive by the media.

**To summarise:**

- The nodal orientation at West-Coast police is highly successful;
- A sharp increase can be witnessed in the usage of cameras with ANPR by local police zones.

**Conclusion**

In this report, we have briefly documented an organisational change project at West-Coast Police in Belgium. This change project entailed the transformation from a narrow community model to a broader community model, by adopting a nodal orientation to monitor and control the flow of movement within parts of the community. Lessons were learned regarding the process of organisational change. A successful approach to combat crime is unthinkable without the coupling of local action (signalling in the community), with relevant (inter)nationally known movements/traffic of offender groups, money, information, and goods (Annual report West-Coast police, 2009). Communities are not bound by borders and are not geographically limited. Therefore, what is needed is a community model of policing combined with a nodal orientation that can be applied at different levels within any community, irrespective of its size and/or location.

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<sup>7</sup>Source: <http://www.polinfo.be/NewsView.aspx?contentdomains=POLICEB&id=VS201338620>

### *Case Study One – Belgium*

This case study describes the adoption of a nodal orientation by a local police zone in Belgium to combat specific safety and security issues. Obviously, the system would be much more efficient if it could be implemented nationally or internationally in the EU, as this would allow the movement of offenders to be tracked over the whole of Belgium or the EU. Although we fully subscribe to this opinion, we have to also consider the possibilities of misuse of such a system, to minimise the possibility of evolving into a police state (in line with the reservations of Prof. de Hert). Misuse can never be fully prevented. However, if it is closely monitored, it can be detected at an early stage, so that corrective action can be taken. One solution would be to store access logs of the system within the Justice Department (or at committee P in Belgium, as this is the Permanent Oversight Committee on the Police Services, which exercises external oversight over the Belgian police and all civil servants with police authority). After all, the department of justice has the role of judge in society.

This means they have the capability to judge whether the intended use of the data by police (and government) is moral.

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## 2

### **Safe Location – Safe Housing**

THE MUNICIPAL POLICE OF BRNO, THE CZECH REPUBLIC

**Zdenko Reguli and Michal Vit**  
(Masaryk University)

#### **Acknowledgements**

This case study was written with help from the Municipal Police of Brno.

#### **Background Information**

Safe Location - Safe Housing<sup>8</sup> is a project implemented by the Municipal Police of Brno to increase the safety of citizens living in an apartment block in the district of Nový Lískovec on the outskirts of Brno. The project was initiated by the Crime Prevention Department of the Municipal Police of Brno. The Municipal Police of Brno - Nový Lískovec office, implemented it with financial support from the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic and the Statutory City of Brno.

The Brno Metropolitan Police (MP) was established by the City of Brno in 1992. MP is a body of the municipality tasked to secure local public order, as well as those tasks according to the Act No. 553/1991 of Collection on Metropolitan Police.

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<sup>8</sup> Information about the project is available (in Czech) on the website: <http://www.mpb.cz/pro-verejnost/bezpecna-lokalita-bezpecne-bydleni/>

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Brno MP's main tasks include:

- contributing to personal and property security
- watching over adherence to the rules of community peaceful co-existence
- ensuring traffic safety
- identifying offences against the law and other administrative civil wrongdoings
- notifying individuals and corporations about the violation of the law and taking remedial measures

The project, based in No. 470/5 Koniklecová Street, is primarily focused on security, peace and risks inside the apartment house (see maps in Appendix 2.2). It is hoped, nevertheless, that the minimisation or even total elimination of the risks will positively influence the security and peace situation in the immediate vicinity. The safety, peace and social risks as well as the levels of danger felt by the residents was defined in the early part of the project.

**Table 2.1 Basic Information Summary**

<b>Name</b>	Safe Location – Safe Housing
<b>Police Force</b>	Brno Metropolitan Police
<b>Date of Realisation</b>	2009 - 2010
<b>Budget (in CZK)</b>	Phase I – 75,000 Phase II – 1, 000,000 Phase III – 100,000

***Implementation Group and Tasks***

Implementation of the project included a range of technical, legal and social issues that were necessary to chart, consult and finally resolve. Due to this an implementation group was established in 2009, which represented all the institutions and expertise (see Project Partners in Appendix 2.1).

The implementation group worked as a unit; however, the project manager used personal and professional consultations as well as operational meetings to deal with individual technical and legal issues. The project manager was also liaising and working closely with Advisory Situational Crime Prevention MV ČR0, who with the Department of Crime Prevention, were the main provider of grants as

well as the technical and operational guarantor of the whole project. Consultations and information from colleagues within the Regional Directorate of Police, Fire and Rescue Service, as well as the Probation and Mediation Service were also essential. Substantial cooperation with the Association of Technical Security Services in searching optimal technical solutions undoubtedly led to the optimal setting of the system. The second important provider and operational partner was the Statutory City of Brno, who was represented on the implementation group by the Coordinating Centre of Prevention.

### **Project Objectives**

There were seven objectives within the project that related to community policing:

- The actual and perceptual increase in the security of the residents and the surrounding buildings
- The reduction of anonymity in the buildings and a reinforcement of a sense of personal responsibility
- The reduction of unknown and unauthorised people in the building
- The reduction of damaging the building's facilities (vandalism)
- The prevention of crime and offences on the premises and in surrounding buildings
- A heightened presence of social services in the building or in the immediate vicinity
- Improved cooperation, commitment and communication between the public, the police and local government

The main drivers for planning and implementing the project were crime rates, police performance, and subjective perception of public safety within the City of Brno. Key findings from a sociological survey '*Perception of safety of the inhabitants of the city of Brno*'<sup>9</sup> show that:

- Fear of theft within the home is one of the four greatest risks perceived by the public within the City
- 86% did not allow a 'stranger' access to their homes and more than 50% of respondents have invested in a safer entrance door

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<sup>9</sup>Source: Sociological survey from 2005 done by Metropolitan Police

### *Case Study Two – The Czech Republic*

- 70% of respondents did not feel completely safe in their own home (both at night and during the day)
- Respondents felt most threatened in the entrance halls, stairs and lift
- The majority of respondents felt safe during the day in their own flats
- In the building, especially in the entrance area in the afternoon and evening, strangers can be present which causes concern to more than two thirds of the residents as these strangers tend to congregate within the common areas, they may be under the influence of alcohol and are liable to disturb the peace
- Despite this the residents do not attempt to help the situation by locking the front door

This survey helped confirm the need to introduce security technology and safe behaviour techniques and the willingness by the public to consider them. The project when it was piloted developed within the existing security risks.

### **Project Implementation**

#### *Phase I*

A wide choice of residential buildings was proposed by representatives of the Municipal Police Brno, Preventive Information Department of the Czech State Police and the Crime Prevention Co-ordination Centre at the Brno Municipality. These buildings were located within different city and police districts, each with different problems and issues. The building at No 5 Koniklecová was chosen. This apartment house is a 13-floor concrete building with 156 small-area flats that will accommodate over 500 people. The tenants comprise those who are socially, ethnically or nationally excluded minorities. In the main area of the house there is the illegal abuse of addictive substances, people are attacked, the house facilities are damaged, aggressive and intoxicated strangers are present and finally there is the threat to the safety of the tenants and immediate neighbourhood. Before the project, the house did not have any security system in place. Frequently used areas of the house had doors equipped with standard mechanical locks and cylindrical inserts. Ground floor windows to basements were not secured by any barriers systems (grids, foils, lockable handles, etc.). Hydrants and dry standpipes were damaged or incomplete. The house did not have an effective monitoring mechanism in place and social work with the tenants was minimal (with the exception of an area for mothers with children).

### ***Phase II***

Technical measures were systematically introduced:

- Clarifying the use of space.
- Development and installation of authorized entry.
- Design and installation of supporting surveillance and reporting systems.
- Preparation and implementation of social prevention.

The role of the police was considered:<sup>10</sup>

- Regular meetings between local police constables/police representatives and residents' councils.
- Attendance of constables/police officers in house meetings.
- Allowing the police to access the building.
- Support and assistance when dealing with crime and criminal activities.
- Designation of houses that are under increased police surveillance.

### ***Phase III***

Phase III is long-term and will continue after the formal end of the project:

- A social assistant for recreational activities will be employed who will mediate between the City, the Municipal and the State Police and the tenants of the house. Their role will include supervision, consulting and raising awareness to help resolve the issues within the house and the low-threshold clubhouse.
- Activity within the low-threshold clubhouse in the apartment house will continue. These activities, with the Centre of Leisure Time Lužánky, will provide recreational programmes for children.
- An Education and Information Campaign run by the Brno Department of Municipal Police will commence for the tenants of the apartment house and will focus on the prevention of crime and social pathologies.
- The close cooperation of the Municipal and the State Police with the care taker and the City in solving current and on-going issues and problems will continue.
- Within the immediate neighbourhood there will be increased police patrol activity (Municipal and State Police), which should help to

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<sup>10</sup>Source: Department of Crime Prevention, Czech Ministry of the Interior

### *Case Study Two – The Czech Republic*

minimize the potential shift of public disorder from the apartment building to the surrounding neighbourhood vicinity.

- If required, co-operation with the Probation and Mediation Service<sup>11</sup> in dealing with potential conflicts will continue.

#### ***Target Group***

The project was developed with the tenants as the target group and the outcomes subsequently defined:

- Creation of a functional model such as an apartment house using social, organisational, and technical processes to maintain public order and civil coexistence whilst raising the standard of safety of individuals and of the property.
- A tangible increase in the safety of the tenants within the apartment house.
- A tangible increase in the safety of the tenants within the neighbouring houses.
- Reduction of anonymity in the houses and a strengthening of personal responsibility.
- Reduction of the risk of movement of ‘strange’ (unknown, unauthorized) persons within the premises of the apartment house.
- Reduction of the risk of damage to the property through vandalism.
- Avoidance of committing crime and offenses on the premises and the surrounding neighbourhood.
- The improvement of social services offered within the house and/or in the immediate vicinity.
- Improved communication and cooperation by the public with the police and local government.

It is evident that the Brno District local government within Nový Lískovec plays an important role in the public’s perception of safety. Measures adopted by the Brno City District within Nový Lískovec include:

- The position of a full-time caretaker has been established in the house together with a lady who provides house cleaning; both are tenants of the apartment house. As well as cleaning and minor repairs, they

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<sup>11</sup>Ministry of Justice



### *Safe Location – Safe Housing*

oversee the house order and compliance of rules laid down by the owner of the house.

- With the support of the City of Brno the property was adjusted for the tenants and as well as the creation of a clubhouse for the children of the tenants.
- The clubhouse was also furnished and equipment purchased for leisure activities.
- The Centre of Leisure Time Lužánky was established with the support from the City of Brno and two people were employed to work with the children.
- During the 2010 the apartment house was refurbished. It was thermally insulated, plastic windows and balcony doors were fitted, new balconies were installed and the lifts were replaced in accordance with European Safety Standards.

#### **Procedures Adopted within the Project**

Prior to the implementation of specific procedures, extensive and thorough preparation took place. The steps taken to achieve these procedures were:

##### ***Step One***

Defining the purpose of the house together with the rules relating to the use of the common areas. Defining the levels of access to the common areas, determining the expected levels of security, which required identification processes and adoption of shared responsibility.

##### ***Step Two***

Developing safe and secure access points. Developing safety standards and evacuation procedures.

##### ***Step Three***

Achieving optimal levels of safety for the tenants of the apartment house with the implementation of surveillance and premier support systems.

##### ***Step Four***

Achieving optimal levels of safety for the tenants of the apartment house with the implementation of crime-prevention and social development programmes.

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These programmes were aimed at specific tenant target groups within the apartment house as well as residents within the neighbourhood.

These steps contributed toward the final goal of the apartment house having clear organisational and technical support systems in place. The security strategy and technical support systems were based on the following activities:

- Understanding and knowing the movement of people in the house and minimising anonymity
- Restricting the movement and access to ‘strangers’ within the house
- Fire prevention and early detection of fire risk
- Ensuring tenants are aware of their own personal responsibility at all times

The City of Brno and the City District of Nový Lískovec worked in partnership to create the most appropriate conditions for implementing the project. A full-time caretaker position has been established as well as building and reconstruction work carried out and a clubhouse created for the children living within the house. The work of the Centrum volného času Lužánky (Lužánky Leisure time centre) has been launched in the clubhouse, with two professionals being employed to work with the children. During 2010 a total refurbishment of the residential building took place.

A clear guide to the organisational policies and system processes has been written and is known to the police and the City District as the ‘*Principles of Good and Safe Use of the Flat and Building*’. These principles include:

- House Rules – describes what is acceptable behaviour and sets out clearly the rules (rights and duties) for those using the flat and the building.
- Provides information on the surveillance of the building and how activities are monitored throughout the building. This includes information about the existence and functioning of auxiliary access, surveillance and alarm systems.
- Provides information on contacts - informs about contacts for people and institutions that ensure the operation and management of the building and hostel

Principles of good and safe practice within the flat and building can be applied in certain areas of the apartment house:

***Mailbox Area behind the Main Entrance Door***

*Guidelines for use:* Upon arrival and on departure lock the door; discourage unauthorised entry. After opening the first front door using the electronic gateway. Meet and collect a visitor personally in the mailbox.

*Proposed procedures:* First and second entrance door - Dallas key<sup>12</sup> and panic handle. Reception - support access system, fire-reporting point, surveillance online. CCTV point (lighting, on-line facility, recording, motion-sensitive activation).

*Comments:* In the reception there will also be support systems for the caretaker/crime prevention assistant. The reception will also be the main point of contact for the police, the post, the clubhouse, et cetera. The fire warning system will operate according to standards.

***Area behind the Second Entrance Doors - in front of the lifts and cellar***

*Guidelines for use:* Lock the door, discourage unauthorised entry. Activities with children within the clubhouse require supervision and entrance must be authorised.

*Proposed procedures:* Door to the stairwell – Dallas key from the stairwell where there is a standard handle. Door to the cellars - Dallas key (according to the location of the cellar), inside there is a standard handle. CCTV point (lighting, on-line facility, recording, motion-sensitive activation).

***Staircase Area (Stair Hallway)***

*Guidelines for use:* Close the doors on the ground floor (entrance to the staircase) and on the residential floors (entrance to the residential halls). Discourage unauthorized entry to the residential halls and stairways.

*Proposed procedures:* Door to the main exit - standard handle (alt. panic handle). Door to the residential halls - Dallas key, inside there is a standard handle. CCTV point (lighting, on-line facility, recording, motion-sensitive activation). The fire warning system will operate according to standards.

*Comments:* Support systems for the concierge and caretaker/crime prevention assistant.

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<sup>12</sup>A Dallas key (or iButton) is able to provide high levels of security at low cost. Using computer chip technology attached to a key fob access to a building, a PC, a piece of equipment, or a vehicle can be restricted dependent on the level of access granted to an individual.

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***Area of Emergency Exit from the Stairway***

*Guidelines for use:* Currently, the rules set by fire regulations are valid. Access is good with no restrictions and unauthorized access impossible. The use of the emergency exit by the tenants is forbidden.

*Proposed procedures:* Emergency exit from the inside use the panic handle. Emergency exit from the outside, there are no hardware handles. Lights with motion-sensitive switching.

*Comments:* Supporting system through surveillance.

***Lift Cabin Spaces***

*Guidelines for use:* No support for unauthorized use.

*Proposed procedures:* The use of lifts - Dallas key. CCTV point (lighting, on-line facility, recording, motion-sensitive activation). The fire warning system will operate according to standards.

*Comments:* Support systems used by the caretaker.

***Area of Residential Corridors***

*Guidelines for use:* Close the entrance door from the stairs into the drying room, discourage unauthorized entry from the stairwell to the residential corridors and unauthorized use of lifts.

*Proposed procedures:* Door to the stairwell – use a standard handle. Door to the drying room - Dallas key, inside there is a standard handle. The fire warning system will operate according to standards.

*Comments:* Support systems for the concierge and caretaker/crime prevention assistant.

**Evaluation**

The Safe Location – Safe Housing Project was awarded the “Urban Security Award” 2011 by Safe City EURO - MED.<sup>13</sup> The “Urban Security Award” is organised within a framework, whose aims are identifying and sharing excellence in the urban security sector. At the end of the project, a survey was conducted. Information sessions between the Brno Municipal Police, the Czech State Police and the apartment house tenants were held. Focus groups identified the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of the project and the main outcomes. The survey analysis highlighted that the feeling of safety within the apartment house

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<sup>13</sup>Information about the award is available on the website:<http://www.safecityeuromed.org/>

### *Safe Location – Safe Housing*

significantly increased. However within the surrounding neighbourhood residents felt there was still the possibility of meeting strangers and inappropriate people. Respondents expressed a high degree of willingness to accept almost all of the technical support systems. The introduction of CCTV cameras at the entrance to the house and the trusteeship of the system to the Municipal Police and regular visits by the local beat officer in the building were evaluated positively.

The development of the technical support system and recommendations for future use within similar projects were identified. These are divided into three separate groups:

#### ***Authorised Entry System***

- Criteria established for permission to access the residential building. Fast and reliable identification and enabling of authorized entry to the tenants of the residential building.
- Minimization or complete elimination of unauthorized access to the residential building.
- Introduction of guidelines for authorized access to the residential building and the consequences of non-compliance.
- Introduction of guidelines for removing current authorized access systems and creating alternative or new systems.
- Introduction of guidelines for the use of the authorized access database, together with guidelines explaining the handling, storage and disposal of data.

#### ***Supporting Surveillance and Warning Systems***

- Identifying the security, law and order risks in each of the common areas in the building.
- Identifying the tenants' sense of threat and fear of safety in each of the common areas of the residential building.
- Application of general definitions of privacy levels<sup>14</sup> in the common areas of the building, compared with the personal attitudes of the tenants (direct approval or disapproval).

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<sup>14</sup>According to Office of Personal Data Protection

### *Case Study Two – The Czech Republic*

- Identifying the location of CCTV surveillance points, a system administrator and rules for handling, management, storage, and archiving of data (video recording).
- Identifying clear guidelines and processes for fire risks and the location of the fire alarm system.
- Identifying clear guidelines and processes for the interception of alarm signals, which will include evaluation and response.

### ***Crime Prevention, Social Interaction and Engagement with the Tenants of the Apartment House***

- Use of the clubhouse for the tenants' children.
- An employed member of staff to work with the children in the clubhouse.
- Linking the position of caretaker to the position of the social assistant for leisure activities.
- Partnership work between the Czech Probation and Mediation Service and the tenants living in the residential building to deal with conflict management.
- Partnership work between the local constables and police officers using the existing crime prevention programmes.
- Partnership work with representatives of the Bílý kruh bezpečí Organisation<sup>15</sup> in addressing specific problems in the target group of single mothers with children (50 housing units).

Table 2.2 shows data taken from the Information System of the Municipal Police Brno during 2009 and 2010 and highlights the change in records and interventions by police officers to events at Koniklecová Street.

The statistical information shows that the apartment house, its tenants and those who visit it adversely affect the security and disruption of peace within the house and the surrounding neighbourhood. The three levels of perception of the situation in Koniklecová Street taken from the public forum on the web site of the City District, police statistics, and the survey among tenants of the house, are complementary and reflect the real situation. Long-term disturbance of public peace and civil cohabitation increases the fears of the tenants, decreases the level

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<sup>15</sup>White Circle of Safety, nongovernmental organisation aimed to help to victims of crimes ([www.bbk.cz](http://www.bbk.cz))

of housing in the area and subsequently increases racial and xenophobic emotions.

**Table 2.2 Records and Interventions at Koniklecová Street**

Year	Number of Interventions	Number of Interventions in the Apartment House	Rate of Interventions in the Apartment House
2009	438	233	53%
2010	288	118	41%

The residents from neighbouring houses<sup>16</sup> were asked their opinion on the situation in the apartment house and whether it affected the safety and order in the neighbourhood. Some of their responses are below:

*'This means that in the Project of Safe Location the council solves the problem that was caused by them for our money.'*

*'The only possible solution how to prevent the prevailing of Gypsy culture in our housing estate is to work to make our housing estate beautiful and cosy. Our houses should be insulated, should have new windows and a brick core, new balconies, green areas should be best kept so that flowers were blooming everywhere and everywhere was clean.'*

*'There are many people who are interested in solving the situation in the house and that are not indifferent to the behaviour in the house and around it; these are the findings of the regular meetings which I of course also participate in. The described project moves the situation much more forward, of course, but most depends on the citizens themselves. It is necessary that in this case most of the "peace-loving" got together and made it clear that they want the house to be peaceful. Everyone who belongs to this group will certainly be interested to come to meetings that*

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<sup>16</sup>Discussion forum on the website of the city district of Nový Lískovec about the house in Koniklecová Street no. 5. Grammar and the content – unchanged

### *Case Study Two – The Czech Republic*

*are held regularly now in the clubhouse at Koniklecová no. 5, where you are of course welcomed, too, and where the project is presented to the tenants.'*

*'The situation in Koniklecová Street is disastrous..... it greatly reduces the quality of life to us as working people.'*

### **The Future**

The knowledge and experience gained from preparing, implementing and analysing the Safe Location – Safe Housing Project, can be used to address similar problems and issues in other residential buildings operating under different ownership models (municipal, cooperative, personal). It will help address the issue of security and public order related to the ownership or use of flats, which affects over 170,000 apartments in apartment houses within the housing development sector.<sup>17</sup> Phase III of the project is still operating and takes into account a detailed analysis of accepted procedures, which will enable the owners and administrators of apartment houses to adopt them in order to gain the best agreements in terms of scope, content and legal compliance. Phase III will also present the methods and responsible approach taken by the tenants to ensure their own safety. The Safe Location – Safe Housing Project can be seen as an alternative approach to the current practice of repeated intervention by the police, which although may address a specific problem or crime does not address the causes or prevent its reoccurrence.


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<sup>17</sup> According to the data of the Czech Statistical Office on 31st December 2006 the city of Brno has nearly 370,000 inhabitants. About 65,000 citizens commute for work to the city. The data of city of Brno on 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2007 show that the total number of 165,366 apartments owned by the city is 39,331 apartments, which make up 24% of the housing stock. Another 22,069 flats (13%) are owned by cooperatives and 103,966 (63%) flats are owned by other owners. Up to the 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2007 another 5,868 flat units have been under construction.



## Appendix 2.1

### Project Partners



Department of Crime Prevention MV ČR



Probation and Mediation Service




Police of the CR- KŘP JmK Prevention  
Information Department of the South Moravian  
Region



City district of Nový Lískovec



Grémium Alarm Association



Statutory City of Brno - Prevention  
Coordinating Centre MMB



Statutory City of Brno – Prevention Department



Fire Rescue of Southern Moravia Region




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Appendix 2.2

Project Location



**Project ZENTRAB**  
**Central Criminal Case Processing**  
A PILOT PROJECT FOR THE CRIMINAL POLICE OF  
THE LAND BRANDENBURG, GERMANY

**Susanne Stein-Müller, Mario Gruschinske and Nathalie Hirschmann**  
**(FHPol Brandenburg, Oranienburg)**

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**Background**

ZENTRAB stands for “Zentrale Anzeigenbearbeitung” which means central complaints processing. It can be seen as an effort related to differentiation in offence management. All offences that have little investigative work get outsourced to this centralised complaints processing unit (ZENTRAB). Before ZENTRAB every criminal investigation department had to process all kinds of cases in their field of competence regardless of the investigative work involved.

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This less organised and structured approach led to high individual workload and caused a reduction in time for fieldwork. A new and better organisation was crucial. As a result, the ZENTRAB department was developed. It was established in November 2009 in the Barnim district as a pilot project for the criminal police of the Land Brandenburg. The successful ZENTRAB department of the Cologne police district served as a model for the Barnim police district, and was adapted. To consider and fully understand the model, the district leader of Barnim, staff council and project management went to Cologne to look at the ZENTRAB department. Telephone conference calls were also carried out.

The model was adopted successfully in Barnim and included different kinds of offences as well as a new software system. The special stacking system proved particularly useful and this was applied in Barnim as well. There is a box for each day of the month, which keeps the system simple and clear particularly when colleagues are sick, or on vacation.

*'We transferred the filing system from Cologne. There is a box for each day with case files. At the end of the month the first box will be emptied and the case files will be sent to the public prosecutor. In this way ZENTRAB can meet the deadlines.'*<sup>18</sup>

The resources needed for the implementation of the project included the installation and move into a multi-person office and the costs of headsets. Thus the resource costs were minor.

ZENTRAB is characterised by:

- a multi-person office,
- no customer contact / no “real” investigative work,
- stringent implementation of a simplified procedure,
- daily completed processing based on precast standards,
- ascription of non-individual related processing.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>Interview conducted on December 19, 2011 with the ZENTRAB project manager Criminal Police Superintendent Dingelstadt. All following quotes without footnotes come from the same interview.

<sup>19</sup>Due to the standardised procedure and the widespread investigative experience each employee can manage all kinds of criminal cases within ZENTRAB. Thus the management of the criminal cases is not bound to individual case managers.

Within the Cologne model, the positive outcomes were:

- the concentration of responsibilities and definition of standards improved the accuracy and quality of data
- the motivation and performance of employees improved
- having a system of office duty without person contact and field work saved resources
- efficiency was gained by synergy effects and by simplifying controlling processes.

*'The more particular offences get prioritised the stronger the positive effects.'*

While ZENTRAB has proved to work in an urban area like Cologne, the pilot project in Barnim put an emphasis on analysing the implementation in more rural areas, typical of the Land Brandenburg. To raise the number of cases in ZENTRAB the pilot project in Barnim included a higher variety of kinds of offences. The project group was formed initially for one year. The aim was to ensure the transferability into a rural area and to assess the effects. Furthermore, the investigative work needed to be adapted to come in line with the investigation closing practice of the public prosecutor. Due to ZENTRAB the investigative departments would be able to spend more resources on processing offences with greater emphasise on investigative work.

*'Police must set priorities. They do not need to investigate everything.'*

ZENTRAB staff was chosen using certain criteria. First of all, participation was voluntary. Second, employees who wanted to work for ZENTRAB had to be willing and able to work in a multi-person office. They had to have experience of different offence types ranging from burglary to assault and they had to be able to cope with the processing of many cases. Similarly, Executives should have experience in operating with mass proceedings and most of all sensitivity towards their staff. The computer-based work within ZENTRAB would be ideal for employees who could not do field work due to physical restrictions such as back complaints or physical disabilities. Hence up to 50 per cent of the ZENTRAB employees would be those limited in their capabilities of service. Diverse kinds of restrictions were taken into consideration when setting up the

### *Case Study Three – Germany*

workplaces. One anticipated incentive for employees to switch to ZENTRAB was the more flexible working time. This would not only attract staff but also reduce work related stress for staff.

#### **Project Goals**

An evaluation of the Criminal Investigation Departments showed a reduction in the number of case officer roles. With Reunification for example, the number of case officer positions had either reduced or officers got displaced regarding their competencies. The re-staffing of a case officer was very often not performance related too. The reduction in case officer positions as well as the mismatches involved a high workload in the departments. ZENTRAB was expected to relocate personnel resources to ensure a better use of knowledge and improve the performance of employees. The competencies and skills of officers were to be the initial consideration when positioning in ZENTRAB. It was anticipated that this together with the centralised responsibility for minor crime, crime with no investigative approach as well as having no investigative responsibility would lead to better employee satisfaction, efficiency and effectiveness. Moving the workload within the criminal investigation department by transferring minor crime and crime with no investigative approach to ZENTRAB was one of the main goals.

#### ***Effectiveness***

The centralised responsibility for minor crime with no investigative duty was intended to reduce processing in the individual departments and increase effectiveness of processing within major and mid crime situations.

#### ***Efficiency/Profitability***

The focused and extensive use of the standardised questionnaire and procedure together with the precise instructions would increase efficiency. The staff relocation within the Criminal Investigation Department would also contribute to more efficiency and better outcomes.

#### ***Employee Satisfaction***

Moving minor crimes to ZENTRAB was expected to have a positive effect on staff within the different work areas. It would lead to a decline in administration work and data collection in the Criminal Investigation Department and thus, give

### *Project ZENTRAB*

the case officers time to do their actual job as criminal investigators. Additionally, this would decrease the workload and raise job satisfaction levels. Within the ZENTRAB team, a reduced workload, an increase in motivation, a decline in absenteeism and reduction in sick days were expected as a result of recruiting staff according to skills, competencies and merits that had previously gone unrecognised. Cases were evenly distributed between all ZENTRAB team members. Due to the multi-person office an individual's performance would be more transparent and would lead to better motivation.

*'Very often in the civil service performance ratings are not really motivating for officers. There is no transparency. You don't know where you stand and how your performance is compared to others'.*

### **Achievements of Project ZENTRAB**

ZENTRAB has been highly accepted among the employees and fulfilled most expectations, although some of the goals have not been met. The limiting factors and barriers are mentioned below. The standardised questionnaire procedure is extensively used.

#### ***Effectiveness***


Figure 3.1 shows how ZENTRAB has increased performance even with a reduction of staff. Although this increase was below expectations it can still be seen as a success. ZENTRAB has taken over about 50 per cent of cases from the former KK I-III (Investigative Departments I-III; formerly responsible for minor, petty offences, cases without investigative approach). This has meant that an officer in the KK I-III has more time to deal with other cases as well as taking care of ad-hoc situations.

#### ***Employee Satisfaction***


The new multi-person office in ZENTRAB promotes teambuilding and commitment. There is mutual motivation and controlling. All colleagues perceive the performance of ZENTRAB as a team performance. Returns are perceived as team failure. High motivation by employees and significant reduction of sick days has been noticeable as can be seen in Figure 3.2.

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**Figure 3.1 Performance Outcome, Relationship of Staff-Number to Investigative Success<sup>20</sup>**



**Figure 3.2 Sick Days of Staff of Barnim District/ZENTRAB 2008 - 2010<sup>21</sup>**



**Achievements Résumé:**

- One of the main achievements is the saving of time for both ZENTRAB and the Criminal Investigation Department. As officers within ZENTRAB do not have to be involved in hearings any longer their time

<sup>20</sup>This figure is taken from the final project report of the Criminal Police of the Barnim Police District. It has been translated into English.

<sup>21</sup>See 3



*Project ZENTRAB*

is not wasted in preparation and waiting for summoned people to attend hearings who do not appear at the police station.

- The use of a standardised data management form to communicate with citizens via phone has saved time.
- The management of the investigative cases has been distributed equally within the ZENTRAB team. It is a transparent work process. Everybody knows the workload of his/her colleagues. They have lunch and smoking breaks collectively.
- The sickness absence rate has been reduced significantly.
- The case managers within ZENTRAB can work more flexibly and the work process is more manageable and structured.
- The efficiency of the investigative police departments can be controlled better. It is not possible to count cases that have not been completed as an investigative success any longer.
- Before ZENTRAB was installed, the workload of the departments corresponded to the number of criminal cases per department and per case manager. Now the departments have more time for other investigative tasks.
- One investigator completes 1300 case files a year.

***Key Success Factors and Enablers, External Stakeholders***

Key success factors and enablers identified that contributed to the success of the project are the following:

- Support by the staff council

*'The support by the staff council was essential to start and to realise the project.'*

- Project management was led by a senior criminal superintendent with police external juridical education

### Case Study Three – Germany

*'I do not come from the police. That was an advantage. I considered the workflow from another perspective. I let the departments give 10 case files to me and checked them.'*

- Good preparation

*'We visited the colleagues in Cologne who successfully introduced ZENTRAB. The number of criminal cases in Cologne corresponds to the number of crime cases in Brandenburg.'*

- Support by public prosecution

*'Sometimes the case files were sent back from the prosecutor and we could not assess why. I spoke with the chief prosecutor and we agreed that all case files have to be checked by him before they go back to ZENTRAB. Now there is a control point so that the ZENTRAB colleagues do not use more resources managing the case files than necessary.'*

### **Limiting Factors and Barriers**

There are different possible explanations why ZENTRAB has not met all its goals. The standardised questionnaire for example has its benefits but also its limitations. Problems can occur if the questionnaire is not fully or wrongly completed, if a citizen prefers face-to-face questioning or if the offence does not adequately fit the questionnaire.

Other barriers or limiting factors could be:

- An investigator in the Criminal Investigation Department now deals only with more severe cases and some find this new work arrangement difficult. One way to address this may be for these police officers to receive special training to deal with more severe cases.
- Some officers refuse to accept the role of ZENTRAB due to their specialised role and culture of investigators. In particular older officers who want to hold onto the investigation of all criminal cases. They want to retain the ability to influence the crime clearance rate by their investigative work.

### *Project ZENTRAB*

- ZENTRAB has reduced the crime clearance rate within Criminal Investigation Agencies. Some of them perceive this as a reduction of their own performance and therefore want to continue to have responsibility for minor crime cases with known offenders.
- Not all Crime Investigation Agencies are well staffed. ZENTRAB only works if there is enough staff in the agencies. If there is a lack of staff in a ZENTRAB unit, staff from other units will help manage their case files.
- There is a lack of statistical knowledge among employees to understand the rationale of the change. Thus the implementation of ZENTRAB has not been fully accepted by all officers in the departments.

### **Further Developments**

#### ***ZENTRAB II***

The findings of ZENTRAB have led to the implementation of ZENTRAB II in September 2010 as an addition to ZENTRAB. While ZENTRAB deals with minor crime and such with no investigative approach using an established questionnaire procedure, ZENTRAB II has been developed to deal with *all* minor crime offences. This includes returns as well as requests. ZENTRAB II has 4 interrogators who carry out questioning only. ZENTRAB and ZENTRAB II can therefore be regarded as a closed complementary system. ZENTRAB II has also developed offence-customised questionnaires. Due to the competences of investigative officers and the reorganisation of workflow, an officer could become more specialised with regard to hearings and find they do this work all day. The hearings can also be carried out via telephone, especially if the summoned person does not or cannot appear at the police station. In this way, ZENTRAB II is closing the gap where personal hearings are needed.

To establish ZENTRAB II, data was collected and analysed for over a year. A computer programme was developed to help predict how many summoned people would appear. This has contributed to developing a more effective process. On average 3 out of 6 summoned people will actually appear. As a result, it has become general practice to send out several invitations each day. Since every hearing requires preparation time this process will become further advanced in the future. Therefore the computer system will become more

### *Case Study Three – Germany*

enhanced. A statistical system that will estimate the probability of how many people will appear and what kind of people are likely to appear will be developed. To achieve this, different data of summoned people will be collected and analysed for any consistencies. In the future, hearing preparation will take place only for those cases with a high chance of the summoned person appearing. This will lead to a saving of resources.

As an incentive, interrogators are now allowed to use 20 per cent of their weekly working time as telework for the preparation of cases.

### **Reflections**

ZENTRAB can be seen as best practise for different reasons:

- It was successfully implemented.
- It has accomplished most of its goals and expectations.
- Employee's motivation, commitment and satisfaction along with performance have improved.
- A higher number of cases are completed and closed with ZENTRAB and ZENTRAB II.
- To continue to meet expectations and improve performance, ZENTRAB will continue its intense training.

Based on the success of the pilot project in the Barnim district, the implementation of ZENTRAB will be expanded throughout Brandenburg. The commission in charge of the structural reform of the police of Brandenburg called "Brandenburg 2020" considers ZENTRAB as a valuable instrument increasing the efficiency and quality of case management in the field of crimes with little investigative work.<sup>22</sup>

The fact that ZENTRAB has been successfully established in the police forces of other German *Länder* indicates that it can be considered as a best practice within the police. For the cities Bremen, Cologne, Aachen, Dortmund, Essen, Mönchengladbach, Recklinghausen and others, ZENTRAB became an essential and necessary instrument of the Criminal Police Departments. In May 2005 the

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<sup>22</sup>Commission "Police of Brandenburg 2020" (2010). *Report*. Document for internal use only.