

former Senator of the Interior of the Land Bremen visited the ZENTRAB department of the Bremen police force and stated:

*'The central criminal case processing... slims down and accelerates procedures and leads to an increasing quality of case management which is profitable for the public prosecutor, for the police and for the citizens. The criminal police departments are relieved ... and are enabled to manage a greater number of severe crimes more promptly.'*²³

Besides the positive results of ZENTRAB one aspect regarding the role of criminal police officers needs to be mentioned. Criminal police officers regard themselves as investigators, rather than administrators. The Federation of German Criminal Police Officers (BDK)²⁴ and the GdP²⁵, which is the largest German Police Union, comment that the quality and the investigative requirements of crime case processing must not get lost due to a standardised and form based procedure. Both Federations understand and welcome ZENTRAB on the condition that it keeps the balance between investigation and administration. With regard to future developments there is still a need for improved statistical knowledge and systems together with data to support the requirements of police officers.

²³See the press statement of the Senator of the Interior of the Land Bremen for more details. Available at <http://www.senatspressestelle.bremen.de/detail.php?id=14267>.

²⁴See the press statement of the BDK for more details. Available at: <http://www.bdk.de/lv/brandenburg/aktuelles/zu-besuch-in-der-zentrab>

²⁵See the positions of the GdP for more details. Available at: http://www.gdp.de/gdp/gdpbra.nsf/id/pos_fa_k_polizeireform?Open&setprintmode=1

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Appendix 3.1

Partners Involved in Project ZENTRAB

District Attorney's Office Frankfurt / Oder

Police Force Cologne

Former Police District Barnim

Main Staff Council

Local Staff Council of former Police District Barnim

Ministry of the Interior of the Land Brandenburg

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Institutional Cooperation with Examples of Skill Sharing and Optimisation

ARMA DEI CARABINIERI AND
CORPO FORESTALE DELLO STATO, ITALY

Fabio Bisogni and Pietro Costanzo
(Fondazione FORMIT)

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Introduction

This case study has been developed on the basis of the information provided directly by representatives from Italian police forces, Arma dei Carabinieri and Corpo Forestale dello Stato, who have direct experience in the reported activities. The selection of the two activities was made on the basis of mutual agreement and proposed by the aforementioned police forces.

Abstract

The proposed cases aim to show how specific, skills-oriented cooperation is produced and will generate direct benefits for the involved police forces and public administrations, allowing for different activities and synergies at a national and international level. In relation to Arma dei Carabinieri, international cooperation activities and, in particular, policing joint exercises demonstrated that a common approach can contribute to the alignment of operational

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procedures, not only enhancing technical skills, safety and security of operators, but also to the overall benefit of the local populations and authorities served by the Civil Crisis Management Missions. Such alignment in the use of the techniques and procedures, corresponding to international policing best practices and standards, may enable the involved countries to contribute more effectively to international stabilisation efforts in countries emerging from a situation of crisis, thus promoting peace and security.

With regard to Corpo Forestale dello Stato, the development of operational and organisational synergies with regions and other local public administrations has been recognized as an effective practice, thanks to the creation, implementation and improvement of special operational protocols to prevent and fight forest fires and for territory monitoring. Such protocols, involving specific technical assets (helicopters) in cooperation schemes, have proved to be very effective in terms of resources optimisation, number of controls and sanctions against environmental law violations, reduction of forest fires and other environmental threats within the territory.

Overview

In Italy²⁶ there are five police forces having national competence, three civilian - namely Polizia di Stato (the National Police), Polizia Penitenziaria (the Prison Police) and Corpo Forestale dello Stato - and two military: Arma dei Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza Corps. All the afore-mentioned forces are centralised²⁷, and they all act at a national level. Arma dei Carabinieri and Corpo Forestale dello Stato are involved in the COMPOSITE Project.

For the purposes of this case study, Arma dei Carabinieri's focus is devoted to their international cooperation activities and, in particular, to policing joint exercises promoted by the European Commission and led by Arma dei Carabinieri. This paper focuses on the analysis of the "European Union Police

²⁶ Source: The Public Security System in Italy, Polizia di Stato official website, <http://poliziadistato.it/articolo/964-The-Public-Security-System-in-Italy>

²⁷ Definition: as "centralised police force" is intended a police force organised under one central command, under the direction of a specific Ministry, and with competence on the whole national territory, without status differences between the structures distributed on the territory.

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Forces Training 2009" (EUPFT 2009), and its planned developments within the "European Union Police Services Training 2011-2013" (EUPST 2011-2013).

As for Corpo Forestale dello Stato, the development of operational and organisational synergies with regions and other Public administrations has been highlighted by the central command. Therefore, analysis is related to the creation, implementation and improvement of special operational protocols to prevent and counter forest fires and for territory monitoring. The two police forces directly provided information and documentation on the proposed cases.

The proposed cases aim to show how specific, skills-oriented operational and organisational cooperation have produced and will generate direct benefits for the involved police forces, presenting different activities and synergies at a national and international level.

International Synergies

Within the framework that generated the Instrument of Stability²⁸, Arma dei Carabinieri obtained funding and leadership for two relevant joint training initiatives: the "European Union Police Forces Training 2009" (EUPFT 2009) and the following "European Union Police Services Training 2011-2013" (EUPST 2011-2013).

With the aim of comparing best practices at the European level, and also taking advantage of lessons learned during previous initiatives²⁹, Arma dei Carabinieri developed a modular training project, aimed at training about six hundred European police experts in the field of international crisis management. Such a programme has been proposed and funded under the European Union 2007-2009

²⁸ The European Union's growing willingness to assert itself as a key player in the management of international crises, has led the European Commission to undertake a series of initiatives relating to the Peace Building Partnership policy aimed, firstly, at the prevention of conflicts. In this context, one of the main financial instruments made available by the European Commission is the "Instrument for Stability" (IFS), established by EC Regulation No. 1717/2006 of 15 November 2006 – European Parliament. Such instrument is focused on "capacity building" and it is aimed, in particular, to achieve four objectives:

- development of the operational capacity of non-state actors;
- improvement of the mechanisms of the "early warning" and access to political research on the field;
- adoption of common tools by the United Nations, World Bank and other international organizations, as well as by the EU Member States;
- identification of European training standards, compatible with those in use at the United Nations and other international organizations, to strengthen and widen the number of trained experts available for deployment in international missions.

²⁹ See, e.g., the Training sessions organized in 2008 by the French National Gendarmerie at the National Training Center of the Gendarmerie of Saint Astier. The 2010 programme has been developed under the lead of the German Bundespolizei in Brandenburg.

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Instrument for Stability. In order to further improve the successfully tested EUPFT 2008-10 training modules, Arma dei Carabinieri submitted a new proposal to the EC and obtained agreement to manage the EUPST 2011-2013 programme.

Specific Activities

The "European Union Police Forces Training 2009" (EUPFT 2009) was developed and delivered in three training sessions, each lasting two weeks. The first week of theoretical and practical learning, was aimed at comparing best practices and procedures. The second week was devoted to completing a role-playing exercise, for command posts and operational units, simulating the deployment of a multinational police coordination, responsible for replacing and strengthening of local police, in a fictional destabilised Country (State of "Ambria," self-proclaimed independent on the island of "Centria"). Simulation of investigations was also included, as well as counter-organised crime actions, forensic procedures and high-risk arrest procedures with hostage liberation.

As for the "European Union Police Services Training 2011-2013, the specific objective was to enhance the international policing skills of around 2,400 police officers from the EU, non-EU countries contributing to Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, and African Union countries, for participation in EU, UN and/or African Union and other international civilian missions as well as to draw lessons from this undertaking in order to contribute to wider international efforts in this field. The programme, including practical exercises, is positioned to develop a rapid deployment capability of police elements in crisis management operations. The training programme is based on 7 training sessions, focused on substitution or monitoring, mentoring and advising functions for crisis management and stabilisation³⁰. The training programme, including public security aspects and the wider rule of law sector simulating interactions with the criminal justice system and the Civil Society, will pay particular attention to the sharing of know-how and best practices.

³⁰For example, HQ's activities, crowd control, public order, criminal investigations such as war crimes, organised crime, trans-national crime, scientific investigations, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), close protection, Explosive Ordnance Devices (EOD), and protection of Human Rights in policing.

National Synergies

The Corpo Forestale dello Stato has always played a central role in the defence of forests against fires, both in terms of preventing and combating the phenomenon, also from the point of view of fire extinguishing activities, suppression of crime and investigation across the whole national territory. Since 2001, due to several reforms of the Italian Constitution, competencies on environmental and forestry policies have been transferred from the central state to the regions; also some responsibilities for forest protection have been decentralized. Within this framework, recognizing the value of Corpo Forestale dello Stato's experience and know how, and taking advantage of the traditional presence of the force within forest and mountain areas, many regions drafted agreements and conventions to cooperate and to entrust to Corpo Forestale several core activities in the protection of forest heritage and territory. From 2010, within the boundaries of these extensive agreements, specific operational protocols have been set up, with three main purposes:

- ***Prevention and Fighting*** against forest fires and related crimes³¹;
- ***Environmental Monitoring*** against pollution and various environmental crimes;
- ***Mathematical Modelling and Technology Development*** for territory monitoring and protection (also in cooperation with universities and research centres).

In order to achieve the above objectives, operational protocols have been specifically drafted in relation to the use of the Corpo Forestale dello Stato helicopter fleet within the regions' territories, for the purpose of prevention and fighting forest fires and to develop an effective and accurate monitoring of the territory, in terms of environmental protection and integrity.

Specific Activities

Within the functional structure of the Corpo Forestale dello Stato, preventive services, control of territory and investigations are performed by local commands, by the Nucleo Investigativo Antincendio Boschivo (NIAB) - the

³¹The responsibility and operations coordination rely to a Region and to Corpo Forestale dello Stato if the scale of the fire is manageable with resources and instruments available locally, otherwise the coordination of the operations is transferred to national Civil Protection.

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Forest Fires Investigation Unit and by the Nuclei Investigativi di Polizia Ambientale e Forestale (NIPAF) - the Environmental and Forestry Police Investigative Teams. A key strength in this situation is the Centro Operativo Aereo (COA) the Air Operational Centre with a fleet of 37 helicopters³², 80 pilots and 120 specialists. The helicopters are used for the prevention of forest fires and for extinguishing operations, to transport personnel and equipment, for the coordination of other aircraft and to support the teams on the ground. The fleet is also engaged for civil protection services, police activities and environmental monitoring. The three main types of activities in relation to the afore mentioned objectives include the following:

- The use of helicopters for forest fires early recognition and for extinguishing activities, as well as for air patrolling and crime prevention;
- The monitoring of specific areas, to identify illegal activities against the environment, e.g. illegal discharge of pollutants in the soil or rivers, use of illegal pesticides, etc.; also monitoring for different environmental risks (e.g. hydro geologic risks) is performed;
- The pilot testing of territorial mathematical modelling, due to the application of new technologies on-board aimed at capturing territory features in order to replicate digital models of specific areas for monitoring and control purposes.

Key Factors

International Synergies

The performance of police duties in destabilised contexts by multinational units requires a high degree of interaction that combines the assets deployed and the typical emergency setting, and also calls for common operational procedures and shared tactics. Arma dei Carabinieri is involved in several international operations for example, NTM-I - NATO Training Mission in Iraq, ISAF - International Security and Assistance Force and EUPOL - European Union Police in Afghanistan, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

³²See Corpo Forestale dello Stato for a detailed overview on the fleet.
<http://www3.corpoforestale.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/343>

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MINUSTAH, deploying the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) and the Integrated Police Unit (IPU)³³.

Specific problems and barriers in destabilised situations are the different:

- legal frameworks/backgrounds
- operating procedures
- threat patterns characterizing the domestic environments, for example diffused crime, organised crime, terrorism, piracy, white collar crime)
- approaches to the victims
- operating tools (weapons, uniforms, cars, communication and Information Technologies).

The most significant barriers and constraints for the target groups are the lack of interaction due to the fact that most police activities are still considered to be strict domestic issues, and also the fact that international training is very expensive.

The requirements to overcome these barriers are:

- the opportunities to directly experience the integration of ‘police-identities’ in a joint mission
- to increase the effectiveness, sharing and comparing capabilities and procedures.

An innovative approach has been adopted since the EUPFT 2009 sessions. This approach placed the emphasis on a specialist police component, for the first time exercised in a wide multinational context, in synergy with the traditional police components of public order maintenance and general prevention. Particularly helpful was the formula based on training modules, which has managed to combine the theoretical aspects with practical skills.

Those involved from participating countries were encouraged to present and compare their operating procedures within a simulated exercise that highlighted a specific situation. For example, the British ‘bobby’ working in close cooperation with investigators from Estonia, Spain and French Gendarmerie. In addition experts in forensics from Portugal, Poland and Greece had the

³³See Arma dei Carabinieri website for further details:
<http://www.carabinieri.it/Internet/Arma/Oggi/Missioni/Oggi/>

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opportunity to compare their practices and methods. Every level of the hierarchy have been involved. This common approach provided and will provide an alignment of all participants in the use of the techniques and procedures corresponding to international policing best practices and standards. It is interesting to note that a dedicated steering committee will be set up to identify the best practices of each contingent, which will be collated in a common summary document at the end of the EUPST 2011-2013, allowing formal recognition of best practices.

Resources

The detailed programme has been designed by a dedicated planning workgroup, comprising staff from the Interregional Command "Vittorio Veneto", the Centre of Excellence for the Stability Police Units (CoESPU) – Centro di Eccellenza per le Unità di Polizia di Stabilità, the special operational unit ROS, the 2nd Mobile Brigade and the Raggruppamento Carabinieri Investigazioni Scientifiche (RACIS) - Forensic Unit as well as departments within Headquarters such as Plans and Military Police and International Cooperation.

639 police officers have been trained within EUPFT 2009, from 19 European countries³⁴ and from 25 police forces, with both military and civil status.

Representatives of the Peacekeeping Operations Department of the United Nations and the European Gendarmerie Force have also attended activities. As well as officers of the Gendarmerie of Argentina and Turkey, representatives from the Organisation of African Gendarmerie, and officers from the Gendarmerie of Algeria, Ivory Coast, Gabon and Senegal have observed.

2400 participants will be trained during EUPST 2011-2013, with the participation of Guardia Civil – Spain, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs / Directorate of Security and Defence Cooperation (DCSD) – France, Ministry of Interior / National Gendarmerie Directorate / International Cooperation Directorate (DCI) – France, The Royal Maréchausée – The Netherlands, Romanian Jandarmeria, European Police College – CEPOL, Egypt and Cameroun police and security forces.

A model of the typical unit of stabilisation was outlined, which consisted of a multinational specialized unit, integrated police units and a single police unit. This was communicated to staff members who were dedicated to prevention and

³⁴Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom, Romania, Slovenia and Spain.

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public order (FPU / IPU), and to the specialised police element. This consisted of teams for criminal investigations, forensic analysis, protection of witnesses and individuals who cooperate with the judicial process, the high-risk operations unit (SWAT) and anti-sabotage skills.

Moreover, a Human Rights Special Unit has been established, to monitor and oversee activities conducted during the exercise, to detect possible violations of international standards on the preservation and protection of human rights.

Results

In the EUPFT 2008-2010 exercises, evaluation showed that:

- Appropriate established operating procedures, indicating relevant administrative, sectors tasks, and daily procedures should be produced and applied, thus facilitating interaction among trained participants. Lack of established operating procedures still represents the main problem
- Commanders in charge should be given a dedicated period of time to sort out all necessary administrative matters, work out structures and chains of communications, assign tasks and responsibilities, and create a 'to-do list'
- Radio communication networks should be provided at a national level for the smaller units and in a common working language for the staff and main units
- Language skills should be improved, as sometimes communication was slow and chaotic due to hesitation and embarrassment to speak a foreign language.

In the EUPST 2011-2013 exercises:

- the presence of 'Rule of Law' will be anticipated, with a view to widen the scope of the exercise
- there is the potential to establish a systematic approach of command and control routine using a standard model for sufficient information and work- flow and work division
- the exercise documentation should include the main CSDP police guidelines as well as booklets on human rights, humanitarian law, vulnerable groups and radio communication procedures so that all the officers will be prepared in advance of the exercise

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- the selection of personnel in relation to language skills should be improved
- from an early stage all units and components should have a dedicated period of time to make contact with commanders, sub commanders and other key positions in order to organise vital elements of performance, communications and responsibilities.

These recommendations from the assessment of the exercise sessions³⁵, contribute to the alignment of operational procedures, enhance technical skills, safety and security of operators, as well as benefiting the local populations and authorities served by the civil crisis management missions.

National Synergies

There are two main reasons behind the implementation of operational protocols:

- the need to streamline economic and instrumental resources by regions and Corpo Forestale;
- the need to enhance the effectiveness of prevention and response activities against increasingly serious phenomena, such as forest fires.

From the regions perspective, they would not have to rent helicopters and related services from private companies, at very expensive rates. Corpo Forestale dello Stato can optimize the use of their helicopters, for example maximising the obligatory flying hours, performing different activities and receiving logistic support such as offices or small hangars for recovery and maintenance at a local level, as well as financial contributions for the performed activities.

To enhance effectiveness, by having ready-to-fly helicopters, deployed in the regional territory, will provide the advantage of real proximity and speed in the intervention, as well as diminishing travel expenses and maximising fuel and means consumption.

With regards prevention activities, the deployment and constant presence of helicopters in well-known and visible areas has been recognised as an effective deterrent, according to statistics and to the assessment of the officers involved.

³⁵Part of European Union Police Forces Training (EUPFT) 2009 notes on Arma dei Carabinieri website available at: <http://www.carabinieri.it/Internet/Coespu/Events/20091130.htm>

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Operational protocols have been signed between Corpo Forestale dello Stato and several regions in the centre and south of Italy, in particular the regions with high fire related risks. In particular agreements have been setup with Lazio, Emilia Romagna, Marche, Abruzzo, Umbria, Basilicata and Calabria. Also agreements with Puglia and Campania are under evaluation. Within these agreements protocols, tasks, responsibilities and resources are allocated on the basis of the specific local needs and constraints. The agreements were for a limited period such as the summer season and with a specific focus on forest fires, however extra periods and new monitoring activities have been quickly added. This process has been straightforward and very easily received by different administrations. No major issues have been raised and there has been a rapid increase in signed agreements (from the 3 initial regions involved in 2010 to the current 7, plus 2 under evaluation).

Resources

As already mentioned, the core asset for this kind of cooperation is the Corpo Forestale dello Stato helicopters fleet, currently consisting of 37 helicopters. For the purposes of operational protocols, the means deployed locally, due to their technical characteristics (dimensions, capacity, equipment), are mainly the NH500D and the AB412EP³⁶. The personnel engaged in these activities, are highly specialised and experienced pilots, as well as a technical support team. This is a highly specialised team within the Corpo Forestale dello Stato, i.e. a EASA PART 145 certified team³⁷.

In addition in order to cover all maintenance needs and to optimise the repair and control activities, a specific team has been set up, equipped with a fully independent '*mobile repair workshop*', comprising a small truck equipped with all the tools and instruments needed for the maintenance of helicopters. As already mentioned, 7 regions are currently involved in these operational protocols, providing logistics support, mainly offices, hangars, helidecks and financial contributions to cover part of the expenses such as travel, overtime,

³⁶See Corpo Forestale dello Stato website for technical specifications:

<http://www3.corpoforestale.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/523> and

³⁷EASA PART 145 is the Implementing Regulation issued by European Aviation Safety Agency for the aircraft maintenance sector (Maintenance Organisation Approval) establishing the requirements to be met by an organisation to qualify for the issue or continuation of an approval for the maintenance of aircraft and components. Further details:

EASA website: <http://easa.europa.eu/home.php>; ENAC website:

http://www.enac.gov.it/La_Regolazione_per_la_Sicurezza/EASA_Implementation_Rules/index.html;

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fuel and maintenance. Also other public organisations are involved, such as local agencies for environmental protection.

Another relevant aspect is the technologies adopted for monitoring activities. Helicopters have been equipped with low cost but effective thermal infrared imaging cameras, able to capture well-defined images and video whilst flying. Such cameras enable teams to locate areas of pollution with aerial infrared thermography. Pollutants such as oils, chemicals, and waste radiate heat differently than the soil or water around them. Thermal imagers can aid investigators to spot and then track such pollutants back to their sources.

Experiments aimed at using this kind of technology to deal with illegal pesticides are also on going.

Results

The involvement of Corpo Forestale dello Stato's specific technical assets in cooperation schemes has proved to be very effective in terms of resource optimisation. Operators and those responsible at Corpo Forestale dello Stato and at a regional level have highlighted this. Also at a political level, the statistics for the number of controls and sanctions and for the reduction of forest fire and the effects on the territory have been appreciated. The widespread and continued development of the present operational protocols is a clear acknowledgement of the success of this initiative. The implemented protocols, exploiting the opportunities of real proximity to the identified territory, have gained relevant successes in terms of prevention and response capacity.

Discussion and Conclusion

International Synergies

The Arma dei Carabinieri EUPFT 2009 has met with unanimous approval, and received surplus applications. Senior officers who have covered the role of 'Head of Mission', a position held by the French and Romanian Gendarmerie and the German Federal Police respectively, have made flattering statements.

The Ambassador of the European Commission at the Political and Security Committee of the EU also mentioned it, during a closing speech. The Council of the European Union, in the framework of the 2974th External Relations Council meeting, held in Brussels on 17 November 2009, acknowledged the relevance

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for civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions of the Instrument for Stability project EUPFT 2009³⁸.

The Future

Following the experience of EUPFT 2009, Arma dei Carabinieri submitted their proposal for the European Union Police Services Training (EUPST) 2011 – 2013, with the aim to increase and develop understanding and to spread practices and lessons learned. The global objective is to strengthen the civilian crisis management capacities of the participating countries. This will enable countries participating to contribute more effectively to international stabilisation efforts within countries emerging from a situation of crisis, thus promoting peace and security. For these purposes the main issues for the future are:

- Focusing on the disparities in courses of action and procedures among participating police services in order to achieve real synergy and unity of action in a crisis situation, for EU Member States, non-EU countries contributing to CSDP missions, and African Union countries.
- Enhancing the flexibility and the interaction of police activities when deployed in the framework of civilian crisis management and stabilisation missions either by the EU, the AU, the UN or other organisations such as the OSCE.
- Advancing towards ‘harmonised’ approaches in the delivery of training and promoting a common approach, both at EU level, and as a contribution to wider international harmonisation in collaboration with partners such as the UN, OSCE and other international/regional organisations. To this end, the training sessions can provide knowledge transfer at two levels. At a theoretical level on different police issues, and a practical level with training for trainers.
- Mainstreaming human rights, including women’s rights and children’s rights and the protection of minorities, disabled persons and other vulnerable groups in civilian police missions, in line with relevant EU policy.

³⁸The Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions Press Release, 2974th External Relations Council meeting. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/111265.pdf

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The development and implementation of joint training will standardise the level of skills of EU Police forces and their activities, in accordance with the European standards and the objectives of the guidelines.

National Synergies

The Future

The fast development of the analysed protocols has enabled further developments in particular with regard to territorial monitoring activities. The territorial mathematic modelling pilot, involving Academics and researchers, has been an important attempt to take advantage of already existing skills and synergies to introduce technological and organisational innovation in typical policing activities and frameworks. This has meant the initial time period for the duration of the protocols has been resolved and an extension to include a full year is under evaluation in different regions. With regards to forest fires prevention and response activities, new requests for the implementation of operational protocols are on-going, but the lack of sufficient resources must be faced. There is a need to increase the helicopter fleet and to train new technicians in order to cover additional territories. Therefore, while innovative and effective territorial monitoring practices are planned for the future, the implementation of new protocols with other regions will be achieved by adopting inter-regional agreements, at the risk of part sacrificing close proximity with the beneficiary territory.

Finally, the model proved to be easily replicable within the national context, being based on already existing wider framework agreements between Corpo Forestale dello Stato and regions.

Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan
BIRO CENTRAL POLICE SERVICES, PUBLIC SECURITY
NATIONAL POLICE, THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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Introduction

The Republic of Macedonia has been a European Union (EU) candidate country since 2005. In 2009 the country was granted visa liberalisation (together with Montenegro and Serbia). Recognising the progress of the country in the areas of rule of law, democracy, and especially in integrated border management, the Minister of Interior on that occasion stated that Macedonia would continue with further proactive measures to meet and to develop EU standards in this field as soon as possible. The first priority was developing the Schengen Action Plan.

Case Study Five – The Republic of Macedonia

One of the most visible components of the EU's Justice and Home Affairs policies is the Schengen Acquis. The Schengen Action Plan analyses many police and police related issues, such as: border control, visas, migration, asylum³⁹, police cooperation, juridical cooperation, dealing with narcotic drugs, arms and ammunition, the Schengen Information System (SIS) and the protection of personal data. The importance of meeting the Schengen Acquis is the lifting of internal border controls among member states within the Schengen Area. Each of the aforementioned includes: relevant measures of Schengen Acquis, analysis of current situations and measures that should be taken by a particular institution with a timetable for their implementation and fiscal implications. However, the lifting of border controls between old and new member states is not an unconditional outcome of accession to the EU. To become part of the Schengen Area, it is necessary to meet certain criteria. It depends upon the Council's decision and careful examination of the legal and practical readiness of the new member state.

In order to give opportunity for each candidate country to demonstrate its readiness to be a part of the Schengen area, the EU introduced a specific instrument called the Schengen Action Plan. This contains all the requirements that represent the conditions for entry into the Schengen zone. The main purpose of the Schengen Action Plan is to demonstrate full awareness of the implications of the Schengen Acquis, and to present a credible schedule for meeting the requirements, most of them ahead of accession.

Background and Key Points

Macedonia's accession to the Schengen Area, as a strategic objective within European integration processes, presupposes the fulfilment of a series of conditions in the field of justice and home affairs, which are an integral part of the Action Plan to join the Schengen area. The adoption of the Schengen Action Plan is the responsibility of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. The Schengen Action Plan of the Republic of Macedonia (together with the National Program for the adoption of the EU law) is a complex and long-term document which defines the dynamics of adopting the EU laws, the strategic direction, policies, reforms, resources and deadlines that need to be implemented and met in order for the Republic of Macedonia to meet the requirements for membership in the EU. The document should be reviewed annually. The review should not

³⁹Within next revision asylum will not be part of Schengen Action Plan because it is not considered in the Schengen Acquis.

Implementation of the Schengen Action Plan

only cover the implementation of identified measures, but also the relevant Schengen measures. It is especially important that this document contains fiscal information for the implementation of these measures. In this respect it is an efficient tool for planning budgetary resources.

The application of the Schengen Action Plan includes the activities of two Government bodies: the National Commission for Integrated Border Management and Ministry of Interior (mainly through the Department of Border Affairs and Department for International Police Cooperation). The adoption of the Schengen Action Plan was preceded by:

- activities associated with the establishment of a National Commission for Integrated Border Management (29.12.2005)
- border police taking full responsibility for border security as part of the Ministry of Interior (08.29.2005)
- categorisation of border crossings (07.06.2006)
- establishment of a National Coordination Centre for Border Management (13.03.2007)
- the creation of the information system for Integrated Border Management (26.03.2009) which provided a platform for the exchange of information and monitoring at border crossings. It also provides the basis for the development of a database for border management purposed for coordinated access and exchange of information between national authorities that have jurisdiction in border management and other acts related to border management.

In the period before the adoption of the Schengen Action Plan, the National Commission of Integrated Border Management and the Ministry of Interior launched a project related to IBM⁴⁰ (started 2007 and lasted until 2009). This project addressed the priorities defined in the National Programme for the adoption of the Schengen Acquis.

⁴⁰Contracting Authority (EC): European Commission, EC Delegation, on behalf of the beneficiary; Implementing Agency: European Commission, EC Delegation, on behalf of the beneficiary, Beneficiary (including details of project manager): The primary beneficiary is the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the second beneficiary is the National Commission of Integrated Border Management. **Overall costs (VAT excluded):** EUR 7.600.000 [EU contribution: EUR 5.950.000]

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The IBM project achieved a number of requirements relating to the Schengen Action Plan. It improved the infrastructure, construction and reconstruction of the border crossing points by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. It organised the continued training of the border police staff on the use of the law on State Border Surveillance, the law on immigrants, the law on police and other related by-laws. At the same time, on a tactical level, a decentralised practical training with local instructors was carried out, relating to the aforementioned issues. Telecommunication links have been provided between the border crossing points and the Ministry of Interior, facilitating the transfer of data from the border crossing points to the Central Database and vice versa. Upon a proposal by the National Commission for Integrated Border Management, the Government approved a pilot study on information systems for IBM with guidelines and recommendations. At the same time the activities relating to establishing the TETRA System commenced and are currently (in 2011) in the third phase of implementation. This system provides complete (optimal) coverage in the Republic of Macedonia with a digital radio signal, as well as reliable and secure communication between the police services in the country and is designed to be compatible with similar systems already used in several EU member states.

Two weeks after the EU Ministerial Forum, the Western Balkans communicated to the Justice and Home Affairs (16-17.11.2009, held in Brussels), on 30.11.2009 that the EU Council supported a final decision to abolish the visa regime of the EU towards the Republic of Macedonia. This decision would take effect from 19.12.2009. The same day, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia approved the detailed Schengen Action Plan. The plan was prepared in 2008 with consultation and support from representatives of other Ministries nationwide.

On 29.12.2009 the Government of the Republic of Macedonia agreed the National Programme for the Adoption of the EU in 2010, the National Development Strategy that had established a system for integrated border management and an action plan for the development and implementation of the system.

National Legislation and Border Protection issues

Law on Border Control

The commitment of the Republic of Macedonia to build a system of border control, compatible with standards of the Schengen legal system, which incorporates the democratic gains of the EU countries, imposed the need for Law on Border Control⁴¹. The aim of the law is to coordinate national legislation that regulates the field of control, surveillance and movement of people across borders with the Schengen Border Code; it incorporates new terms, compatible with the directives of the European legislation. Law on Border Control (previously titled the Law on Control over State Borders) was adopted in 2006 and subsequently amended in 2007 and 2009. The law was partially co-ordinated with the Convention for implementing the Schengen Agreement (from July 14, 1985), during the period when the Republic of Macedonia was not yet a full member of the EU. The law coordinated with:

- Regulative No.562 (from 2006) of the European Parliament,
- The Council of Europe's rules governing the manner of movement of persons across borders (from 15.03.2006),
- Partially with Regulative No.1931 (from 2006) of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe (from 20.12.2006),
- The rules of local border traffic at external frontiers on land between Member States
- It amended the provisions of the Schengen Convention.

The need for coordination of the law with directives (or instruments) was set out in the Schengen Action Plan. In drafting the law on border control, practices and ideas were transferred from the Republic of Slovenia, Croatia, and other European countries, according to the directives of the European Parliament or the Council of Europe. The law was carried out fully in compliance with the Schengen Code that required the submission of the list of passengers by airlines.

An important part of the Law on border control is Chapter VI that states:

'Border Surveillance which regulates the issues related to the purpose of conducting the border surveillance (contained in Article 42), and with the way of performing the border surveillance (Article 43), methods for carrying out the border surveillance (Article 44), police units and the

⁴¹Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, no.171 from 30.12.2010

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means seconded to carry out the border surveillance (Article 45) and providing the border surveillance.'

In the previous Law on State Border Surveillance, the Commission for Integrated Border Management was established. Its work and competences were only partially regulated and did not specify the rights and obligations of all parties involved in the National Commission for Integrated Border Management. The law gives details of all the parties' powers within the Commission and established the National Coordination Centre for border management.

Other Acts

The start of the Schengen Action Plan (30.11.2009) had recommendations and criteria for visa liberalization of Macedonian citizens. During the implementation process of these recommendations, the Ministry of Interior achieved the activities grouped in four areas:⁴²

- Security of Documents
- Border Management, asylum and migration
- Public Order and Safety
- External Relations and fundamental rights

Within these areas further structural and legal changes were approved in addition to those within the Schengen Action Plan. Most important was a Risk Analysis. Risk Analysis⁴³ is a mandatory obligation of all States of the European Union. In order to comply with the acts of the EU, the Republic of Macedonia was obliged to incorporate a Risk Analysis and any additional elements arising from that issue. Risk analysis is a recommendation in the "Schengen Catalogue for External borders control, removal and readmission", which is also an obligation for the Republic of Macedonia to fulfil on its road to the EU. Acceptance and incorporation of recommendations and best practices provided in the catalogue is an important precondition for Macedonia's accession to the Schengen zone.⁴⁴

⁴²Information on the roadmap for visa liberalization (in Macedonian), Web site of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia, from 18.07.2009, <http://www.moi.gov.mk/ShowAnnouncements.aspx?ItemID=7367&mid=710&tabId=96&tabindex=0> (Accessed on 02.12.2011).

⁴³In the form of "Model of integrated risk analysis" is prepared by the European Agency "Frontex".

⁴⁴National strategy for development of the established system for integrated border management, Document accepted at 130 session of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, held on 29.12.2009. Source:

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From today's perspective, the activities provided within the Schengen Action Plan are an integral part of the Strategic plan of the Ministry of Interior. Thus, within the Strategic Plan for the period 2009-2011 the Department for Border Affairs and Migration as well as the Regional Centres for Border Affairs aims to implement the already adopted best practice and common standards in the field of integrated border management. This is in accordance with Schengen regulations, the directives and common handbook, the material-technical equipment and modernization of police stations, and improving the cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries.⁴⁵ In order to further comply with the provisions of the Schengen Border Code and within the Schengen Action Plan, the Republic of Macedonia proposes to continue to upgrade the legal framework in the area of border management.

Schengen Action Plan – Insight from the Interview of a Senior Level Police Officer

The interviewee had read about the concept of the Schengen Action Plan as a best practice model, and had previous experiences acquired from working in the given field. For example working on projects that highlighted positive and negative experiences of meeting goals, so as to apply the positive experiences and avoid similar mistakes.

The Schengen Action Plan as a document is very important as it can regulate the relations of the International Police Cooperation in the Ministry of Interior through the evaluation of international documents. It is a fine example of best practice in international police cooperation and it presents a basis for implementing the objectives of the Schengen Action Plan on a national as well as an international level. The idea of forming the working group of the Schengen Action Plan was an idea of the Government of the Republic Macedonia in order to facilitate and pave the way for the integration of the Republic Macedonia in the EU, Schengen and the Euro Zone. The group consisted of members from 10 Ministries, representatives from the Delegation of EU in the Republic of Macedonia and representatives from the CIVIPOL

http://www.igu.gov.mk/files/pdf/nacionalna_komisija/23022010_strategija_igu.pdf (Accessed on 02.12.2011), p.39

⁴⁵National strategy for development of the established system for integrated border management, Document accepted at 130 session of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, held on 29.12.2009. Source: http://www.igu.gov.mk/files/pdf/nacionalna_komisija/23022010_strategija_igu.pdf (Accessed on 02.12.2011), p.8

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mission responsible for the implementation of police reforms in the period 2006-2008.

The Government of the Republic Macedonia, who instigated the initiative, asked the working group to begin the preparations for European integration. The Department for European Affairs within the MOI chaired the project and facilitated the communication between the involved institutions. The Department helped the working team to establish the initiative and become operational, by providing people, experts, training, and following the changes that occurred in the European Union whilst referring to the documents, initiatives, regulations and the European Commission's Regulations and forwarding to the working group updates of developments. The working group used the experiences and the Schengen Action Plans from Croatia, Czech Republic and Bulgaria. In fact, everyone was involved in this initiative, and among other things, is the most beautiful example of a best practice in which all have benefitted.

The initiative was quite large and complex, and it required a huge commitment from the people that were involved as team members, authorities and institutions. Good organisation and coordination were required long term. After implementation, the processes became easier and the outcomes were generally positive. It proved to be a very good foundation for later requirements and conditions needed to fulfil the purposes of the national strategy. The application of this practice was primarily seen as an internal need, in that the State and the MOI were already preparing to meet the challenges relating to the European integration processes and to successfully avoid threats for national security. Police officers in the MOI also had expectations about the European integration process, from police cooperation meetings where there were positive and negative examples from other countries who had gone through the same process. Experience of implementing the changes and to adapting national capacities came from other EU countries. They helped the Republic of Macedonia to adjust their laws and legislation in line with those of the EU member states in order to establish and improve bilateral and international cooperation with other countries. Initially there were no major problems, but barriers from external factors became apparent, for example the signing of bilateral agreements within international cooperation.

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Financial resources for activities relating to the Macedonian Schengen Action Plan are mainly from internal resources. External as well as internal resources were used for the following:

- training and education of the national working teams
- exchanging experiences
- exploring best practices
- contracts with the foreign expert working teams for evaluation of the documents and other papers. The applied techniques (routines) were of particular importance in allowing for new ways of working and thinking of police officers. The national team, in the form of the working group, had already acquired good training, experience and skills to work in this area, but the experience and training obtained from foreign experts and accessibility to materials from other countries strengthened the capacity of national staff to face the challenges. Some of the challenges were easily tackled and some of them were difficult and complex to resolve. Sometimes the experience available was insufficient and the team had to analyse the data and materials themselves.

The interviewee believes that best practice has a dual effect although its primary purpose is to improve the transfer of knowledge and experience. This is particularly evident when cooperation is strengthened within the working group at a national level, and also at a bilateral and international level. When the Schengen Acquis is initially analysed it looks straightforward, but there are many obligations that are imposed by the EU and the EC. The Republic of Macedonia, by fulfilling the Acquis has applied the best practices.

Conclusion

The Republic of Macedonia adopted the Schengen Action Plan in late 2011, immediately after receiving the visa liberalization for its citizens. The approval of the Schengen Action Plan, as a result of cooperation between representatives from several Ministries, the EU delegation in Macedonia and Police mission CIVIPOL, is one of the more complex accomplishments in which the Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Interior was involved in as a leading party, with other relevant Ministries and state agencies. The collective experiences from police within several EU states and within the region, together with the support given by the EU authorities during the development of the Schengen Action plan, has given this document strategic value.

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The State, by the competent authorities involved in the preparation of the Action plan, worked very hard during the implementation stage. However for political reasons, including the result of events associated with the interruption of Macedonia's EU integration processes from 2009 until now, the dynamics changed and in relation to the implementation of the Schengen Action Plan has slowed down.

Today (December, 2011), many of the measures of the Schengen Action Plan have been implemented, but a considerable number of measures have undergone modifications. One reason is because the document was not revised in 2010 with the acceptance of the Visa Code, which defines the new rules for issuing visas. During 2011, the relevant departments within the MOI made a detailed analysis of the Visa Code. This analysis has not been about the coordination of legislation only, but has focused also on the fulfilment of material and technical prerequisites for the implementation of the Schengen Plan in the Republic of Macedonia. In 2012 when the detailed analysis is completed, a review of the Schengen Action Plan will take place.

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United Under One Roof Safety Houses in the Netherlands

THE NETHERLANDS

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Safety Houses in the Netherlands

The Dutch practice of 'integrative Safety Houses' found its origin in the 1990s when concerns for neighbourhood safety heralded the need for a cooperative, community-based response. Safety Houses have since garnered widespread praise and support, resulting in their extension across Dutch cities and principalities. This case study outlines the development of the Safety House initiative, from its origin until now (2011). Safety Houses started around 1997 with an initiative labelled as *Justitie in de Buurt* (Neighbourhood Justice) in 4 police regions. There are 45 Safety Houses in operation today. The main aim of Safety Houses is to form a close cooperative network surrounding targeted risk groups. The police have, from the very beginning, played a pivotal role in these networks. After all, the aim of Safety Houses is to deliver safety, which is an intrinsic part of the police's role. The police are supported in this activity by multiple external partners, which each contribute to this overall goal. This case

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study provides evidence testifying to the success of this important Dutch initiative, while also drawing attention to the difficulties and complexities inherent in this approach.

Methods

This best practice description primarily draws upon open source reports. Safety houses have been intensively researched and publicly debated by several stakeholders. In addition, there is a dedicated webpage (<http://www.veiligheidshuis.nl>) which provides an overview of all safety houses in the Netherlands, also offering regular updates based on new research or media reports on safety houses. We used this website as the basis for our description of safety houses. Next to this we conducted a literature review drawing upon Dutch publications and master theses focusing on safety houses⁴⁶. In the appendix we provide some selected examples of these sources, for the interested reader.

What are Safety Houses?

Safety Houses reflect the Dutch approach of integrated solutions in the field of safety. In the last two years Safety Houses have been introduced (but not implemented yet) into all Dutch cities. They constitute a unique approach, involving very close cooperation between multiple stakeholders on various processes. In a Safety House several processes are investigated simultaneously. Every process (e.g. juvenile crime, domestic violence, et cetera) has its own covenant, its own knowledge sharing process, and its own partners. The concept of Safety Houses aims at preventative as well as repressive and localized policing. It is also integrative, offender-oriented and problem-oriented. Safety Houses are actual locations (houses) where several public organisations gather to discuss local or neighbourhood problems. Thus Safety Houses represent central collaborative hubs where multiple stakeholders may meet, with the aim of tackling problems of community safety and high volume crime. Safety Houses further endorse an individualized and offender-oriented approach, including close consultation with individual offenders to combat on-going and repeat offending and (typically) youth crime. Safety Houses are thus action oriented

⁴⁶Many Dutch scholars worked on evaluation studies with regards to safety houses – Google Scholar provides 176 hits for “veiligheidshuis” (retrieved November 2012).

(inductive policing) rather than policy oriented (deductive policing). Problems of serious and organised crime are referred to other agencies.

The overall objective of the Safety House is to create a comprehensive network around at-risk youth (such as those in the care system), citizens affected by domestic violence, and prolific offenders to prevent them dropping out of care processes or sliding into criminality. Alternative penalties are prescribed for at-risk youth: ensuring that they are not immediately labelled as 'criminals'. More specifically, the activities focus on an individualised approach in:

- preventing crime (and aggression / violence)
- reducing recidivism
- reducing and preventing nuisance
- providing appropriate care to the victim
- being a reliable information hub for safety partners
- providing after-care
- strengthening coordination between network partners

In sum, Safety Houses are an integral approach that combines prevention, repressiveness, and aftercare, within administrative *and* criminal justice. A natural side effect of this approach is that it is possible to focus upon local or neighbourhood problems and emphasise the local administrative and neighbourhood cultures in which these problems are embedded.

A Brief History

Although it is difficult to identify the exact origin of the Safety House initiative, it appears this idea arose on a national level as a response to fears surrounding neighbourhood safety. In the 1980s youth criminality and addiction were acknowledged to be widespread and difficult to tackle. The Netherlands had seen increases in high volume and violent crime causing this issue to rise up the political and policy agenda. At the same time law enforcement and community providers increasingly acknowledged a need for greater cooperation and coordination in response to these issues. It thus became clear that innovative and integrative solutions were needed to combat youth crime and to reduce rates of re-offense and proliferation of crimes.

Against this backdrop, four pilots were started in 1997 in some neighbourhoods within Amsterdam, Arnhem, Maastricht and Rotterdam where social problems

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and crime were high. This initiative reflected a significant change in law enforcement from a repressive model to a more localised and (also) preventative and immediate approach by summary jurisdiction. The pilots were labelled *Justitie in de Buurt* (Neighbourhood Justice), demonstrating the Ministry of Justice's interest in adopting a neighbourhood approach. As this initiative was new, the earliest instances of Neighbourhood Justice had no protocol to build upon. However the programme took some inspiration from France's 'Maison de la Justice' initiative following the visit of two Dutch civil servants at the French ministry. In France this policy had aimed to improve cooperation between local and national government, as well as to enhance coordination between lateral and vertical (hierarchical or centralised) policy initiatives.

In these early years the only cooperation was between the police and the prosecution service (chain) and was based on the original, judicial initiative. In the years after the Millennium, in Tilburg (also in some other cities, but Tilburg is the one most often mentioned) there arose the idea to extend the early initiative to incorporate more partner-organisations. In 2003, The Minister of Justice announced a change in policy with regards to Neighbourhood Justice. In the intervening period a new (Christian right-wing) Cabinet had been installed; a Cabinet that placed safety and security at the heart of its policy. Outlining the new approach in the government policy statement entitled, 'Towards a safer society' (*Naar een veiliger samenleving*) the new Cabinet highlighted the need to:

- promote a safe living and dwelling neighbourhood
- organise and develop policy on safety and security at a local level (subsidiarity principle)
- emphasise the principle that community policing is (still) important
- ensure local authorities are responsible for the police (and become local directors)

On the basis of such principles, a new style of Neighbourhood Justice was initiated, going under the label of *Veiligheidshuis* (Safety House), which was more purposeful, more cooperative and much broader in scope than the previous pilots. The Cabinet started the local and bottom up initiative in Tilburg, in 2002, as an example of good policy and declared it 'national'. Following Tilburg's example, the first Safety Houses were introduced in 2003.

In 2007, the decision was taken to implement a nation-wide network of Safety Houses and by 2008 there were 29 Safety Houses in existence. After several evaluation studies on precursor Safety House initiatives the former Minister of Justice (Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2008 – 2009, 28684, nr. 213), wrote a letter to parliament on April 20, 2009, in which he declared that the success of Safety Houses in some cities, should be extended throughout the country.⁴⁷ According to the Minister, the Safety Houses had contributed to the overall goal of reducing criminality and harassment by 25% and the number of re-offenses by 10% (from the figures reported in 2002). In that way Safety Houses – originally a bottom up initiative – became a part of the overall country-wide policies ‘towards a safer society’ (since 2002) and the government statement ‘work together, live together’ (since 2007 *Samen leven, samen werken*) and national policy programs, such as ‘safety starts with prevention’ (since 2007 *Veiligheid begint bij voorkomen*). The plan to extend Safety Houses has now been realized and there are currently 45 Safety Houses up and running throughout the Netherlands.

It should be taken into consideration that many Safety Houses are still in construction. Therefore, research is primarily focused on processes and not on outputs or performance. Real scientific research on the outcomes is hardly done. However the qualitative output is satisfying; cases are settled and individual clients are being served on welfare, health, housing and safety as a direct result. However whether the approach delivers value for money is not yet known, and is hard to measure.

Future

The new Cabinet (installed October 14, 2010) plans to spread the Safety House initiative into new regions throughout the country. In addition they aim to further develop and extend the approach. The State Secretary of Justice has launched a knowledge network – a nation wide website – around Safety Houses, and research is currently exploring the possibility of introducing a nation-wide system of client registration. An audit system (control) has also been set up to assist the Safety Houses by reformulating and measuring their goals in a SMART way (Hirsch Ballin, 2009; Ministerie van Justitie, 2009).

⁴⁷Many Dutch scholars worked on evaluation studies with regard to Safety Houses - Google Scholar provides 119 hits for “veiligheidshuis”.

Evidence of Best Practice

Evaluations of Safety Houses suggest that they have a positive impact in the areas of domestic violence, juvenile crime and persistent offending (Van Vianen et.al, 2008). Members and partners in the Safety Houses also report greater knowledge sharing in relation to prolific offenders, while benefits are also seen in cooperation between justice and care partners, and in reports of greater respect and trust between professionals from different sectors. On an operational level, processes and procedures are often found to improve through the implementation of this approach (Rovers, 2011). Interventions are more effectively coordinated, including a more comprehensive, targeted and coherent approach across different organisations and sectors. On the input-side the knowledge of possible criminal offences and offenders is also found to be signalled at an earlier stage, leading to pre-emptive actions to stem further (and more serious) crime.

The success of the Safety House model is also evidenced by the decision to extend this model throughout the country. Indeed in his letter to parliament, the former Minister of Justice outlined the expected benefits of the programme's extension in terms of crime reduction and recidivism (Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2008 – 2009, 28684, nr. 213). Of course these success stories cannot be found in every Safety House. Indeed a fundamental aspect of this localised and problem-oriented approach is the need for neighbourhood action in response to specific community-oriented issues, suggesting that the direct replication of a particular Safety House in a different part of the country would be neither appropriate nor effective. However, in general, critiques of this initiative have been aimed at the 'organisation' and 'administration' of Safety Houses rather than the 'approach' (Terpstra & Bakker, 2002), implying that the general aims of Safety Houses are widely accepted and endorsed, even though the benefits of this initiative are not always capitalised upon in practice. In a recent newspaper article (NRC-NEXT, October 13, 2011, 3), criminologist Ferwerda, stated that, with regards to the youth-approach:

*'...there is a kind of consensus about the Safety Houses, they work well: decisions on individualised cases on youngsters are made quicker'.
(Authors' translation)*

The success of Safety Houses can be inferred from several factors:

- First and most importantly, Safety Houses provide a critical basis for direct interaction between different actors and institutions (multi-disciplinary). As such, they provide an important forum for knowledge sharing and the exchange of ideas and expertise, around a common topic or problem. This, in turn, allows for a holistic and integrated approach to matters of community safety and for instance domestic violence.
- Safety Houses focus on addressing multi-issue problems, which often has a structural character and requires an integrated or comprehensive approach. The underlying idea is that while repression may be effective in the short term, intensive supervision by a customised care programme provides the best long-term results. Not to say that repression is unnecessary. The approach includes the family of (youth) offenders too.
- Safety Houses are problem-oriented and encourage direct action aimed at managing or combating targeted cases. At the same time, intervention and supervision of clients is individualised and managed on a case-by-case basis.
- Safety Houses involve cross-stakeholder cooperation encouraging greater coherence and integration in the delivery of safety across different sectors and enhancing the cross-domain expertise of safety professionals and partners.
- Interventions and supervision of clients is local, in the neighbourhood, so successes are also visible in the immediate community
- Safety Houses are becoming knowledge and expert centres, providing enhanced sources of knowledge on matters of local law enforcement.

Partners and Processes

External stakeholders and partners who are actively involved in current Safety Houses include the following:

Justice-chain partners:

- Police
- Parquet Public Prosecution
- Council for child protection
- Probation Netherlands

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- Addiction Rehabilitation Foundation
- Salvation Army Probation
- Service Establishments Justice / Penitentiary (PI)
- Institute for Forensic Investigation
- Victim Care Netherlands
- Halt Netherlands

Other partners / participants:

- Municipalities
- Municipal departments Public order and safety
- Municipal Department of Social Development
- Youth Care Agency
- Public Health care agencies
- School attendance officers
- Schools
- Public Housing agencies
- Mental health partners

The standard operating procedures for Safety Houses are complex. First there will be a meeting on screening, where i) investigation takes place in several databases and ii) history of a specific case is investigated. This means that not every report will end in a 'case' in the Safety House. Only a few partners participate and decide on whether or not this will be a case. The second step involves a meeting on the care-process with regard to the reported case. The third step might be a judicial meeting on the reported case. In every step the possibility of participation of new partner-organisations is possible.

Safety Houses are meant to be a network and they function as a network. Conditional upon the process at stake, participants 'wander in and out of the decision processes'. Safety Houses are made up of several processes. Partners of each process may meet once a week or sometimes once a fortnight. So, partners do not gather at specific daily or weekly intervals, but are instead, available on demand. Generally, the director is not a manager of a Safety House, but a manager of a process, and generally he is employed at the local government offices.

Agreements are laid down in a covenant between the partners. Because a covenant does not have the status of a law, compliance cannot be enforced. It is an agreement with rules of instruction based on trust. For every process (e.g. prolific offenders, domestic violence, juvenile criminality, et cetera) a separate covenant is needed. A covenant sets down the partners that are invited with regard to that particular process of working, what information can be shared, and what kind of Standard Operating Procedures have to be implemented and in what ways. Some partner-organisations – and the police itself as well – are bound to strict rules with regards to for instance privacy and confidentiality. Sometimes an agreement is based on a vow of secrecy.

Enablers

The realisation and success of Safety Houses is dependent on a number of factors, the most important of which are summarised here.

Human and Organisational Resources

- It is clear that the original intention to adopt a Safety House model (in the 1990s) required a fundamental change in thinking in regards to the treatment of criminality and public safety. Safety Houses thus required innovative thinking and strategic vision both at the outset and in their continued implementation, in order to become and remain a success.
- Several researchers (Terpstra & Bakker, 2002; Vianen et al, 2008; Dammen et al, 2008; Rovers, 2011) stress the fact that connectedness and cooperation between partners is important. Safety Houses provide an important geographical location in which these exchanges may occur.
- The Safety House employees are selected for their problem solving and cooperative / open attitude. They are thus key players in ensuring the success of Safety House ventures. The personal drive of these professionals is a very important factor for the success.
- The nature of the Safety House environment, which houses multiple institutions and partners in a common space allows for short lines of (face-to-face) and immediate communication, facilitating collaborative exchange.
- Knowledge, including the storing, accessing, and the sharing of knowledge, is important. Knowledge has to be factual and to the point.

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Knowledge sharing processes must be laid down in protocols (Snippe et al., 2006a; Rovers, 2011).

- Also a tough direction (supervision) and control on the follow up processes, such as aftercare is important (Snippe et al., 2006b).
- Institutional support from Ministers and Cabinet and the main offices of separate partner-organisations is important too, for subsidies and for the affirmation and legitimacy of the initiative.

Financial Resources

- Of course Safety Houses are also dependent on sufficient financial backing with estimates indicating that annual budgets are in the region of 200.000 – 400.000 Euros per Safety House (Rovers, 2011). Originally, subsidies came from different agencies: (e.g., The Ministry of Justice, Prosecution Service, Police, Provinces, and Local Authorities) as well as additional subsidies that were raised under the banner of a war on the degeneration of cities: 'Montfrans-gelden'). Subsidies of the Ministry (earlier of Justice, since 2010 of Security and Justice) were fixed until 2004. It was then agreed that the subsidy would remain in place for three additional years. This system lasted until 2007.
- Since 2007, the Ministry and the Prosecution Service have paid for the Justice-parts of the Safety House, an amount totalling to around 200.000 Euros a year. Despite the retrenchment politics of the new Cabinet (in 2010), it is envisaged that there will be no budget cuts in Safety Houses in the coming years. In fact 7.7 million Euros has been made available in 2011 for further development of the Houses. However given current climes it is noteworthy that the G32 (the 32 largest cities and towns) have recently criticised the retrenchments and budget cuts, claiming that they are afraid that cuts to Safety House budgets are forthcoming, despite the promise of the Minister (Bruls, 2011).

The basis of Safety Houses derived from a combination of an external threat, an external opportunity, an internal opportunity and other preconditions (money, politics, enthusiastic people, et cetera). As demonstrated in the long list of enablers above, many of the financial, human and organisational resources required to make the Safety Houses a success are still important to the effective initiation and continuance of this initiative.

Similarly environmental enablers have an important role to play in dictating the success of the Safety House initiative in specific locations. Given the localised and problem-oriented nature of the initiative it is unsurprising that variations in Safety Houses became evident (Terpstra & Bakker, 2002) causing a tendency for decentralisation and devolution in policy (Terpstra & Bakker, 2002; Vianen et al, 2008; Dammen et al, 2008; Rovers, 2011). Indeed this is an inherent characteristic of a localised approach in which the needs of the immediate community are of paramount concern. However at the same time this implies that the success of Safety Houses is likely to be variable and largely dependent on the environmental conditions in which a particular house is operating.

Difficulties and Complexities

Despite the cited benefits, evaluations of Safety Houses are not without criticism. As may be expected, cooperation between partners can still be improved. Differences in the approaches, attitudes, regulations and cultures of disparate professional groups continue to represent a challenge to the effectiveness of Safety Houses, while issues of power and jurisdiction sometimes remain unclear. In addition critics suggest that the effectiveness of Safety Houses is not readily measurable and that the narrow, localized nature of such initiatives make Safety Houses vulnerable. The effectiveness of Safety Houses would also be placed in jeopardy, in the event of budget cuts and subsidy losses.

Safety Houses are also extremely complex ventures, involving partners from many different domains that adhere to many different goals, values and ways of performing. In addition Safety Houses are based on reciprocal relations and dialogue between the offenders or service recipients and the network partners, adding additional complexity to the process. The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to deal with an individualised approach is similarly intricate and sometimes ambiguous. Coordination of the chain for a particular issue (e.g., domestic violence) involves multiple partners and procedural steps. Add to this the fact that there can be many 'chains', for instance on youth and on prolific offenders, each with different directors / managers and police officers, and the level of complexity becomes even more apparent. The success of Safety Houses thus hinges on good coordination and the ability to reconcile the complex array of processes and procedures that Safety Houses entail.

A Case in Point: Knowledge Exchange and Complexity – Difficulties and Developments

It is important to note that the complexity of Safety Houses is inherent in the ambition for cooperative working, decision making and the transfer of ideas across multiple and diverse disciplines working in a network. In addition to case specific knowledge sharing this initiative provides the opportunity for cross-domain collaboration that facilitates new and innovative ways of thinking. In that sense new knowledge creation routines rise to the surface. New possibilities and solutions emerge through ‘coffee machine’ moments, in which informal discussions around a coffee machine allow for new insights and developments. Different partners contribute unique areas of specialist knowledge and expertise to collective solutions and problem solving. In addition Safety Houses provide an important forum for cooperation and joint decision making that enhances mutual trust and respect between partners working in separate domains. Thus Safety Houses draw upon the broad resources and capabilities of multiple stakeholders, to offer an integrative approach to law enforcement.

However paradoxically, the advantages of such a multi-disciplinary, integrated form of working are also the source of its greatest challenges. Professionals of several organisations, with their own perspectives, sense making, values, organisational histories and cultures, disciplinary backgrounds, laws, rules and instructions represent a highly complex collective. Managing these different partners is inherently difficult and can result in misunderstandings and inefficiencies. In addition the potential for diffusion of responsibility is high in an environment in which no organisation has the definitive power of decision. Professionals have their own relationship, mandate, and instructions from the main office of their parent organisation. The expectations placed on police representatives (by both themselves and external partners) are particularly high given their (action oriented) status and standing in the group. This can lead to additional burdens on the police, which are not matched by other partners. In addition it leads to a blurring of role definitions as Safety House partners (especially the police) are forced to taken on responsibilities that go beyond their formal roles and jurisdictions. Similarly the issue of privacy is a continual challenge, including questions regarding what information can and cannot be shared with different partners. Research (Tweede Kamer, 2009; Winter, 2009) highlights the ambiguity surrounding data protection and the difficulties associated with reconciling data protection and privacy concerns with the need

to speak honestly and openly to external Safety House partners. The sharing of knowledge by the police, for instance, is bound to the *Wet Persoonsgegevens* (WPG) en *Besluit Politiegegevens* (Law and Resolution on personal particulars). An additional complexity arises from the clients themselves, who are often affected by a complex range of problems that cut through housing, family, work and financial domains. Information is similarly fragmented across the many organisations with which such individuals come into contact. Thus information comes from multiple sources. If systems are not compatible then the comparison, exchange, and coordination of data is a significant challenge.

Summary

Although there seem to be some bottlenecks with regard to Safety Houses, they are generally regarded as widely successful. However as many Safety Houses are still under construction, quantitative (performance) evaluations are often not possible. Instead, (qualitative) assessments point to the cited process benefits and informal measures of performance rather than to any objective or definitive outcomes. In this regard, the anecdotal evaluations of clients and partners are satisfying; indicating that cases are effectively settled and that individual clients are served effectively on welfare, health, housing and safety. The on-going success of the Safety House initiative appears dependent on the ability to juggle the diverse requirements, cultures and expectations of multiple stakeholders, and to provide the right internal conditions and external resources to support and develop this unique initiative. Given the widespread success of the Safety House initiative in the last 20 years it appears this endeavour is worth the effort.

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The Electronic Eye at the Door of the European Union

BORDER POLICE, ROMANIA

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Motto: 'We are a different kind of ambassador'

Romania's adherence to the European Union led to the increase of responsibility in the field of surveillance and control, which aimed to enhance security on the external border of the European Community. The biggest challenge was to perform these activities with the same efficiency in the Black Sea area, which is considered an open door of entrance in the united European space. In this context, some drastic measures of border surveillance were considered. They involved the implementation of technological solutions without any precedent in

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Eastern Europe and they included the implementation of complex surveillance systems based on advanced electronic equipment.

The aim of this case study is to investigate the best practices of the Romanian Border Police (RBP) in using a component of the integrated system that ensures the surveillance of the Romanian and European Border. This component is represented by the SCOMAR system (a complex system for the observation, surveillance and control of the traffic in the Black Sea area;

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nsS8Xbr0K2w>).

SCOMAR has been used for the surveillance of the maritime border of Romania and the European Union since 2007 and aims to ensure public safety within the region both at sea and in the coastal area of the Black Sea.

(http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/film.php?id_film=465),

Analysis of this advanced surveillance system will provide knowledge in relation to:

- The process of consolidation of the system and the Romanian Border Polices' efficiency in the border surveillance through the elaboration of a complete solution that provides real time information about the operative situation.
- The process of tracing migration, prevention of illegal migration and reduction of the illegal traffic of goods and smuggling.
- The process of communication (hard data and verbal) using specific internal networks.
- The process of alignment to the European Union standards in terms of border security and cooperation.

The data collection methods we used for this case study were: documentation, archival records, and interviews. This case study can be used to inform police forces with responsibilities involving blue borders surveillance and the use of similar advanced equipment to ensure public safety.

The SCOMAR blue border surveillance system is seen as best practice because it shows how in a few years a country can move from having no integrated maritime surveillance system to having one of the best systems in operation in the European Union (EU). The SCOMAR system can still be improved and it

may not be the best on the market at this point, but this case study aims to highlight the best practice for implementing, managing and operating a blue border surveillance system for EU member countries that do not currently have such a system. It will also help future EU members who will need to integrate their system or implement a new system that meets the EU standards and requirements.

Project Overview

SCOMAR was considered a project of best practice having been evaluated by external and internal stakeholders. From an external point of view the Schengen evaluation commission experts reviewed the system in terms of the technical capabilities and the appropriate legislative package. For both aspects they evaluated positively and in the final report stated that Romania complies with the Schengen Aquis. The report mentioned in particular the high level of training by the RBP who work in the Command and Control Centre, at border crossing points, at the surveillance points and on the ships that are part of the SCOMAR system. The management structure and the rules to adopt new procedures were seen as being slim and flexible, making it possible to adapt to new threats as they appear in the future. The ITC component of the system is designed to be modular in order to facilitate further development and can easily be interconnected with new systems if required. Besides the review of the Schengen experts, the SCOMAR system received positive feedback from partner countries that interacted with it in joint operations conducted through the FRONTEX Agency or in cooperation with neighbouring countries at the Black Sea. The professionalism of the RBP and the high levels of technical equipment used were particularly noted.

Internally the SCOMAR system is seen at all levels as being state of the art technology used in securing the Romanian maritime borders. By being open to collaborations and eager to use all the capabilities of the SCOMAR system, even beyond its primary role as surveillance and control system at the border, the local community and the scientific community also benefit from its existence. As an example the Institute for Marine Research and Development “Grigore Antipa” from Constanta is working together with the SCOMAR system to track and monitor dolphin migration in the Black Sea.

Background Information

The need to implement the SCOMAR system was twofold. By joining the EU, part of the Romanian border became an external EU border and as such Romania had to comply with specific requirements regarding the security of these borders. Alongside this, Romania is in the process of joining the Schengen, which carries a new set of requirements introduced by the Schengen Acquis. Since joining the EU Romania became more attractive to immigrants who have seen it as an open door to enter the EU. Once Romania has joined the Schengen area it is anticipated this will increase further. Finance for this new system SCOMAR has been through PHARE Funding Memorandums.

The main internal factors that influenced the development of this project were the lack of an appropriate integrated surveillance system for the maritime border and the need to cut operational costs. The fact that SCOMAR would, in addition, be used for traffic monitoring by the Romanian Naval Authority strengthened the argument to invest in this project. These external and internal factors highlighted the need for appropriate management of the maritime border at the Black Sea and the subsequent development and implementation of SCOMAR.

What were the resources initially considered as important to achieving the changes required?

Initially the most valuable resource for the successful implementation of the project was the knowledge for building, implementing, managing and using the system. This knowledge initially came from a Polish firm who wrote the first draft of the requirements. At the same time Romanian experts visited the systems used in Spain by the Guardia Civil and in France by the French Gendarmerie. Collaboration with the Spanish and French colleagues was essential as, later on, they helped in training the SCOMAR personnel. Knowledge and expertise was also received from the companies that provided the equipment for the system. Their experience in building similar systems was very useful. The knowledge and experience of all these stakeholders was vital to the successful implementation of the project.

As previously mentioned, the technology was essential in the implementation of the project. Acquiring appropriate radars, cameras, computers, communication equipment etc. was very important. State of the art technology used in every

component of the system created the premise to use SCOMAR at its full potential.

What were the funding sources and other levels of resources allocated to achieve the changes required?

The budget allocated for this project was €24.6 million. The funding was secured through PHARE funding and co-funding from the state budget, as the Romanian Border Police is a public police force. The funding included several contracts within the PHARE Funding Memorandums (2003, 2004, and 2005) (see Appendix 7.2). In general, the budgeting and the financial resources were considered adequate and did not generate any problems for the implementation of the system. Due to the intense activity of the specialists within the Romanian Border Police and the Ministry of Administration and Interior, to ensure adequate technical assistance for the SCOMAR implementation, there was a saving of €500,000. After the implementation phase, three ships were acquired through contracts financed from the Schengen Facilities, RO FSCH 18.1.1. – Marine Surveillance Vessel (the Stefan cel Mare vessel) and RO FSCH 18.1.2. – Patrol and Intervention vessels (MAI 2110 and MAI 2111; Appendix 7.3 and Appendix 7.4).

These were acquired as part of the “Control reinforcement at the external borders through the increase of naval and terrestrial mobility - RO-FSCH 18” project. These three vessels cost over €54 million. Although acquisition of these vessels reduced the difficulties and errors associated with human surveillance, it did involve high costs that cannot be fully supported by the state budget due to the current economic crisis. Given the responsibilities of the Romanian Border Police must be performed in spite of these external factors, human resources sometimes supplement their use.

Were knowledge creation routines, alliance routines and /or acquisition routines important?

From the start of the implementation phase, there was great interest in establishing knowledge sharing routines. To effectively use the SCOMAR system, the Romanian Border Police formalised the activities conducted by the Command and Control Centre enabling an operator to understand the procedures required to use the system. They also developed procedures relating to the

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organisation of work activities. These procedures were evaluated and with approval at a senior level, updated a year after implementation. Some of the procedures related to information exchange between the RBP and other authorities at Territorial, Central, Regional and European levels. Others referred to activities within the Command and Control Centre, for example with regard to levels of access and the programme of work. A set of procedures relating to specific critical situations was also developed, for example, system breakdown.

If ideas and knowledge were transferred, where was this from and was it easy or difficult to do?

As the implementation of SCOMAR was a recommendation by the EU with regard to the Integrated System of Border Security, it was important to consult with partner countries, for example France and Spain that already had similar systems. The knowledge and expertise within these countries was fully used in the implementation of SCOMAR. The main knowledge transfer was from the Spanish SCOMAR system, used by the Guardia Civil (Spanish Border Police) for several years mainly on the African border, which is considered to be one of the most dangerous European borders.

At the beginning of the project, the Romanian Border Police went to Spain to examine the SCOMAR system and in particular the camera system. The experience was considered invaluable as commented:

'Spanish colleagues have experience in this field and they shared it with us' (Balan, 2007).

Interviewees highlighted that after the implementation of the system several methods were used and this knowledge was shared at organisational levels, for example:

- Common platforms that include the Romanian Border Police.
- The annual Cooperation Forum at the Black Sea where groups work on specific topics to improve data and information/experience sharing. Each country is allocated a topic for consideration, for example risk analysis in the Black Sea area.
- Common exercises designed to ensure that partners have the same operational 'language' and use the same procedures for different

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activities such as search, control and vessel approach, common practices, data and information exchange.

- Involvement in different bilateral projects or partnerships between Romania and another country to combat criminality and terrorist acts (Appendix 7.5).
- Involvement in the European Community European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) project. This relates to the centralisation of information in the management of the European terrestrial, air, and maritime and fluvial borders.
- Knowledge and experience exchange under the auspices of FRONTEX Agency⁴⁸. To date this has involved interactions with police forces from Cyprus, France and Spain through the Maritime Focal Points Action on surveillance and control responsibilities. In terms of naval expertise, an international mission conducted in the waters belonging to Greece and Turkey contributed to the RBP gaining knowledge and experience in the field of illegal migration at sea (Appendix 7.6).
- Other exchanges involve working together with neighbouring countries in the Black Sea area, such as Russia and Bulgaria, and will include personnel training on data and information exchange (Appendix 7.7). It is important to note there is a commitment to improve the training in this field. These external operations contributed, as stated by one interviewee, to change the *'thinking style'* of the police because they facilitated exposure to *'another type of knowledge, another type of execution'* and *'dialogue that leads to accentuating the differences in adopting the same actions'*. These operations have enabled flexibility and have given the opportunity to reflect on the different problems and issues. Having this ability to reflect and adapt has been considered an extremely effective learning method. These exchanges have been essential in the development of the work procedures for SCOMAR.

⁴⁸European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. Started in 2009 and they involve the participation of the Romanian Border Police personnel and naval equipment in different operations.

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From an internal perspective, the RBP found the knowledge and experience exchange was not difficult as colleagues from the General Inspectorate were aware of the situation and the particular needs. Another important factor that enabled this was the low staff turnover, and subsequent retention of knowledge and expertise. Interviewees commented that to work on the SCOMAR system was considered an interesting role and the selection and recruitment process conducted by an internal HR psychologist was very effective. The selection process was customized for the specific needs and this has ensured a high job-person fit⁴⁹. Other factors contributing to this have been the EU environmental working conditions, employee benefits and the challenging aspect of the job that is characteristic of the maritime and the blue border areas in particular. Staff are confronted daily with new dangers, and risks which contribute to this challenging environment.

How complex/large was the project?

As stated by a former General Inspector of the Romanian Border Police:

'...this project was one of the most ambitious international projects in terms of security and cooperation at the Black Sea level. Through the Complex System of Traffic Observation, Surveillance and Control at the Black Sea (SCOMAR), the Romanian Border Police and Romania gain new insight into the international plan for the fight against criminality by strengthening the security at the Eastern border of the European Union'.

Another General Inspector stated:

'The Romanian border is exposed to numerous challenges, particularly illegal migration, smuggling of counterfeit products, drugs and stolen cars traffic. It is essential to respond to these challenges, which are more numerous and complex, by using the same complexity. Using the SCOMAR system, Romania strengthens its reliable partner status in relation to the European Union and the geo-strategic potential is exploited through the safety that it creates at the Eastern border of the European Union by fighting against trans-border crime specific to the Black Sea'.

⁴⁹HR and RPB consider they have 99% cases of job-person fit.

Were external stakeholders affected and if yes, in what way?

Interviewees highlighted the impact of SCOMAR in relation to external stakeholders, some of which have already been discussed. In addition to this, public safety has increased by introducing such a high quality surveillance system. Other police forces that the RBP collaborate with can benefit from more accurate, quick and reliable information with regard to the situation on the blue border. Romania has become a resource for knowledge transfer with other European partners who are considering developing similar surveillance systems. There has been an important impact on society as a whole through research projects the system is involved in and through effective collaboration with the local community and public organisations.

What were the enablers that contributed to the realisation and success of the value-adding activity?

One of the main enablers mentioned by our interviewees for this particular project was the '*international and national context*'. On an international level, with Romania being a part of the EU and having a large external EU border there was and still is great interest in the security levels to ensure the borders remain safe. Moreover, efficiency in the surveillance and control of all borders remains a requirement for complying with the Schengen Catalogue and the Schengen Aquis, and it is therefore central to Romania's efforts to become part of the Schengen Area. On a national level, considering all these facts, SCOMAR was given the status of great importance and both the RBP and a number of Ministries agreed that its implementation was a priority. One interviewee mentioned how the implementation of SCOMAR '*was considered a national interest*'. The interviewee goes on to explain how the management at different administrative levels included it in their strategy. This allowed a common focus, from authorities such as the Ministry of Administration and Interior, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Transportation to ensure a '*common and coordinated effort*', which enabled the efficient implementation of the project. The fact there were no significant problems in terms of *financial resources* meant they could implement the SCOMAR system according to plan with no specific delays or unforeseen costs involved. The interviewees confirmed the implementation of the project was delivered on time.

What were the difficulties and barriers that had to be overcome (or that blocked) the realisation and success of the achievement of the value-adding activity and performance improvement?

The main barriers identified by interviewees were related to the system's location. The coast provides a very difficult geographical environment the RPB had to master. The area is very difficult to access and few utilities such as electricity were in place when the project was implemented. The implementation stage occurred during the winter and the weather posed a series of unexpected problems, with storms, strong winds and floods. These events meant, the construction team had to find creative ways to deal with problems in order to meet deadlines.

During the implementation stage problems were identified that needed to be addressed to ensure the system functioned smoothly. For example, along the coastline sensors had to be installed which was difficult to access but once the equipment was installed the operation of these sensors is carried out remotely. Apart from the adverse environmental conditions, the only other issue interviewees mentioned, as a potential barrier was the newness of everything. From the equipment, this was new in the international market as well as in the police, to the system itself. As a result extra tests were carried out to verify the viability of the equipment and the systems across such a large project and with such adverse environmental conditions.

How is the best practice expected to be developed, transferred to others or change in the future?

There was specific interest mentioned by interviewees to develop international transfer of knowledge and experience by conducting visits to the European 'hot zones' where migration poses a significant problem. Whilst the RBP felt they were prepared on a theoretical level for the current migration situation in Romania, they felt more *training* on specific and more critical migration problems would help so they can prepare for the future as they develop further border control systems.

Maintenance of the system was another issue associated with the development of SCOMAR. Whilst the system is very efficient it is also high maintenance. Currently there are one or two companies in Romania who can service the system but the costs associated are extremely high. To reduce some of the costs

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the RBP have trained a team, who were involved with the implementation, to deal with technical issues and all components of the system. To ensure effective maintenance, the RBP are developing this team to respond quickly to the systems' demands and deal with all types of issues within a tight timeframe. Through the financial instrument External Borders Fund, the Annual Programme 2011, at the end of 2012, maintenance services for SCOMAR system will be contracted.

Finally further development of SCOMAR, involves integrating *future projects* within the system. One of the main projects involves ships operating systems integrating completely within the SCOMAR system with online data and information transfer between the ship and the system. This would ensure real time data exchange and would allow staff in the Command and Control Centre and the Commander of the ship to have complete sight of the ships location. As well as improving information exchange it would also increase the operational area for SCOMAR. Although there are many solutions for this integration to take place, the challenge the RBP face is finding the most cost effective way to do it. It is estimated that within a year an online connection should be in place. Another important project is developing a green energy supply system that could be used to charge the system throughout the coastline. In considering these future projects, interviewees highlighted the subsequent need for new procedures; new personnel training and new knowledge transfer routines.

With regard to the *transfer of good practices*, this is already happening. As already mentioned there is a series of pilot European programmes for testing different surveillance solutions and the RBP have been asked to share their expertise and knowledge of the SCOMAR system. Interviewees expressed their willingness to offer support to countries like Bulgaria, who are currently developing a surveillance system, in the same way as they received support from European colleagues such as Spain when SCOMAR was being implemented. If the strategic goal is to have similar systems throughout Europe, a system that would secure all European blue borders, then the knowledge and information sharing processes will be crucial for effective implementation and management.

Having the knowledge and experience of the SCOMAR system and its functioning, there are a number of important issues the RBP identify as relevant for any partner that starts such a project. Therefore, in an effort to transfer good practices on such a system, they emphasize the following:

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- Training of the employees should start before the end of the implementation stage. An early training programme would allow for better use of these employees and their competencies. It would also generate a more accurate image of the characteristics and competencies of the teams working on the system and the competencies of the employees in general.
- A second Marine Surveillance Vessel (Stefan cel Mare) would be extremely useful, so when one vessel is on international cooperation mission, such as the FRONTEX programme, the other vessel is still available on the national border.
- The existence of a specialised team for equipment maintenance is cost effective and at the same time increases the speed of the operational response in case of an emergency technical issue.
- Collaboration with the local community and local public organisations, including research institutions, can be of great value to ensure a positive impact on society with regard to perceptions of the system and the police.

In conclusion, the police officers interviewed expressed their hope that this project and the collaboration with international partners will give them the opportunity to strengthen their previous partnerships. Their international colleagues were pleasantly surprised to find a reliable and professional partner and the RBP proudly consider themselves '*a different kind of ambassadors*' for Romania and for the Romanian Border Police force.

References

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